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Abstract: 
George Eliot is undoubtedly one of our most intellectual authors. 
A study of her methods of characterisation, of the kinds of choices 
her characters confront, and of the solutions offered for the various 
moral dilemmas discussed in the novels, reveals the basic moral and 
psychological assumptions she shared with her contemporaries. 
Thus, the tensions generated by her attempt to reconcile a belief 
in universal causality with a belief in the possibility of exercising 
the .rill and therefore of being morally responsible require her to 
emphasise the inexorability of the laws of antecedent and consequent 
and at the same time to retain for her characters a slight measure of 
freedOm of choice. 
As nineteenth century psychology gradually freed itself of its 
philosophical origins, it incorporated elements from biology, neuro-
physiology, and sociology. George Eliot's knowledge of association 
psychology is revealed by her use of the theory of psychological de-
terminism which governs the way in which her characters exhibit moral 
ascendancy or decline. Similarly, her emphasis on the "medium" in which 
a character lives relates to the mid-nineteenth century biological and 
sociological stress on environment and the interdependence of an 
organism with its medium. Lastly, the emergent evolutionar,y psyohology 
which held that ancestral tendencies, once established in the nervous 
system, were transmittable from generation to generation, becomes a 
factor in two of her later works. 
George Eliotts concern for the moral development of her readers 
and the enlargement of their sympathies is well documented in her 
letters. Because she believes in the possibilities of individual 
moral growth, the novels are concerned with moral development and 
decline. Characters can be placed along a moral axis according as 
they display or reject such qualities as sympathy, or allegiance to 
the past, or acceptance of duty. Unmistakably throughout all George 
Eliot's moral conflicts and solutions is a hierarchy of absolute 
values. 
To bridge the gap between description and evaluation, however, 
it is necessary to examine more specifically the aesthetic 
implications of George Eliot's framework of belief. Her concept of 
self, the tragic implications of a framework of universal causality 
and irreversible laws, constitute important limitations on the 
manipulation of plot and theme, and on the development of characters 
abd the choD!ces they confront. 
Preface. 
There are only three footnotes in this work. These are designated 
by Roman numerals to distinguish them from the notes which are 
located at the end of the text. 
I should like to thank Dr Gordon Spence for his patient reading 
of my work and his helpfUl oomments, and Professor K. K. Ruthven 
for his advice and encouragement. 
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Introducti on. 
1 
"Lesson on the Brain to Polly. tt Lewes' endearing journal entry for 
14 April, 1870 affirms our belief that George Eliot is one of our most 
intellectual authors. Her familiarity with European literature, her 
competent editing of the Westminster Review, her friendship ~~th so many 
eminent nineteenth centur,y scientists, philosophers, and sociologists, 
all testify to her intellectual appetite and to the extent of her know-
ledge of contemporary developments. An examination of the surface texture 
of her novels reveals a vast array of literary and scientific allusion, 
sometimes in the form of metaphor and sometimes in a more generalised 
authorial comment. These overt references are not the only evidence, how-
ever, of George Eliot's system of beliefs. A study of her methods of 
characterisation, of the sorts of choices she allows her oharaoters to 
confront, and of the solutions she offers for the various moral dilemmas 
disoussed in the novels, reveals the basic moral and psychological 
assumptions she shared with her contemporaries. 
Thus, the tensions generated by her attempt to reconcile a belief in 
lIuniversal causality" 2 with a belief' in the poss,ibility of exercising the 
will and therefore of being morally responsible for one t s actions, regu.i.re 
her to emphasise the inexorability of the laws of antecedent and consequent 
and at the same time to retain for her characters a slight measure of 
freedom of choice. 
As nineteenth century psychology gradually freed itself of its philo-
sophical origins, it incorporated elements from biology, neurophysiology, 
and sociology. In this way it became an experimental science in its ovm 
right. Early nineteenth centur,y psychology Vlas laid on t he foUndation of 
Locke's chapter on the association of ideas. Habitual responses were 
thought to result from the frequency or vividness with which ideas or 
impressio1J,s were presented to the mind. George Eliot makes use of this 
association psychology when she incorporates the theory of psychological 
determinism into her novels. This theory governs her conception of the 
2. 
"my in which a character exhibits moral ascendancy or moral decline. Sim-
ilarly, her emphasis on the "medium't in which a character lives is akin to 
the mid-nineteenth century biological and sociological stress on environment 
and the interdependence of an organism with its medium. Lastly, the 
emergent evolutionary psychology which held that ancestral tendencies, 
once established in the nervous system, "'.'lere transmittable from one gener-
ation to the next becomes a factor in two of her later works, ~ Spanish 
Gypsy and Dan:tel Deronda. 
George Eliot's concern for the moral development of her readers and 
the enlargement of their sympathies is well documented in her letters. 
Nineteenth century agnostics, deprived of the moral sanctions of Christ-
ianity, had to seek elsewhE"'.r~ for H foundation for their ethical beliefs. 
Interpretations of ~ Origin .2! Species tended to be progressivist and 
teleological, especi~lly when the conclusions derived from Darvdn's bio-
logical hypothesis were applied to the field of anthropology. George Eliot 
is less of a facile optimist than some of her oontemporaries, but she still 
preserves a belief in the possibilities of individual moral grmrth. The 
novels are concerned with moral development and moral decline and the 
various ways in which these are achieved. Characters in the novels can be 
placed along a moral axis according as they display or reject such moral 
qualities as sympathy, or allegiance to the past, or acceptance of duty. 
Unmistakably throughout all George Eliot's moral conflicts and solutions 
is a hierarchy of absolute values. 
The intellectual breadth that is thus manifest in George Eliot's 
novels leads Basil Willey to declare that "probably no English writer of 
3. 
the time, and certainly no novelist, more fully epitomizes the cent~; 
her development is a paradigm, her intellectual biography a graph, of its 
most decided trend. It 3 One possible approach, therefore, 1to. J George Eliot t s 
work is to use her articles, letters, and novels as quarries for research 
into nineteenth cent~ ideologies. A related pursuit is the search for 
influences, and the detection of similarities between her thought and 
that of her contemporaries, not in order to suggest a common preoccupation 
with certain topics but in order to establish causal links. Historians of 
ideas can delve into her novels and come up with items labelled ItComteJ' 
or "Feuerbach)' or ''Darwin. tt But conclusions of this ldnd are very difficult 
to prove and therefore always remain tentative. And when vIe are dealing with 
~a mind of the quality of George Eliot's, it is highly probable that 
on certain occasions she herself was the originator of the "influenoe." 
Lewes, for example, acknowledges that he owes to her his recognition of the 
Utopian nature of Comte's work. 4 Later, in ~ Study ~ Psycholoeax (1878), 
he mentions that "one very near and dear" 5 has brought to his 'notice an 
important pasSage from Aristotle's Ethics. Herbert Spencer similarly 
admits a debt to her. 6 In his AutobiOgraphY, he also states clearly 
that "there is not the slightest foundation" for the belief that he had 
much to do with her education: their "friendship did not commence uutil 
1851--a date several years later than the publication of her translation 
of Strauss, and when she was alrea~ distinguished by that breadth of 
culture and universality of pOYiTer which have since made her known to all 
the world." 7 And a further indication of the pervasiveness of her in-
fluence occurs in the notes D~vin's son added to the posthumpus edition 
of ~ Expression ~ ~ Emotions ?::!l ~ ~ Animals. 8 For there he suggests 
that readers who are seeldng confirmation of his father's thesis should 
turn to Ge0rge Eliot's novels. Clearly George Eliot exerted direct influence 
on various seminal writers of the nineteenth century, and we can thus 
assume a strong possibility that she also influenced them indiDectly. 
Besides, when we read such diverse works as F. D. Maurice's The 
Conscience, Lectures .!2!!. Casuistry, (1868) --a copy of which he sent to 
George Eliot whom he greatly admired-- and F. H. Bradley's Ethical 
Studies (1874), we recognise certain similarities. It is more profit-
able in such a case to assume that nineteenth-century thinkers held in 
common a certain set of assumptions and preoccupations (and, as a result, 
shared a common moral disco'U'se) than to try to establish that one author 
influenced another. The basic problem for a philosophical approach to 
George Eliot is that if we concentrate on her ideas we risk ignoring the 
4. 
novels as novels, by disregarding the complex patterning of characterisation 
and plot, and the blend of irony and compassion in her portrayal of 
individual human beings. 
A more profitable critical approach to George Eliot as a novelist can 
be categorised as formalistic. Critics of this persuasion, such as Barbara 
Hardy, Reva Stump, and W. J. Harvey, treat George Eliot's novels as com-
plete, self-contained worlds. Instead of concentrating on the relationship 
between her ideas and nineteenth-century thought in general, they focus 
f, 
almost exclusively on the subtle interplay within the novels. Whereas a 
philosophical analysis of George Eliot may lose sight of the texture of 
her novels, formalist criticism which ignores or discounts the intellectual 
background may be equally distorting. Patricia Beer, for example, extols 
the charaoter of Fedalma in ~ Spanish Gypsy as the one instance in which 
George Eliot allows her heroine to break out of the traditional womanly 
role and take on the leadership of the Zincali. As this is the sole instance 
of such female heroism, Patricia Beer is forced to conclude that George 
Eliot permits such behaviour in a poem whereas she does not countenance 
it in a novel which would roach a wider audience. 9 However, a study of 
the psychological assumptions of the period reveals that in this poem, 
5. 
as in the late novel, Daniel Derouda, George Eliot utilises the evolution-
ary psychologists' belief in the possibility of racial inheritance, and 
assimilates this belief to her moral absolute, duty. In this way, Fedalma 
is constrained to take on the leadership of the Zinc ali by the unmodifiable 
facts of her ancestry; she is not the free spirit envisaged by Patricia 
Beer. 
The two approaches can lead to fund<'3,mentally different conclusions 
about George Eliott s treatment of her chnracters. George Levine, writing 
vathin the framework of his examination of her ideas, and seeing a simil-
arity to the thought of J. S. Mill in her oompromise betvleen the concepts 
of determinism and freedom, maintains that "what is essential is that she 
f'elt she Vlas free to v/ill and responsible for her acts at the same time 
that she believed in universal causality. II 10 On the other hand, Miriam 
Allott, responding to the pervasive melancholy of' the later novels, Vlith 
their sense of frustrated possibilities, limitations, and waste, declares 
that George Eliot must have lit convinced her nerves' of the need to act 
and v~ite as if' human beings were indeed the f'ree agents which she longed 
them to be--free, that is, tc command their lives in aocordance vdth their 
oym I inductions as to what is for their dood and evil. t" 11 Are these two 
writers making, in ef'fect, two quite divergent statements about George 
Eliot or is it just a case of' dif'f'erent critioal perspectives? An historian 
of' ideas, concentrating on the intellectual ~ramework of George Eliot's 
novels will inevitably discover af~inities between her thought as displayed 
in the novels and that of' her contemporaries, Spencer, Lewes or J.' S. Mill. 
12 He will observe the paradox of her "soft determinism," her attempt to 
reconcile irreversible laws with a belief in the possibility of' !twilling 
strongly. It 13 .And in this respect he will be presenting an accurate pict-
ure. But a literary critic who concentrates f'ar more on the af'fective 
tone o~ the novels is likely to reacYI the conclusion that while George 
6. 
Eliot wanted, even needed, to believe in a freely operating will--other-
wise how can man advance to a more morally enlightened state with greater 
emphasis on fellowship and sympathy, and less on a self-seeting "amoral 
individualism"? 14 --nonetheless her prevailing mood is bleak and despond-
ent and her view of human potential is far from prOmising. These views 
are not mutually exclusive but represent honest attempts to respond to 
different levels of George Eliot's presentation of the human dilemma. The 
epigraph she tl),kes from Rasselas, for ohapter 61 of l.1iddlemarch, is approp-
riat~ "I Inconsistencies,' answered Imlac, 'cannot both be right, but im-
\., 
puted to man they may both be true.' II 15 However much a critic may desire 
to take lIa firm footingll like Mr Casaubon so that lithe vast field of mythical 
constructions becomes intelligible, nay luminous vlith the reflected light 
of correspondences,1I 16 this is not possible. U. C. Knoepflmacher laments 
the/'bifocation in George Eliot criticism between those who regard her 
primarily as a representative nineteenth~century intellectual and those 
v/ho consider her first ancl foremost as a novelist. He calls for "a cohesive 
approach" that will combine ttthe methods of the t new criticism t with those 
of the 'history of ideas. tit 17 
My aim is to offer a synthesis of these two methods, to find a satis-
factory bridge between an approach to George Eliot's novels that examines 
her relationship to the background of ideas and an approach which is ex-
clusively formalistic. CloBe attention to the texts of the novels makes it 
possible to isolate and identify certe.in key ideas and constellations of 
ideas which can then be related to the general baclr..e;round of nineteenth 
century thought. In tlus way it is possible to formulate the set of con-
structs by means of which George Eliot came to terms w1.th the external 
world. Onoe we have located these constructs in the novels, we can 
ascertain their effectiveness as determinants of action, as motive forces 
for characterisation and plot. Initially, therefore, I will concentrate on 
" . 
7. 
identifying the set 'of mental constructs which becomes the fre.mework of 
the dif'ferent novels. Thus I vrill discuss George Eliot's thought under 
the general headings of Determinism, Psychological Assumptions, and Moral 
Development. 
But in setting out a description of certain of George Eliot's key 
I 
ideas and assumptions, it is necessary to make clear that I am by no 
means attempting a chronological analysis of the development of her 
thought. Occasionally there will be a temporal progression if only be-
cause one idea superseded another in the nineteenth century. Evolutionary 
psychology, for example, incorporated both the learning theories of the 
association psychologists and the evolutionary hypothesis contained in 
Darvrin's !h!::.. Origin of Species, and George Eliott s acceptance of its 
tenets inevitably reveals a similar progression. And even if I am not 
emphasising chronological development, it is still the case that aQY 
attempt to outline different ideas will suggest a linear progression. Yet 
George Eliot's ideas do not exist in isolation from one another. The 
web imagery which pervades so much of her writing as an analogue fo!' 
the interdependence and complexity of human lives as well as far the 
environmental pressures that restrict them is also appropriate to an 
aIk'1.1ysis of her thought. I would be most unwilling, therefore, to im-
Hate Mr Tulliver and by an indiscriminate tug suggest that her ideas 
were inextricably entwined. 18 It is more a case of one idea entailing 
another. 
In dealing with George Eliot's ideas, therefore, we are attempting 
to unravel "the mingled thread" which is "so curiously tvd.sted together" 19 
so that we can examine it carefully. The linear progression of my analysis 
from an examination of determinism and psychological assumptions to a 
descrip~don of moral grovrth with all its ramifications is not arbitrary. 
I d.eliberately start vrith the intractable and the impersonal--the irrevers-
ible laws--and work towards the yielding, the dynamic and the 'personal 
world of individual moral growth, and ultimately of moral growth that 
8. 
comes about as the result of the influence of one personality on another. 
An analysis of ideas is constantly in danger of becoming too abstract, too 
remote from the actual novels. We are not examining tracts or philosophic 
treatises. It may be exciting to track dovm certain of George Eliot's 
ideas and r.clate them to contemporary thought , but we must not lose sight 
of the fact that the real focus of our attention is the struggling indiv-
idual as his life is unfolded within the world of the novels. The rich 
texture of George Eliot t s thought, the set of mental constructs by which 
she sought to understand the world she lived in and the endless variety 
of human nature, provide a framework for the novels. They constitute a 
mental scaffolding. If we examine the novels in terms of this scaffolding, 
we can recognise where it offers a spaciousness for the character's devel-
opment and where it imposes restriotions on oharacter grmrth and plot. 
Once we have identified George Eliot's basio moral and psychological 
assumptions we can evaluate their effectiveness as determinants of aotion, 
and assess their impact on her control of authorial distance and on the 
possibilities for choice that she offers her charaoters. 
Thus in one area, George Eliot's system of beliefs provides a fruitful 
tension in the novels. In her efforts to depiot both-the '~ard, unacoommod. 
ating Act ual" 20 and t he struggling individual, she has to shift her per-
spective from the one to the other, and reveal the dissonance that exists 
between what the character believes is the case and what really is the case. 
This is the source of much of the irony of the novels so that while, for 
example, we rejoioe at Gwendolen Harleth's defiant energy, we can see the 
pathos of her having wandered into a swamp wearing her satin shoes. 21 
Similarly the scientific and literary allusions create a network of 
references which relate the personal and the individual circumstances to 
9 .. 
a wider, more universal situation. It is only her anxious control of her 
characters and of her readers' response to those characters that we regret. 
A certain measure of freedom is required even in a world dominated by 
"universal causality," 22 if a character is to accept responsibility for 
his actions and achieve moral growth. But if the nature of that moral 
growth is closely circumscribed by a moral absolutism and a hierarchical 
construct then we will find restrictions on the ways in which a character 
is allowed to define himself within his particular community and on the 
sorts of choices open to him. And the rigidity that this entails will be 
partially concealed by the authorial approval meted out to those vlho are 
morally developing. llltimately what this means, is that if we accept ) 
George Eliot's premises, we can see that her conclusions are irrefutable. 
Within her inflexible set of co-ordinates her characters do achieve care-
fully controlled moral growth and do learn to transend their egoistic 
limitations. They are socialised. Freedom, in George Eliot's scheme, is 
"necessity understood," 23 and in our acceptance of her frame of reference 
we are also asked to adhere to this definition. When we understand the 
necessity that presses on her characters, we can also recognise the small 
measure of freedom that they are allowed and the possibility of moral 
growth which this confers. If, however, by an analysis of George Eliot's 
system of beliefs, we are able to step outside her, framework, we can see 
a sad 10s8 of freedom and autonomy. The characters are not encouraged to 
rebel against their circumstances, because a failure to accept the reality 
of the circumstances which oppress them is a sign that they are morally 
lightweight. Ironically, if vIe refuse to accept George Eliot's universe, 
we stand convicted, in her terms, of "moral stupidity, It 24 and range our-
selves on the side of such superlative egoists as Gwendolen Harleth. Yet 
within the terms of her own set of' beliefs, we can see an implicit recog-
nition that moral growth is correlative with freedom. Even allowing f'or 
our twentieth~entur.Y preoccupation with freedom and autonom,y, I still 
maintain that with certain characters, George Eliot suggests a greater 
degree of freedom than she has really provided. Maggie Tulliverts habit 
of self-renunciation incapacitates her and makes it almost impossible 
rCfi:. her to "choose" at all. Dorothea Brooke looks as if she is making a 
dramatic choice in marrying W:ill Ladislaw, but the only alternative she 
is offered is to stagnate at Lmvick. Derondats acceptance of his Jewish-
ness is constantly foreshadowed throughout the novel; he has a curriculum 
vitae. Yet we are asked to commend his "choice." Vie seem to have been 
10. 
offered in these oharacters greater freedom than is actually the case. An 
analysis of George Eliot's fundamental ideology reveals that she holds her 
characters, situations, and indeed her readers in too confining a hand. 
This constitutes an undoubted limitation in the novels. 
~~ first chapters examine her basic ideas. The later chapters offer 
a critical assessment of those ideas. They seek to substantiate my claim 
that George Eliot's incorporation of fundamental nineteenth-centur,y 
assumptions into the texture of her novels constitutes in some areas an 
enriohment and in others a decided limitation. 
Let us now begin our analysis of George Eliotts system of beliefs 
with an examination of how she achieved her compromise between 
"necessitarianism" and the ability "to ivill strongly. tI 25 
11. 
Determinism. 
1 
"Necessi tarianism--I hate the ugly word, II George Eliot wrote in 
1875 to Mrs Ponsonby. This friend was in need of such rallying words as 
she was sho'.ving signs of succumbing to the paralysing effect of fatalism, 
the "lazy fallacy" or the ttargument of sloth, II 2 as William Chase Greene 
calls it. George Eliot next expressed her gratitude that "every fresh 
morning is an opportunity that one can look forward to for exerting one's 
will," and she declared how important it was to reconcile necessitarianism 
"with the prs.ctice of willing strongly, willing to will strongly, and so 
on. lI 3 Any such reconciliation, however, raises the question of how it is 
possible to allow for any measure of free will in a world dominated by 
lIuni versal oausality." 4 In this seotion I intend to relate George Eliot f s 
ideas to the general background of nineteenth century thought. and show 
\ jus.t"h~w she achiev:~ such a reconciliation. 
~/ , 
George Eliot's acceptance of the principles of necessitarianism appears 
as early as 1851 with her review of R. VI. Mackayt s ~ Progress of ~ 
Intellect for the Westminster Review. There she writes of lithe recognition 
of the presence of undeviating law in the material and moral world--of that 
invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of physical 
science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social organisation, 
our ethics and our religion." Her argument concludes with the categorical 
statement that "it is this invariability of sequence which can alone give 
value to experience and r~nder education in the true sense possible. 1I 5 
She might not have gone sO far as to share James lviill t s optimistio claim 
that, given the time, he could "w:rite a book vlhich would make the human 
6 
mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to st Paul t Sll --she had too 
12. 
realistic an appreciation of the immensity of the task to do that--but she 
would have conourred "lith the underlying sentiment. She expressed herself 
in agreement, for example, "lith the IIfundamental doctrine" of Charles 
Bray's book, ~ Philosophy .2!. Necessity (1841), that "the mind presents 
itself under the same condition of invariableness of antecedent and con-
soquentas all other phenomena, 'I but qualified this with the rider that 
mental phenomena are "proportionately difficult to discover as [}hey ar!J ~ 
more complex." 7 But she and Lewes were in the vanguard of nineteenth-
century thought in their acceptance that the mind was subject to the 
determining laws that obtained for the physical organism. Other thinkers 
were more cautious. Nineteenth-eentury thinkers who were concerned with 
the nature of the mind fall into two catEt8ories. The first were philo-
sophers, castigated by Francis Gall for working "in a closet." 8 In this 
group belong Auguste Comte, the Mills, and Herbert Spencer. The other 
group consists of scientists actively engaged in neurophysiological 
experimentation and researoh. Lev.es is interesting because he initially 
belonged to the first category but he was mortified by Huxley's description 
of him as a mere ''book scientist" 9 and became increasingly cccupied 
with genuine research. 
Most nineteenth-century thinkers, philosophers or scientists, were 
bedevilled by the basic assumption that the mind v~s somehow a separate 
entity, or even, as Lewes scathingly puts it, an "abstraction. 1t 10 Even 
a brief survey of the development of nineteenth-century neurophysiology 
reveals that as physical researoh into the function of the brain became 
more detailed and acourate, the scientists had to struggle against their 
wish to deny the evidence that the cerebral cortex was involved in the 
sensory-motor functions of the body. G. H. Lewes stands out in this 
connection for his unflagging missionary zeal to persuade his readers 
to accept the mind as a "function of the organism." 11 In his 1845 
13. 
review of the IIlr~jor work of the French scientist, Francis Gall, ~ ~ 
fonctions ~ cerveau, ~ ~ ~~ de chacune ~.~ I'arties (1822-25), 
Lewes acclaims Gall's "vision of Psychology as a branch of Biology" 12 and 
credits Gall with rescuing lithe problem of mental funotions from 
Metaphysics. II 13 However the battle was not to be won so easily. In 1878 
in ~ Study of Psycholo&.¥, Lewes is still having to refute the enduring 
notion of the Will as an entity separate from the ordinary functioning 
of the body and is criticising what he calls the ftspeculative mistake lt 
of personifying the lIabstraction Will as something apart from the total 
14 
of volitional impulses, and, therefore, removed from their conditions." 
lIA metaphysical abstraction," as he points out, "has no physical deter-
15 
minates II and is not "admitted vdthin the rigorous limits of determinism. II 
It is of course the phrase "rigorous limits of determinism" that is 
the stumbling block, because it was believed that to give up the notion 
of the Hind (or Will) as a separate entity and subsume its functions 
under the general laws for the functions of the body, VlaS to question the 
whole basis of morality and the freedom of the will. Vie have seen that 
George Eliot, far from denying the implications of such a deterministic 
account of the mind, welcomec. it, seeing in the "invariability of 
sequence tl that "which can alone give value to experience and render 
education in the true sense possible." 16 Implicit in these statements 
about the functiOning of the mind are not only assumptions about the 
body/mind problem but also assumptions about causality. In ~ Stu<& .£!. 
Psycholo&l, Lewes remarks that "because the Will is thus the abstract 
expression of the product of Experience, it is eduoable, and beoomes 
amenable to the Moral Law." 17 We are in no doubt that George Eliot 
conourred with this belief that the "Will is educable"; a brief examin-
ation of an episode in Daniel Deronda bears this out. 
Gwendolen fears that she will be overvlhelmed by her hatred of 
Grandcourt. Deronda. refrains from uselessly suggesting to her that she 
should feel .differently, but instead indicates to her a meditation tech-
nique. She can use her fear to intensify her self-awareness and provide 
a mea~s oj self-restraint •. ~ofldii·aamOlrl::she'S··Gwendolen in thesELwords: 
Vum your fear into a safeguard. Keep your dread fixed on the r""--
idea of increasing that remorse which is so bitter to you. Fixed 
meditation may do a great deal towards defining our longing or 
dread. We are not always in a state of strong emotion, 8,nd when 
we are calm we can use our memories and gradually change the bias 
of our fear, as we do our tastes. Take your fear as a safeguard. 
It is like quickness of hearing. It may make consequences passion':" 
ately present to you. Try to take hold of YO~8ensibility, and 
use it as if it were a faculty, like vision. . 
This passage shows very clearly that George Eliot had no doubts that the 
will WaS educable, and her analogy with the organs of sense--"quickness 
of hearing," "faculty of vision"--indicates that she accepts that the 
mind is "inside" the physical organism, and therefore is 3ubject to the 
same laws~ Far from rejecting; therefore, as the behaViourist~ categar~ 
ioally ao; the "oausal 'efficacy'! 19 of the feeling of self':aWarenes~, 
Geo:rg~ Eliot has Deronda attempt to proVid~ a "felt purpose'; ~ by offer~ 
ini some motivating force to stiff~ti Gwendolents Will. The only thing 
that is in question is whether Gwendolen has sufficient strength of will 
to carry out Deronda t s proposed programtne~ 
If the laws of causality operate universally it is difficult to 
imagine a P~/looPhole through which a person can choose to exert his 
will. Such a loophole, however, is found in the distinction that was 
drawn between laws which could not be altered and laws which could be 
adapted for the purpose of instituting desired changes. In his discussion 
of the age-old problem of free will and determinism, Donald Mackay points 
out that the vexing question for moralists is not whether they are free 
21 to choose but whether they are free to change. And it is this aspect 
of the determinism dilemma that most occupies George Eliot .. This is the 
importance of her advice to Mrs Ponsonby. It is anticipa.ted earlier in a. 
brief note at the end of a letter to Bessie Parkes where she promises 
to reform "in spite of a firm belief in neoessity." 22 If change is to 
be engineered, we need to know about the laws in order that we may work 
them to our advantage. Some laws are immutable but others can be used to 
further progress. In 1878, George Eliot wrote to Charles Ritter that 
"the great division of·· our lot is that between what is immodifiable 
and is the object of resignation and that which is modifiable by hope-
ful activity-- by new conceptions and new deeds." 23 We are confronting 
here a common solution adopted by necessitarian moralists. In their 
desire to control and manipulate in order to make an ideal world, Basil 
Willey sees a way of reintroducing "free will by imputing to us the 
power of originating Gh~ arrangement" 21+ of circumstances to produce 
required results. Thus we have Comte's triumphant claim that "it remains 
in a man's power to soften and shorten crises, as soon as he grasps 
15. 
their reasons and foresees the issue." 25 In this way, the nineteenth-
century belief in "invariability of' sequence" 26 was not seen" as betoken-
ing a closed system with only one possible future and with our freedom 
consisting merely in the fact that we cannot know for certain what that 
future will be. Rather it was seen as off'ering the liberating possibility 
of instituting necessary changes in education, government, social organ-
isation and so on. George Eliot's rejection of the "ugly word, 
Necessitarianism" 27 indicates that like other nineteenth century thinkers 
she had no brief for the notion that the tie of antecedent over consequent 
implied "irresistibleness. II 28 She would have agreed with A. J. AyeI' that 
. it was a "superstition" to believe that "causes and eff'ects are somehow 
joined together like members of a chain gang. II 29 To her, as to Lewes, 
Comte, Spencer, J. S. Mill and others, the relationship of' cause to eff'ect 
meant "uniformity of' sequence." 30 Lewes, for example, i".rrites that lithe 
fact that events arrive irresistibly whenever their conditions are present, 
16. 
is coni'used with the conception that the events must arrive whether the 
conditions be present or not, being fatally predetermined. II He dist-
inguishes between necessity and fatalism in these terms. tlNecessity 
simply says that whatever is is, and will vary with varying conditions. 
Fatalism says that something must ~; and this something cannot be mod-
ified by any modification of the conditions. II 31 In !. System . ..:?! Logic, 
J •. S. Mill writes in similar terms that what "revolts our feelings" is 
"humiliating to our pride" and "paralysing to our desire of excellence" 
is lithe feeling of some intimate connexion, of some peculiar tie, or 
mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent. 1I 32 
He provides an answer to the problem of necessitarianism in terms very 
similar to George Eliott s instruction to "will to will strongly" ~;::-:_, 
.- ,,/ ~ 
.J 
1<h'( ~" 
when he maintains that "we are exactly as capable of' making our own 
character, if !2. will, as others are of making it for us." 34 This is the 
compr~ by which both thinkers escape from the closed system of "hard 
~ 
determinism;' which is how William James defines such "harsh words" as 
"fatality, necessity, and even predetermination; and embrace "sof't deter-
minism" of which the "real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity 
understood." 35 Far from dismissing this solution as a "quagmire of 
evasion, " 36 as James does, George Eliot maintains that our freedom, our 
power of making desired moral improvement rests ~n just this necessar,y 
understanding. Freedom is an adjustment to lawf'ulness, not a state of' 
anarchy. The "immodifiable" laws concern the "hard non-moral outward 
conditions"; 37 the laws which can be modified, however slowly, concern 
moral issues and are man-made. Many of these are indeed inadequate and 
in need of adjustment but the process of change must be gradual. Almost 
at the end of her life George Eliot wrote to Elma stuart that "the reason 
why societies change slowly is, because individual men and women cannot 
have their natures changed by doctrine and can only be wrought on by 
little and little." 38 Any suggestion that freedom means an overthrovdng 
of existing laws and an entry into a state of unregulated impulse is 
soundly scotched, for example, in the following rebuke offered to the 
youthful enthusiasm of Felix Holt by the Dissenting minister, Mr Lyon. 
He provides a musical analogy which refers indirectly to the harmony of 
the spheres and suggests that conflict and discord are inevitable while 
mankind is in its present state of imperfection. His reference to a 
"higher rule" is especially pertinent to my later discussion of George 
Eliot's moral thought. 
wrou yourself are a lover of freedom, and a bold rebel against 
usurping authority. But the right to rebellion is the right to 
seek a higher rule. and !!ot to wander in mere lawlessness. Where-
fore, I beseech you, seem not to sa:,' that liberty is licence. And 
I apprehend .lfthat there is a law in music, disobedience where-
unto would bring us in our singing to the level of shrieking 
maniacs or howling beasts: so that herein we are well instructed 
how true liberty can be naught but the transfer of obedience from 
the will of one or of a few men to that will which is the norm 
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or rule for all men. And though the transfer may sometimes be but 
an erroneous direction of search, yet is the search good and nec-
essary to the ultimate finding. And even as in music, where all 
obey and concur to one end ••• so will it be in that cro.ming time 
of the milennial reign, when our daily prayer 'will be fulfilled, 
and one law shall be 'written on all hearts, and be the ve~ struct-
ure of all thought, and be the principle of all action. 1I 
Mr Lyon shies away from the notion of unfettered liberty, which he 
sees as anarchy. The musical analogy of the "singingll of "shrieking maniacs" 
or "howling beasts" reveals his anxiety. Obedience to the laws thus con-
stitutes freedom; it does not impose a sense of restraint. Lewes expresses 
a similar sentiment when he claims that "in organic, as in social life, 
the indispensable condition of perfect action is the co-operation of in-
Qependent e.gents--the Freedom which is subordinated to Law, and the Lavi 
which secures Freedom." 40 In this vray the rules of antecedent and con-
sequent by v:hich a character t s future actions ore determined by his past 
actions are seen to constitute a kind of logical entailment and the very 
existence of a socia.l setting which modifies and is modified by each in-
di vidual becomes the all-embracing structure, the "form" within which 
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that individual defines himself. ,<'.'e are paradoxically more free if we 
i \, 
choose to accept the "immodifiable It laws than if YIe disregard their in-
evitability. 
Another explanation of how freedom is possible at all vd .. thin a strict 
notation is offered by Lewes in his section on liThe Freedom of the Vlill tI 
in The, Study 2! Psychology (1878) ,where he writes that tithe vessel 
which is swept onwards by the waves does not determine the individual 
movement of the sailors. Each sailor knows that he moves with the vessel, 
but knows also that he is free to move to and fro on the deck. tI 41 He is 
saying that the ship has to obey cirtain laws of wind and tide; in add-
ition there are the structural limitations of its size and how it is 
built. At the same time, the sailor on board this ship has a certain 
nervous system which determines his muscle p071er and co-ordination, and 
a cerlain psychological constitution vlhich determines whether he feels 
courageous or timid, active or indolent. All these factors or "conditions" 
have to be taken into account in a discussion of the sailor's'''choice lt of 
walking about the deck. 
Lewes is describine; here the interlocking systems which make up the 
physical universe, all of which obey their ovm laws and functions but 
which still, as he maintains,allow some measure of independence. "The 
organism," as he says, "is a part of Nature, and is swept along in the 
great current of natural forces. But the organism is also a system of 
forces, and this system has within itself the conditions of its special 
actions; just as our world is a part of Nature, yet, being a system, its 
movements are in some sense independent of the solar system." 42 
If a human being is one such "system of forces" and human society is 
" , 
another and both are subject to their restraininB and limiting "cor1ditions, n 
this provides tw'O or more sets of interlockinB conditions. The great com-
plexity that this implies, not only makes accurate predictions difficult 
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but also allows for a degree of flexibility and creativity. This does not 
mean that such flexibility or such crea.tivity is uncaused, that it lies 
outside the universally operating succession of antecedent and consequent. 
It just means that any concatenation of antecedents may lead to new and 
unexpected consequents, although if we but knew enough we could trace 
the process quite systematically. Future events, therefore, are often un-
predictable, not because they are arbitrary but because we are ignorant of 
all the factors involved. Accordingly the outcome of Maggie Tulliver's 
struggle against her increasing attraction for Stephen Guest cannot be 
deduced by us from our '~owledge of l!:@ characteristics. II George 
Eliot warns us that although we "have known Maggie a long while, II we 
need to be told, "not her characteristics, but her history, which is a 
thing hardly to be predicted even from the completest knowledge of such 
characteristics. II 43 Complexity confers uncertainty and unpredictability .. 
Recognising this, Lewes maintains that there are "two classes of effects 
markedly distinguishable as Resultants and Emergents. II 44 His theory of 
Emergents constitutes his most important and original contribution to the 
history of science. With Resultants the process is clear, "every resultant 
is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous 
and commensurable. It is otherwise," however, "with emergents, when, in-
stead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one 
kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of 
things of unlike kinds. II 45 Thus he concludes that 
although each effect is the resultant of its components, the pro-
duct of its factors, we cannot always trace the steps of the pro-
cess, SO as to see in the product the mode of operation of each 
factor. In this latter case, I propose to call the effect an 
emergent. It arises out of the combined agenCi~46but. in a form 
which does not display the agents in action ••• I.,._:~>fl~re all 
effects simply resultants, in the sense here specified, our de-
ducti ve power would be almost absolute; a mathematical 'express-
ion would include all phenomena. It is precisely because effects 
are mostly emergents that Deduction is insecure, and Expe:riepce is 
requisite to confirm even the most plausible deductions. 4;]'~' 
The intricacies of human nature, the fact, for instance, as George 
Eliot tells us, that "our speech even when we are most single-minded 
can never ta.ke its line absolutely from one impulse," 48 and the com-
plex inter-relationships within society are neither "homogeneCAls" nor 
"commensurable." Thus they produce emergent effects. There is always 
likely to be some undetectable factor which complicates our under-
standing of the p:rocessof interaction, or leaves us in doubt as to i:ts 
result. In a similar vein, Francois Jacob, describing the increasing 
..!> 
sophistication of response in living organisms, ,~ites that 
Together with the capacity of response to stimi1i, the degrees 
of freedom left to the organism in the choice of responses also 
increase. In man, the number of possible responses becomes so 
high that one can speak of the "free will" so dear to philO-
sophers. But flexibility has its limits. Even when the pro-
gramme gives the organism only an ability, that of learning, for 
instance, it imposes restrictions on what can be learnt, on when 
learning is to take place and under what conditions •••• man must 
still be in a favourable environment at a certain stage of his 
development in order to fulfil this potential. 49 
As Jacob indicates, in biological terms, unlimited freedom is an i11us-
20. 
ion. Greater sophistication of response does not confer freedom. We still 
have to obey certain laws which prescribe how, when, and where development 
can take place. He also reveals that there is a precariousness, that there 
are manifold ways in which environment may not be favourable and deve10p-
ment, as a result, may be inhibited or stunted. 
George Eliot gives a striking instance of this precariousness in 
Romolawhe:re we learn that the heroine's potential for growth was lying 
dormant until she came under the charismatic spell of Savonarola's person-
a1ity. "Romola had had contact with no mind that could stir the larger 
possibilities of her nature; they lay folded and crushed like embryonic 
wings, making no element in her consciousness beyond an occasional vague 
uneasiness p " 50 The possibility far spiritual growth was there but it had 
to wait foX' the right "conditions." 
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~[,his description of' a··· reedom (howc'yer slight) possible'::i thin 
a framework of universal causalityrevfOcl.s the ninetcenth- century shift 
from a mechanistic to an organicist analogue. ,. v:hen the 8Yents 
of the ·I'lorld were seen to resemble the "rorking of a ';ell-regulate.:'. rnachine, 
there was no room for flex:'~bility or the creative ac<;iclent. Now,o';lever, 
Lewes can contrast the"spontaneity" of. orgar..isms wi-:;h the 51 
of machines. can further··comrrient that IIno machinE' l ed.ucable .. All 
its actions may be predicted. What it deo!; todc'1Y, :Lt::ill do tomar-roIY, 
and without variation in the way of it." 52 Eliot oa:, ask 
to be regarded not as a "machine always grinding out the same r.tk'lterial 
or spinning the same sort of web \I but to be granted;:r~ed.om to ";"ite 
out r::E,~ own varying unfolding self. II 53 
','fe have learnt that George Eliot· s reconcilir,.·.·ion of freedom end 
necessity VIas two-fold. Freedom is "necessity unCLel~S;:·ood" 54· but "'t is 
also uncertainty and unpredictability .. ';'':.i1.8 laws nay:. cease to opc'rateo 
By accepting their inevitability we dO':1.ot fritter 
" 
\'[e can even learnJ to d.irect and use certain laws about 
change. At the same time, ~he sheer 
given situation produces a slight area on'ly in 
°che uncertainty it confers as to r esult ~ The 10.',1;;:. a 
the embryological images suggest a and chang;:; .. Free .... 
dom is po~~ible only with::'::l these stric.:.::ly 
VIe have ::raced .. ,c:·t 
c6conciled nfces anCi fre e will. 'I'll: 
sorne 
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Let us now examine the novels to see whether George Eliot is able to c.on-
vert her reconciliation·· of· freedom and necessity into a satisfactory 
framework within which she can work out the possibilities of grovrth or 
decline in individual characters. 
The philosophic problem of conciliation leads in the novels to a 
technical problem of point of view. To present convincingly a world of 
causal necessity and constraint, a different perspective, even perhaps 
a different language is required from that which is suitable for an 
analysis and description of the inwardness of a character, his mt>tivation, 
his struggles and his triumphs. If a purely extraspective viewpoint is 
adopted there is no difference discernible in the process by which a 
raindrop gets to the ocean and a m~~ gets to the office. 56 ~. 
~~l:::l.-t--pt1rPo:;e-. It is only vrhen we take the man's motivation, 
his mental processes into account that the two activities of the man 
and the raindrop are not similar. But shif'ting perspective to allow 
for a man's own account of his behaviour, allowing the validity of an 
intropseotive viewpoint, may be merely to introduce what Herbert 
Spencer calls our "subjective illusion" 57 of free will. '''Sir,' said 
Johnson, in his characteristic way, 'we know the will is free, and 
there's an end of the matter.' II 58 But unfortunately it is only the 
beginning. 
The twentieth century behavioural psychologist, B. F. Skinner, 
comments that "it requires a special verbal environment to impose con-
sciousness on behaviour by inducing a person to respond to his ovm 
body while he is behaving. If consciousness seems to have a causal 
effect, it is the effect of' the special environment which induces .self'-
observation." 59 George Eliot would not have accepted Skinner's state-
ment. She accepted the Itcausal efficacyfl 60 of the desire to change--
Alexander Bain calls it "Rhetorical efficiency." 61 The episode I have 
already mentioned from Daniel Deron~ where Deronda suggests to Gwen-
dolen that .only by constant watchfulness can she protect herself from 
committing a rash and irrevocable v~ong towards Grandcourt)clearly re-
veals that George Eliot sees such self-awareness as one of the strongest 
factors in a character's regeneration. 
We need be in no doubt as to George Eliot's recognition of this two-
fold world, of the poignancy of the shifting perspective between the re-
ality of the causal universe and a character's ovm representation of his 
place in this universe. She wrote to John Chapman (July, 1852) of her 
certainty that lithe thought which is to mould the Future has for its 
root a belief in necessity, that a nobler presentation of humanity has 
yet to be given in resignation to individual nothingness." 62 Some 
twenty years later she wrote to ldrs Ponsonby, whose struggles vdth fat-
alism I have alrea~ mentioned. 
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As to the necessary combinations through which life is manifested, 
and which seem to present themselves to you as a hideous fatalism, 
vmich ought logically to petrify your volition--have they, ~ fact, 
any such influence on your ordinary course of action in the primary 
affairs of your existence as a human, sociaJ., domestic creature? 
And if they don't hinder you from taking measures for a bath ••• 
why should they hinder you from a line of resolVe in a higher strain 
of duty to your ideal, both for yourself and others? But the con-
sideration of molecular physics ms no+. the direct ground of human 
love and moral action, any more than it is the direct means of com-
posing a no~le picture or of enjoying great music. One might as 
well hope to dissect one's ovm body and be merry in doing it, as 
take molecular physics (in vrhich you must banish from your field 
of view what is specifically human) to be your dominant guide, 
your determiner of motives, in what is solely human. That every 
study has its bearing on every other is true; but pain and relief, 
love and sorrow, have their peculiar h±,,,,t ory which make an exper-
ience and knowledge over and above the swing of atoms. 63 
One more quotation, this time from Middlemarch, shofTs George Eliot's 
explicit awareness of the double perspective I have been describing. 
Discussing Bulstrode's anguished attempts to explain his ovm situation 
and actions in suitably religious terminology, (what she calls "doctrinal 
references to superhuman ends II 64) I George Eliot informs us that "even 
while we are talking and meditating about the earth's orbit and the solar 
system, what we feel and adjust our movements to is the stable earth and 
the changing day." 65 
In the novels we have two narrative vie-ws, the analytic and the sym-
pathetic. Felicia, Bonaparte comments that the treatment of Hetty Sorrel. 
in ~ ~ provides the "paradigm pattern which Eliot follows through 
all her subsequent novels."~he adds that "against the voice of the 
analytic narrator who traces the inevitable evolution from oause to 
effect, the sympathetic narrator calls for that human evaluation of the 
t ; 67 
events which renders Hetty s fate an object of compassion .. " In the 
tension between these two narrative views lies much of the irony of the 
novels. We are asked to recognise both the intransigence of the world 
confronting the characters, the "hard unaccommodating Actual which has 
never consulted our taste and is entirely unselect," 68 and at the same 
time to feel compassion and fellovlship for those characters who fail to 
see clearly, who do not take fully into account the weight of circum-
stances. 
Later, I will deal more fully with the implications of this two-
fold narrative view, with its interlocking of two planes of reality, 
the subjective and the objective. vVhat, for example, does it mean in 
24. 
terms of the presentation of a character like Mr Casaubon in Middiemarch? 
George Eliot shifts her perspective to show him· to us in the distorting 
mirror of his neighbours' sensibilities; we also see how he appears in 
his own eyes and then are given an authorial overview. 
This "binocular vision" 69 that she maintained in the novels, while 
it is technically a projection of the philosophic conntmdrum of necess-
ity and free vdll, also provides a means of focussing on her belief that 
the fate of any character is not dependent on either circumstanceB or 
temperament, but on an interaction between the two which it may well 
be too difficult to predict with any accuracy. As she tells us about 
Lydgate, 
He was at a starting-point which makes a man's career a fine sub-
ject for betting, if there were any gentlemen given to that amuse-
ment who could appreciate the complicated probabilities of an 
arduous purpose, with all the possible thVlartings and furtherings 
of circumstance, all the niceties of invlard balance, by which a 
man swims and makes his point or else is carried headlong. 70 
25. 
The emphasis is given equally to circumstances and to inward balance, and 
George Eliot continues with the remark that "character too is a process 
and an unfolding. II 71 We can recognise here Lewes' "emergents" as well 
as a quite explicit organicism. Lydgate is not a mechanical creature, 
wound up like a clock to perform predictably and inevitably; he is 
rather an embryo which mayor may not develop satisfactorily. There is 
no escaping the philosophic paradox of George Eliotts beliefs, the para-
dox that Itman is in subjection to the external world, though he also to 
a certain extent controls it. II 72 
It is this paradox that underlies her stringent comment that "if we 
had been greater, ciroumstance would have been less strong against us." 73 
She thus sets herself the challenge of revealing convincingly to her 
readers both the strength of those circumstances, the provincial t ovm 
of Middlemarch which "counted on swallowing Lydgate and assimilating 
him very comfortably, II 74 the unrelenting "life who "mastered" 75 him, 
as well as those features of his o',m nature which diminished his resist-
ance to those very circumstances. And she has to do this vrl.thout our 
feeling that the dice are 'weighted unbearably against Lydgate from the 
very start. It is the Aristotelian problem of what kind of man will 
arouse our pity and terror. His humanity needs to be close enough to 
ours that we do not reject him as a monster of depravity and yet he 
must seem to maintain control over his own situation so that we feel 
he could have done otherwise if he had chosen differently, or in this 
case, if he had been "greater." George Eliot shows us quite clearly 
Lydgate t s hamartia, his fatal flaw or error of judgement,) in his. 
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"spots of commonness. It 76 So that ·although "about his ordinary bearing 
there was a certain fling, a fearless expectation of success, a confid-
ence in his ovm powers and integrity much fortified by contempt for petty 
obstacles or seductions of which he had had no experience,1t 77 he came in 
the end to be counted among those who are "shapen after the average and 
fit to be packed by the gross. II 78 
At this point, we confront a difficuUy that W. J. Harvey expressly 
warns us about, a difficulty of not confusing the "artistic inevitability 
of 8. novel "lith determinism as a philosophy_ /I 79 UIn so far as a novel 
is successfully created," he maintains, "it will seem to have an inevit-
able tightness and finality; given these characters and this situation 
the outcome will have a logic and justness we cannot but accept. But this 
is a by-product of artistic success; it has nothing to do with naturalism 
as a literary kind nor with determinism as a world view." 80 
How then do Vie decide that a character such as Lydgate is not con-
strained, not compelled by forces outside his potential control but has 
some freedom to choose, is permitted some measure of autonomy? Within 
the narrow loophole of freedom, which, I have indicated, is all that 
George Eliot allows, there is not an indefinite range of possibilities, 
not an open-ended future. We do not find in her novels the random, the 
arbitrary, the totally unexpected, nor do we find a character making 
dramatic and drastic changes in his behaviour and attitudes. 
However, if Lydgate were not free to choose, if he were constrained 
or compelled, there would be no suggestion that he was responsible, acc-
ountable for his actions; we vlould have the impression that he was travel-
. ling along a rigidly defined path and that at no point was there the re-
motest possibility of divergence. We would have no sense of crisis, of 
suspense; there would be no accompanying "penumbra of unrealized poss-
ibilities," 81 no suggestion of what might have happened "if only ••• " 
And this is definitely not the case. We do feel that if Lydgate could 
~nly have exerted himself a little here, had only controlled hisimpet-
uous and impatient tongue there, and had struggled to find a vocabulary 
to describe his and Rosamond's behaviour that would have been intellig-
ible and acceptable to them both, things would have been different. This 
accords very much with Lewes' description of the factors involved in any 
decision, when he says that "inpsychological·language, the resultant is 
the chosen motive, and is conditioned by three determinants,--1)fhe 
nature of the stimulus; 2) The momentary state of the mind; 3) The in-
82 dividuality of the person. II This suggests that a slight alteration of 
potency in one or other of the factors will create a different combin-
ation and that it is this which provides the possibility of a small de-
gree of freedom, the loophole both George Eliot and Lewes allow for ex-
ercising the will. This does not suggest that the character will act in-
consistently; his behaviour will still be seen to accord with the rules 
governing his part~cular organism. George Eliot frequently refers to 
the "bias" of a personts nature. In the following quotation from 
Middlemarch Mr Casaubon has just been told the serious nature of his 
illness and George Eliot stresses that even her~ at the moment of fac-
ing death/he does not behave in a way that is inconsistent with his 
''bias. tI "When the conunonplace, 'We must all die l 'j:;ransforms itself sud-
denly into the acute consciousness 'I must die--and soon,' then death 
grapples us, and his fingers are cruel •••• In such an hour the mind 
does not change its lifelong bias, but carries it onward in imagination 
to the other side of death, gazing backward--perhaps with the divine calm 
of beneficence, perhaps with the petty anxieties of self-assertion." 83 
But George Eliot is careful to distinguish between those characters 
who, like Tom Tulliver, are "inexorable, unbending, unmodifiable" 84 and 
those she shows as having the possibility of growth and change. In her 
discussion of Lydgate in chapter 15 of Middlemarch she comments, 00 I 
have already mentioned, that'lcharacter too is a process and an unfold-
ing." 85 The word "unfolding" is especially interesting because of its 
embryological connotation and its suggestion that a man's growth will 
be defined by an embryological blueprint. We are reminded of 1.Jr Irwine's 
remark to Arthur Donnithorne in Adam Bede that "a man can never do any-
thing at variance with his own nature." 86. The following epigraph from 
chapter 41 of Felix ~ expresses the same idea. 
for the soul can grow, 
As embryos, that live and move but blindly, 
Burst from the dark, emerge regenerate, 87 
And lead a life of vision and of choice. 
Growth is therefore seen to be possible but within set limits, just as 
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freedom is limited and restrioted. Character is seen to unfold and develop 
but it is still consistent with its own nature. We will find, therefore, 
that in our ana~sis of a particular character we need to concentrate 
our attention on the small "aetermining" actions that precede the major 
act of choice. Iris Murdoch states that "the exercise of our freedom is 
a small pieceTtleal business which goes on all the time and not a grand-
iose leaping about unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, in 
this view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is 
switched off between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. 1I 88 In 
Middlemarch, on this assumption, it is more rewarding to consider not 
just the fact that Lydgate votes for Tyke, thus cementing his relation-
ship with Bulstrode in the eyes of the Middlemarchers who do not find 
Busltrode's piety endearing. We need also to consider the minute ad-
justments of expediency and self-interest with the .Voider recognition 
of social factors, what George Eliot calls "niceties of inward bal-
ance," 89 f"or it is in these preliminaries to action that we learn 
most about character. W. J. Harvey regards the exercise of the will 
as one of the "constitutive" categories by means of which we come to 
know a character. He mentions two factors which he feels are important 
to this category: the range of choices offered and the sort of chooser 
the character is shown to be. 90 
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I am maintaining, then, that we learn more about what sort of chooser 
Lydgate iSI by examining his state of mind prior to his voting for Tyke.;] than 
we do by just registering the fact that he does vate far Tyke and that it 
ha~ certain consequences. 
Lydgate, a newcomer to 1uddlemarch, is dependent on the patronage of 
Bulstrode if he is to have a free rein to carry out the researches which 
he sees as so important to the advancement of medical science. He reluct-
antly recognises a parallel between his situation and that of a govern-
ment member who has to toe the party line and propitiate the Itinister if 
he is to have a place in the Cabinet. He feels an extreme dislike for 
"the hampering threadlike pressure of small social conditions, and their 
frustrating complexity." 91 His first encounter with such complexity 
occurs when he has to decide whether to vote for Bulstrode's candidate, 
Tyke, or for Farebrother for whom Lydgate feels a genuine friendship. 
However, Farebrother has the regrettable habit of playing at whist for 
money and Lydgate's young arrogance prevents him from sympathising with 
the financial pressures that might induce even a man of the cloth to 
gamble in this way_ Farebrother, further, has generously indicated that 
he will bear no grudge against Lyclgate if he should choose to vote far 
Tyke. This is the first testing-ground that George Eliot devises in 
which to try Lydgate's mettle. 
The first thing we learn about LydgD.te as a chooser is that llwith-
out telling himself the reason, he deferred the predetermination on 
which side he should give his vote." 92 Far from sitting dovm to delib-
erate over the issue, he allows hinself to consider it each morning 
while he is shaving, which is hardly giving the matter his full attention. 
"It would really have been a matter of total indifference to him--that 
is to say, he would have taken the more convenient side, and given his 
vote for the appointment of Tyke without any hesitation--if he had not 
cared personally for Mr Farebrother. 1I 93 We see that he clearly recog-
nises here no degree of social responsibility, unlike Dorothea, who, in 
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a later episode of the book, when she has the living of Lowick to bestow, 
takes her responsibility very seriously. However the "hampering thread-
like pressure" 94 disturbs him, but only to the point of his hoping that 
some other factor will intervene which will prevent him from having to 
compromise himself. Accordingly, 
when he set out for the hospital, his hope was really in the 
chance that discussion might somehow give a new aspect to the 
question, and make the scale dip so as to exclude the neoessity 
for voting. I think he trusted a little also to the energy which 
is begotten by circumstances--some feeling rushing warmly and 
making resolve easy, while debate in cold blood had only made it 
more difficult. However it was, he did not distinctly say to 
himself on which side he would vote; and all the while he was 
invmrdly resenting the subjection which had been forced upon 
him. It would have seemed beforehand like a ridiculous piece of 
bad logic that he, with his unmixed resolutions of independence 
and his seleot purposes, would find himself at the very outset 
in the grasp of petty alternatives, eaoh of which was repugnant 
to him. In his student's ch~mbers, he had prearranged his sooial 
action quite differently." ~5 
This long passage is worth quoting in full beoause it reveals so olearly 
those aspeots of Lydgate's nature which oontribute to his dovmfall: his 
fastidious recoil from politioal realities and a certain assumption of 
superiority, of arroganoe towards his neighbours and their oonoerns; a 
deferring of deoisions and a reliance on impulse or spontaneous action. 
All these add up to a laok of knowledge, both of himself and of the 
faotors ranged against him. It is not enough to dismiss Middlemaroh as 
a "petty medium" 96 and hope by so doing to neutralise any impaot it 
Il.l.ay have on him. And his wish that something will come up at the last 
minute that will. save him from compromising himself appears derisory in 
the face of what actually happens. He not only arrives too late to hear 
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or benefit from any prelimin~ debate but is invidiously forced into giv-
/) ing the ~ vote, which he certainly does under:the °influence-'.of -some 
flfeeling rushing warmly and making resolve easy" 97 even if the feeling 
were not quite what he has in mind. Riled by :Mr Wrench's assumption that 
of course Lydgate will vote for Tyke, he acts defiantly, determined to 
show that-such needling suggestions.of partisanship do not t;t'oub];e him, 
and. does indeed vote for Tyke. 
In terms of Harvey's "constitutive category" of freedom, we can see 
that Lydgate scarcely qualifies as a chooser at al~ in the sense of his 
making deliberate conscious choices; rathe~ he allows himself to be 
rushed into choosing under a spurt of impulsive feeling. It comes as no 
surprise to us then, to vdtness how he comes to engage himself to 
Rosamond. Overwhelmed by the unexpected glimpne of genuine feeling in 
her which shakes him from flirtation into love, he embraces her and 
half an hour later leaves the house "an engaged man, whose soul was 
not his own, but the woman's to whom he had bound himself,," 98 We can, 
therefore, all the more appreciate the irony of the concluding comment 
of the chapter dealing with the chaplaincy affair. Lydgate has had a 
conversa;~i.on with Farebrother, who, true to his word, has shown no in-
jured vanity that Lydgate did. not vote for him but Lydgate has found his 
conversation somewhat dispiriting. He thinks to h;imself that thel"c is' 
"'aT pitiable infirmity of will in Mr Fe.rebrother. II 99 
Lydgate unfortunately is not greater and circumstance is very 
strong against him. And the strongest factors in his downfall.are his 
failure to acknowledge the force of circumstances and his ignorance as 
to his own nature and its susceptibilities. Indeed it is his very "con-
fidence in his o,m powers and integrity much fortified by contempt for 
100 petty obstacles or seductions over which he had had no experience." 
that defeats him. That one sentence sums up his self-deception 
101 
and his failure to appreciate the "hard unaccorrunodatins Actual." 
But if he had had more self-awareness and a greater capacity for 
making a realistic appraisal of circumstances, would this have made him 
more free, less constrained, less certain of defeat? As we have seen, 
102 freedom to George Eliot equals "necessity understood." Such under.-
standing, if Lydgate had been able to achieve it, would have given as 
much freedom as we are granted in this causally determined universe. 
32. 
? 
George Eliot has been recognised as a Stoic in the doctrine of Y). , 
patient endurance which she advocates, but the similarities between her 
world view and that of stoicism go deeper than the adoption of an att-
itude of resignation towards the hardships of our lot. The self-
instruction she records in a letter of 1868 expresses both the value of 
endurance and the importance of working within the existing framework of 
the laws of the universe. For here she insists that it is well "never to 
beat and bruise one's wings against the inevitable but to throw the 
whole force of one's soul towards the achievement of some possible 
better." 1 03 This meliorist statement aligns George Eliot with other 
nineteenth-century reformers who believed that Vie could make some pro-
gress if we understood the laws and co-operated with them. However, her 
basic belief in "invariability of sequence" 104 accords with the Stoic 
emphasis on natural laws. A. A. Long discusses the Stoic definition of 
the sage or the ideal good man as "one whose actions are consistently 
determlned by a reasoning faculty which accords with the will of Nature 
or God. This makes him the only free man. Reason does not give the sage 
free will, in the sense that his actions are undetermined by character 
and environment. But it enables him to make what will happen part of his 
own will and plan." 105 The similarity between this definition and the 
groundplan that has emerged from a study of Lydgute's freedom to choose 
is unmistakable. Freadom for the Stoics as for George Eliot is necessity 
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understood, not beating and bruising one's wings against the inevitable, 
but throwing all one's energies into achieving whatever it is possible 
to achieve, however slight. The consonance between Stoicism and George 
Eliot's thought patterns is interesting, showing as it does,rhow similar 
world views lead to similar responses. Within both systems it would 
appear that although some freedom is acknowledged, it is undeniably the 
scantest of freedoms, and consists less in the possibilities of action 
than in the cultivation of a state of mind. 
In this section I have examined the question of freedom in connection 
with the one character, Lydgate, from the one novel, Middlemarch. I will 
now look briefly at a further aspect of George Eliot's concept of free-
dom in connection with Gwendolen Harleth from Daniel Deronda. 
George Eliot expresses her delight in each day as providing an opport-
unity for exercising the will, for "willing to will strone;ly." 1 06 This, 
taken in isolation from the patterning of the novels, might s~ggest a 
Nietzchean glorification of the super-hero, the apotheosis of the will 
for its ~vn sake. In these terms the history of a character like 
Gwendolen H&rle~h, whose "will was peremptory," 107 would read as a 
tragedy in that she was unfortunate enough to marry a man whose will 
was stronger, and who took a sadistic delight in controlling her, effect-
i vely paralysing her will with his "torpedo" 108 ":,,like grip. But George 
Eliot would never have consented to so morally neutral an analysis of 
her work. Psychological criticism directed at Gwendolen's failure to 
master Grandcourt might well stress that the fault lay in her low self-
esteem, which allowed her to suffer from uncertainty and self-doubt; it 
vlOuld JIlf',ke much of Gwendolen' s barel:(~~inted at frigidity as a determin-
ing factor i~ the failure of the marital relationship. This low self-
esteem in George Eliot's terms, however, provides the entry for possible 
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moral regeneration; remorse as an agent oft:he conscience is a sign of 
potential moral strength, not of psychological insufficiency. 
If, then, a morally neutral exercising of t he will is not permitted, 
what is George Eliot saying in the early part of Daniel Deronda? VIe see 
Gwendolen's superb self-confidence that she will make a mark on the 
world suffer a series of shocks until in her final outpouring of her 
soul to Deronda . after Grandcourt' sdrowning, we can scarcely recognise the 
self-contained, proud young lady of the opening scenes. Th6 underlying 
commentary points constantly to the exaggerated and unrealistic quality 
of Gwendolen' s expectations, both of herself and what she can-achieve,' -/ fi,.-;} 
and of the world. Grappling with the implications of their loss of fort-
une, she says pettishly to her mother: '''It seems to me a very extra-
ordinary world if people in our position must sink in this waY all at 
once' •••• the other worlds with which she was conversant being construct-
ed with a sense of fitness that arranged her mm future agreeably. II 109 
We encounter similar solipsistic beliAfs in other egoists, for example, 
Arthur Donnithorne or Rosamond Vincy. George Eliot sums up such mistaken 
notions when she points out that "the most obstinate beliefs that mortals 
entertain about themselves are such as they have no evidence for beyond a 
constant pulsing of.their self-satisfaction--as it were a hidden seed of 
madness, a confidence that they can move the world without precise notion 
of standing-place or lever. II 110 The key words from this statement are 
"evidence" and "precise notion." For George Eliot, as we have seen, the 
world was governed by irreversible laws and freedom consisted in recog-
nising these laws, co-operating with them where possible and not strain-
ing against those that were immutable. In these terms, Gwendolen's ignor-
ance or partial ignorance that this is how things are makes meaningless 
her defiant claim that "she did not mean to submit, and let misfortune 
(10 what it would with her." 111 It is inevitable tha.t she should suffer 
and fail to achieve mastery over lithe unmanageable world" which, like 
Herr Klesmer, was lIindependent of her wishes--something vitriolic that 
would not cease to burn because you smiled or frowned at it." 112 
If we are in doubt as to the attitude George Eliot wants us to adopt 
tmvards Gwendolen, or are tempted to feel that George Eliot treats her 
too harshly, we are provided with an explicit, and in her eyes, wholly 
admirable, exemplar in the person of Mirah Lapidoth for whose submission 
to fate, and piet~ we are enj oined to feel unqualified approval. Mirah 
113 
says, "'I set myself to obey and suffer: what else cou.ld I do?'!! 
There is a very explicit structural patterning in the contrast between 
these two women in Derondats life: the exhibitionism of the one is set 
against the lack of self-consciousness in performance of the other: one 
rejects all claims of duty, even the teaching of the superfluous and in-
convenient sisters, while the other sadly accepts the duty of caring for 
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the derelict father: and most noticeably, one is defiant and unwilling to 
submit to the dictates of fate while the other is all patient' endurance. 
Gwendolen t s kicking against the pricks is shovm to be futile and is based 
on her ignorance of circumstances. Our final view of her is of one chast-
ened and reduced, anxiously mouthing Deronda's words that she may "live to 
114 be one of the best of women, who make others glad tha.t they were born. II 
Mirah's stoicism and resignation of her ovm claims are rewarded and she 
marries Deronda. 
This brief discussion of Gwendolen Harleth, and the longer analysis 
of Lydgate confirm George Eliot's underlying belief in freedom as I 
have outlined it in the first section of this chapter. Both Gwendolen 
and Lydgate illustra.te the waste ofl potential that occurs when people 
are ignorant of where their limits lie, when they fail to accept how 
much they are circumscribed by their situation. They suffer for their 
failure to acknovdedge the force of necessity and for their refusal to 
recognise that their only safeguard against such necessity is "evidence" 
and "precise notions, II 115 and the directing of their energies and the 
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strength of their will towards achieving "some possible better." 
The tension between a belief in "universal causality" 117 and a belief 
in the capacity of the individual to exercise his will underpins all 
George Eliot's thought. The Positivistic faith in irreversible laws, 
while conferring the possibility of scientific progress, also bordered 
on a totally mechanistic description of the world and of human possibil-
ity. Yet some measure of freedom of choice had to be maintained if an 
individual was to be held responsible for his actions. There is an im-
portant difference between moral progress vlhich is determined. and inev-
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itable) and moral progress which occurs as a result of an individual's 
making genuine moral choices and learning from his successes and failures. 
George Eliot's solution to the problem of hOi'l a character can have any 
118 free will at all in a world dominated by "invariability of sequence" 
is two-fold. Some laws are inexorably binding and unmodifiable and towards 
those we can only adopt an attitude of patient stoicism. But others, espec-
ially those which involve social or moral organisation, are less rigi~in 
that a knowledge of theml least enables us to co-operate with them to 
achieve beneficent results. We cannot make any impression on the law of 
gravity but we can recognise the learning processes outlined by the 
association psychologists, avoid certain tendencies and reinforce others 
in order to effect desired change. This solution is summed up in the 
phrase "freedom is necessity understood." 119 The other solution offered 
is Lewes" emergent evolutionary belief, where the immense complexity of 
the factors in any given operation makes accurate prediction impossible 
and thus confers a certain flexibility. It is not that certain causes will 
not produce certain effects; it is that we can never be entirely sure of 
all the causes operating at anyone time. Thus, when we come to the in-
tricacies of human relationships, we have a less rigid groundplan and 
greater scope for moral development than would be the case in a totally 
mechanistic universe. 
But, to analyse George Eliot's ideas in relation to the general 
ideas of her period is to run the risk of suggesting that her novels 
Dre philosophic or moral treatises and to give weight to the adverse 
opinion expressed by one critic 'Jlho felt thc'lt her books had been dic-
tated to her by the "ghost of David Hume. II 120 An analysis of her ideas 
provides an accolmt of the uphilosophic equilibrium ll she achieved, but 
there still remi\ins the problem of a "practical equilibrium" 121 in 
terms of plot development, characterisation and. narrative technique •. : 
Later, I 'will focus more closely on the actus.l novels in order to dis-
cuss what happens to these ideas when they become part of the story of 
a ~mggie Tulliver, a Romola, or a Dorothea Brooke. For the moment, how-
ever, I am concentrating on the "philosophic equlilibrium, II isolating 
certain recurring ideas and clusters of ideas from her novels and re-
lating these to the ideological background of the mid-nineteenth oen-
tury. 
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Psychological Assumptions, 
A knowledge of the psychological assumptions entertained in the 
nineteent~ntury enables us to pinpoint the co-ordinates within ~ 
which George Eliot presents her characters. But those assumptions do 
not constitute one fixed and delimited set of beliefs. Nineteenth 
century psychology only gradually emerged from its dependence on philo-
sophy. As it incorporated research findings from the fields of biology, 
neurophysiology, and sociology it became a science in ita o,vn right. The 
school of association psychology which developed from Locke's chapter on 
"The Association of Ideas" emphasised the way in which frequent or 
vivid impres~;ions coalesce in the mind and predispose our thinking and 
reacting in certain definable ways. Research into the functioning of the 
brain was, at this time, in its infancy, and attempts to relate ideas 
to actual neural circuits led to what R. S. Peters sees as a persistent 
confusion in nineteenth century empirical thought, a confusion between 
"philosophic questions about the meaning of ideas and about the grounds 
1 
of knowledge" and "questions in genetic psychology about their origin. II 
Alexander Bain is an important figure in the development of psychology 
in that his concern with action led to a more dynamic approach to psych-
ological problems and opened up the way to a study of behaviour. 
The publication of The Origin :?!. Species in 1859, and the socio-
logical i'r.ritings of such men as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer re-
inforced the increasing importance given to environment or the "medium" 
in which an organism lived. Both evolutionary biology and sociology rec-
ognised the interdependence of one creature with another and the com-
plexity of their inter-relationships. It was acknowled.ged that no 
creature can exist in isolation. The realisation that there was constant 
competition f'or territory and food led to the coining of' the phrase 
"survival of the f'ittest. tI 
The merging of' these basic concepts. the formation of habitual 
patterns of response and the importance of environment in determining 
experience. produced an evolutionary psychology which claimed that an-
oestral patterns were laid down in the nervous system and accordingly 
could be transmitted f'rom one generation to the next. We are thuB born 
with fixed tendencies which dispose us to act in certain ways. On the 
surface this may seem to be a return to a belief in the theor.y of 
innate ideas but writers such as Lewes and Spencer stressed the exper-
iential origin of these inherited tendencies. The learning theories of 
the association psychology still apply; they have just been set further 
back in time so that it is not we ourselves but our ancestors, whether 
animal or human, remote or proximate, who have learnt responses to sit-
uations. and passed them on. 
If we turn to George Eliot's novels, we can see very clearly that 
she was familiar ,nth these different psychological developments. Assoc-
iation psychology provides the theory of psychological determinism and 
governs George Eliot's conception of how to delineate systematically a 
character's moral growth or decline. The emphasis, on environment. or 
"medium, n becomes increasingly important in the novels. Middlemarch, 
for instance, vdth its sub-title. ! Stud~ ~ Provincial Life, can be 
regarded as a socioloq~cal document. The tenets of evolutionary psycn-
t1'tt\\ 
ology appear in two(\late works, ~ SpaniSh Gyps~ and Daniel Deronda. 
The next three sections offer more substantial evidence of the re-
lationship between the mid-oentury psychological assumptions and the 
novels of George Eliot. 
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Psychological Determinism. 
lIConstructs l1 for the comprehension of the world are more "satis-
_ factory" if they are "characterised not by straight-line cause-effect 
thinking but -by ecological thinking." 1 'fhis statement occurs in an 
article, IIDarwinism and Darwinisticism" in which Morse Peckham dis-
cusses how nineteenth~century intellectuals assimilated the revolution-
~ ideas contained in Darwin's ~ Origin ~ Species. Obviously, he 
is not talking specifically about George Eliot's novels, but his re-
mark becomes especially interesting when set alongside one made by a 
George Eliot critic, J. Hillis Miller. He outlines the correspondence 
George Eliot saw between "small- and large-scA.le structures tt which he 
claims is a oontributory factor in her "rejeotion bf that straight-
forward idea of single causes which had characterised, for example, 
~ Bede. In Middlemarch," he continues, ''Eliot still believes in 
causality, but in the psychological and social realms the causes are 
2 
now seen as unimaginably multiple." 
I now propose to discuss the shift of emphasis detected by J. Hillis 
lklller and other oritics in the light of the posstbilities suggested 
by Morse Peckham. I will, therefore, endeavour to show that the progress-
ive awareness of oomplexity and interconnectedness apparent in the 
later novels, in oomparison -with the more clear-cut, even simplistic 
causal relationships traceable in the earlier novels, has a parallel 
in the development of psychological theory in the nineteenth cent~. 
The later Gecrge Eliot does not reject outright the simple causation 
of the earlier novels; the treatment of Bulstrode, for example, offers 
many similarities to the treatment of Tito Melema. It is just that she 
incorporates this simple causation in vlicler frame of psycholog:Lcal 
and social presentation. It is not a case of either/or, but of her 
~~dening her base to include more factors. The simple causality so 
app~rent in characters like Arthur Donnithorne, Tito Melema, and even, 
in some respects, Maggie Tulliver, is not totally discarded when she 
begins to concentrate more rigorously on "medium!! and a character's 
relationship vdth the whole complexity of his environment. In the same 
way, the association psyohology whioh developed out of the epistemo-
logical enquiries of Locke and his followers was not discarded by 
Spencer, Lewes, and other evolutionary psychologists of the roid-
nineteenth century; in fact it provided a necess~ foundation on 
which they could erect the new psychology. The relationship between 
them is that between a two-dimensional square and a three-dimensional 
cube, not that between two totally unrelated geometric shapes. 
It is necessary to make clear from the outset that I am not attempt-
ing to prove direct influence. I am not stating that George Eliot per-
used the learning theories of Locke, Hartley, the , Spencer, and 
others, consciously seeking out a basis for her characterisation in the 
novels. I am, hov/8ver, suggesting that we can ler:I'21 a great deal about 
.the terms in which she presents her characters to us, the manner in 
which they confront the problems that assail them, vie examine the 
basic psychological assumptions of her time. George Eliot is constant-
ly preoccupied with moral development. She would. wholeheartedly have 
concurred with Donald Mackay's statement that Yilhat is important is not 
that we are free to choose but to change. 3 And her belief in irrevers-
ible laws gave her an assurance that change was possible, even if, as 
I have suggested, it were a very limited change. The following state~ 
ment from her review of Mackay confirms this possibility when she 
writes with reference to the "invariability of sequence!!, that it 
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"this alone which can give value to experience and render education in 
the true sense possible." 4 
In terms of hums-'-n response, this "invariability of sequence" relates 
to the formation of habits, and to the difficulties we have, 1)oth in ac-
quiring them and ridding ourselves of them, if they prove undesirable or 
coI.l.llt-e-F~Qg.l1c:!;i'\Te. 'When we come to examine the novels we see that George 
Eliot's references to habit fall into two categories depending on whether 
the habit belongs to one of the minor characters or whether it relates to 
a protagonist. Sometimes it is just a passing phrase as in the following 
reference to Jack Lingon in Felix Holt as a "man of sixty ••• with a mind 
and with habits dried hard by the years." 5 At other times, it is a tech-
nique for presenting character growth or decline by means of her belief in 
the theory of psychological determinism. Both kinds, however, show a def-
inite connection vnth the learning theories of the school of association 
psychology. I will briefly outline the background and development of this 
school before discussing hoVl George Eliot incorporated its prinCiples in-
to her novels. 
The law of the association of ideas was originally formulated by 
Locke as an epistemological corollary to his sensationalism. Rejecting 
the theory of innate ideas, Locke claims that the mind is a passive re-
ceptor of sense impressions; "the senses," he says, "at first let in 
particular ~ and furnish the yet empty cabinet." 6 This is the same 
basic assumption that causes George Eliot to vrrite in The Millon the 
Floss about "that familiar hearth, 'where the pattern of the rug and the 
grate and the fire-irons were 'first ideas' that it was no more possible 
to criticise than the solidity and extension of matter." 7 In Locke's 
schema, what is important is that the mind, the tabula ~, is passive, 
storing inputs from the sensory world but not itself structuring exper-
..,-...... 
ience or inventing ideas. He says that "it is not in the power of the 
most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety 
8 
of thought, to invent£!. frame ~ ~ simple idea in the mind." 
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We see evidence of George Eliot's acceptance of some form of sansation-
alism in her treatment of two different characters who, because of 
physical or mental hardship, have been reduced to a state of childish-
. ness; both of them need to orient themselves firmly in the physical 
world in order to re-establish for themselves any sense of identity. 
'Mr Tulliver, after his stroke, and Balda.ssarre,after his long penance 
in slaver,y, are confused and incoherent. Vlhen Mr Tulliver is recovering, 
he has difficulty, at first, in re-establishing the co-ordinates of his 
world, and George Eliot indicates that sense impressions in this in-
stance are a stronger source of knowledge than that provided by words. 
It is better for him to be brought do,mstairs and to actually see that 
the bailiff has removed all the furniture than to be told about it. We 
read that "the full sense of the present could only be imparted gradual-
ly by new experience--not by mere words, which must remain weaker than 
the impressions left by the ~ experience. II 9 And shortly afterwards, 
George Eliot comments of 'Mr Tulliver that tlhis faculties seemed to be 
renewing their strength from getting a footing on this demonstration 
of the senses." 1 0 This is similar to the description of the pathetic 
and broken Baldassarre in Romola, whose "power of. imagining facto, tt we 
are told, "needed to be reinforced continually by the senses." 11 Later 
we learn that it was as if "he needed the sensation to keep alive his 
12 ideas. It 
The same stress on the importance of sensory input as a means where-
by we maintain stability occurs in Felix Holt after 11r Lyon is shattered 
by the possibility that Christian is Esther's father. We read that IIhe 
was so afraid lest his emotion should deprive him of the presence of 
mind necessary to the due attention to particulars in the coming inter-
view, that he continued. to occupy his sight and touch vrlth the objects 
'Nhich had stirred" the depths not only of' memory, but of dread. tl 13 These 
various examples leave us in no doubt as to the importance George Eliot 
attributed to the power of sense data to build up lasting impr~oR:L.9ns., 
in our minds. They are dravm from people ,/Iho are in some state of phys-
ioal and emotional extremity, all of whom have regressed to an earlier 
stage in the learning process and illustrate Herbert Spencer's remark 
that if, as he believed, ttthe fundamental condition of vitality, is 
that the internal order shall be continually adjusted to the external 
order," then, "necessarily ••• the order of the states of consciousness 
14 is in correspondence with the order of phenomena in the environment. \I 
If, as Locke believed, the mind was passive during the learning 
process, this provides an explanation for men's individual differences. 
These can be attributed to experience and therefore ultimately to the 
environment. In his chapter on "The Association of Ideas", he says that 
"this strong combination of' ideas ••• the mind makes in itself either 
voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be 
very different, according to their diff'erent inclinations, education, 
interests, etc." 15 That George Eliot recognises this individual diff'er-
entiation given by experienoe, we see from an early description of 
Deronda. The suspicion that he is illegitimate, !~the sense of an entailed 
16 disadvantage--the def'ormed f'oot doubtf'ully hidden by the shoe," is 
an experience of suff'ering which greatly contributes to his moral 
growth. tlDeronda's early-wakened susceptibility, charged at f'irst with 
rea~ indignation and resistant pride, had raised in him a premature re-
flection on certain questions of' lif'e; it had given a bias to his con-
science, a sympathy ~dth certain ills, and a tension of' resolve in cert-
ain directions, which marked him of'f' f'rom other youths much more than ulliY 
.talents he possessed. II 17 
Another major thinker to ','iork l:Lt thoor'J of i.lssociation ViS.S 
who added Newtontn of vibrations to 
to produce a psychophysical 
sations ,'lore pe ..ralleled "'1 ..;.." Vlora"lons 'elemental' particle;; in 
the nerves and brain. II The genesis of 5de,lS is ,:).ttributed to the fcc.ct 
that Usensations, by being oft ee, lG"we certc.in vestiges, 
or imclges tI ~ 8 of themselves.. The Utili . [,!'lans , f::ml the Mills 
added to the laws of association the further Lotion of the 
icance of pleasure and pain, or to bor::'orr D.n analof,ue from the L',7 of 
gravit2.tion, [cttraction and. repulsion. 
gi yes us pleasure and sh.').T U7.Jc1J1 f'roln '.'Jhat 
frequency and. vi vid...~ess are sufficient orlS ·.:;·f [lOIN ass 
build up in the mind, then as-sure and are OO\;.OU5 
Irhia reveals a shift of emphasis from'~''!.at of ;-~ learni.'rlg i;C tb.at 
of motivated action. The most 
Alexander Bain. He was also :':5 a pioneer ()., biological 
ology and was engaged in active 
more than any other 1 0-
context and make it a natLU'sJ, :.'.enC0 in its'Jilll .. Bain 
examined all.motorphenome';.a, b 
and related all forms of 
At this 
":ith the evoldionary 
's "metaphysicGcl Ii 20 and. then 
08e of Da,r,',in himself. H~.'hus, out in hi 
History 
,----"-
tion)f 
lS frb ,:;uency or habit He 
Q is vlell as an. ont at:lon" 
eX3.mine the evolutionc:cry if.: 2:'{ Yioxt ers. 
The discussion so fa:c h3,S indicate' tlwt the 18.;;,' of associat· on 
offers an explanation of the process f)f habitc. habits 
a.:t'e associative patterns 'J£' response, J.earned reactions to the world. of' 
experience v;hich coalesce in the mind as a result of frequency ana/or 
vi vi<i.Yless. George Eliot uses the actua:, word "habit; i'requently, as in 
the folloYling description ·of Romola. "Tt had become ;30 thoroughly her 
habit to reject her impUlsive choice, ~md to obey pf!ssively the 
of outward claims. II 22 Or we have this corrunent from 
that "our habitual life is like a v!all ,'lith 
been shone on by the suns of manyyeers: te.ke one of tHe pictures a:nay, 
and it leaves a definite blank space, to V,rhich our ey'as can never turn 
'nithout a sensation of dL5comfort. II 23 In ~;'eorge Eliot :~n81ces 
reference to tile possibility that habit becomes 
physical organ; sm, like tree movement of a muscle :orne other 
Deronda's admonition to Gwendolen about 
enjoins her to use this meditative exer'Jise in the 2.".;:,8 vmy J"ne.t she 
uses her or her sense of hearin£:> T:'19 ease 'ihieh Tito utters 
the lies about his father, claiming h::uf. vindicti ve ser-
vant, is likewise described rlith a "The lie was not 
so difficult when it Ylas once begun ... .,.sma. ::lense of pOi.er such 
as men feel {lhen they have begun a musc;11ar fe(~t sue ·'2ssfully. II 
Another wa'y in which George Eliot ref 'i:o--formation and its 
effects on the personality is by means ':of various 
d.rr:n·m from water, for example, "channe18,y i; 
5, especially the word "fibre .. n 1'11<:; 
habit and the effect of habit spread ou 
i'ollowing description in 
effect of habit .. Jerru;yn has cc,"!tr~.()t 
, mainly those 
.ii ;;':"esistance"' or from } 
tb ';hole 'rhe 
cnoldng, 
habi';s of 
thinking and acting 'I 25 so that he has become one of lithose who ere led 
on through the years by gre.dual demands of a selfishness which has 
spread its fibres far and ''Iide through the intricate vanities and sordid 
cares of an everydE,y existence. 1I 26 The presence of the word "selfishness!! 
in this description underlines very forcibly the fact that while George 
Eliot was concerned with how we learn, her major preoccupation lay ..,'Iith 
how we learn moral responses, with hmv we can exploit these laws of 
lIinvariability of sequence ll 27 in order to safeguard ourselves against 
moral chaos. Accordingly, in the novels, we have various characters who 
manifest different degrees of moral awareness and there is frequently a 
correlation between rigid habit formation in the characters and an in-
f'lexible, unsympathetic response to other human beings. Some of the char-
acters are shovm us in the process of acquiring these habitual responses, 
others we encounter at a stage in their lives where these responses have 
already become "set." And these habitual responses influence judgement, 
creating prejudice and false assumptions, as much as they influence 
overt behaviour. 
Tom Tulli vel' in ~ Mf!:l:. .2£ ~ Floss provides a useful illustration 
of this; his action in condemning bfuggie outright on her chastened return 
from Mudport is shown as totally in keeping with his habitual severity, 
lIa severity, \I as George Eliot tells us, " strongly marked by (}hes~ pos-
itive and negative qualities ••• strength of will, conscious rectitude of 
purpose, narr01~ess of imagination and intellect, great power of self-
control, and a disposition to exert control over others.1/ 28 To such 
people, she explains, "prejudices come as the natural food of tendencies 
which cnn get no sustenance out of that complex, fragmentary, doubt-
provoking knowledge which we ca.ll truth .. II 29 Tom is c~rtain that he is 
right and he has never seen any necessity to question that certainty. 
He believes what he sees and has no inkling that he is biased in his 
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seeing, or that he is looking in the world for confirITk"ttion of what he 
already believes to be there. Accordingly, in his reactions to Maggie, he 
"judged by what he had been able to see; and the judgement VIas painful 
enouf',h to himself. He thought he had the demonstration of facts observed 
through years by his own eyes whioh gave no warning of their imperfect-
ions." 30 This is the mature Tom, but· we could say of him what George 
Eliot says of Harold Transome that "the man ,vas no more than the boy 
writ large, with an extensive commentary. tl 31 The younger Tom had been 
described as a "boy who adhered tenaciously to impressions once received: 
as with all minds in which mere perception predOminates over thought and 
emotion, the external remained to him rigidly what it was in the first 
instance, II 32 a boy, we are told, "born with a deficient power of 
hending ~igns and abstractions ••• a congenital deficiency." 33 He 
appre-
is one 
of those few characters whom George Eliot describes as "inexorable, un-
bending, unmodifiable." 34 
This brief account of Tom Tulliver indicates two aspects of George 
Eliot's belief in the potency of habit formation: the fact that it pro-
duces rigid, non-adaptive behaviour and that it applies to the realm of 
ideas as well as to the world of action. A passage in Lewes' ~ PhJsio-
~ of Common ~ (1859-60) draws all these strands together. In it he 
equates habit, fixed ideas and automatic actions,' offers the fact of 
repetition as an explanation for their potency, and uses the word 
"channel" to describe how they come to be established in the neuro-
logical circuit. Lewes maintains that 
Habits, FiXed Ideas, and what are called Automatic Actions, all 
depend on the tendency which a sensation has to discharge it-
self through the readiest channel. In learning to speak a new 
language, to play on a musical instrument, or to perform any 
unaccustomed movements, great difficulty is felt, because the 
channels through which each sensation has to pass have not 
become established; but no sooner has frequent repetition cut 
a pathway, than this difficulty vnnishes. YJ 
49. 
The similarity between this passage and the following account of Tito 
Melema is ,unmistakable. VIe learn that "in this first distinct colloquy 
with himself the ideas which had previously been scattered and interrupted 
had now concentrated themselves; the little rills of selfishness had 
united and made a channel, so that they could never again meet with the 
same resistance. 1I 36 Tito's selfishness has become fixed and established 
as a habit, an automatic action, and the suggestion, even, is that this 
has caused there to be laid dovm in his nervous system neurological cir-
cuits which become permanent and irreducible. 
The laws of association psychology describe the learning process and 
tell how 17£ come to acqui.:r:e habits; they also suggest the inevitable co-
rollary that habits once established in this way become enormously dif-
ficult to eradicate. Maggie Tulliver, returning in a tired and depressed 
state from a spell of schoolteaching, compares her state of mind to that 
of a bear continuously pacing out the same confines. She says to Lucy, 
"'It is with me as I used to think it would be with the poor uneasy 
white bear I saw at the show. I thought he must have got so stupid vdth 
the habit of turning backwards and forwards in that narrow space, that he 
would keep doing it if they set him free. One gets a ba.d habit of being 
unhappy. II 37 
A habit of unhappiness obviously constitutes a. ba.d habit; if there 
are laws which state categorically how such' habits are formed, obviously 
they can be used in the formation of good and valuable habits; the prob-
lem becomes one of determining how to eliminate such entrenched habits as 
the one Maggie has just described. As Spencer in !h£. Principles of 
Psychology (1855) declare~ "where a certain relation has been daily ex-
p;·;rienced throughout oU!" whole lives, vdth scarcely an exception, it be-
comes extremely difficult for us to conceive it as otherwise--to break 
the connection between the states of consciousness representing it •••• " 38 
50 .. 
It is this very rigiCiity of habit :formation that is cause fo? CCrl-
. corn, and-suggests the sort of' limitat:'Lon that J" •.. 
sadly when he says that 
the doctrine of what is called Philosophical ~\Jecessity weighed 
on my existence like an incubus. I felt as I was scient:'..f-
ically proved to be the helpless slave of antecedent circ~~stances; 
as if my character and that of all others been formed for us 
by agencies beyond our control, and '.vas wholly out of our own 
power. I often said to myself, what a it would be if I 
could disbelieve the doctrine of the formation of charact~ by 
circumstances .••• it would be a b:.f:essing if the doctrine of nec-
essity could be believed by all quoa~ the characters of others and 
disbelieved in regard to their own. '9 
However, Mill's buoyancy returned and orge Eliot's earlier novels 
could almost be said to be~ploring the implications of the in 
~ Szstem of' Logic, that Itwe are exactly as capCi.0le of making our ovm 
character, if ~~, as others are of maJr..ing it f'or us," 40 a remark 
which contains the same resonance as George Eliot t 13 cOIllInent to Nfl'S 
Ponsonby about the need to "will strongly. 
Two characters from the early novels who clearly illustrate this 
capability of making their ovm characters, however lli"vdttingly, are 
Arthur Donnithorne in B,$d,e, and THo Melema in RS:~lOlf-l" The tech-
nique which George Eliot adopts for setting these characters before us, 
is to present them with various moral CBS; whetl1er to see Hetty 
again, whether to deny Baldassarre's We are shown the 
characters grappling with their o .... m conscious and unoonscious desires, 
their unstable resolutions, their self-deceits and .!:a;tionalisations .. All 
the time the authorial commentary is hammering home -co us the inescapable 
fact that "our deeds determine us, as much as we our deeds." 
The point George Eliot is making so forcibly is ths,t we CalL'1ot 8.scape the 
psychological pressure of our choices. Although ',ve escape the phy-
sical consequences, George Eliot does not allow this to happen to her 
C~ld"racters, thus laying herself o}?en to charges O~·l out a 
retributi ve justice or a "poetic justice 11 saa.::..y out cf keeping in such 
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realistic novels. 43 But what Vle cannot escape is our necessity, 'whether 
we choose well or badly, to readjust our inner balance after each new 
choice. George Eliot describes this authorially in an image vd.th a suggest-
ion of political insurgency and pragmatism. 
There is a terrible coercion in our deeds which may first turn the 
honest man into a deceiver, and then reconcile him to the change; 
for this reason-- that the second wrong presents itself to him in 
the guise of the only practicable right. The action which before 
commission has been seen with that blended common-sense and fresh 
untarnished feeling which is the healthy eye of the soul, is 
looked at afterwards with the lens of apologetic ingenuity, through 
which all things that men call beautiful and ugly are seen to be 
made up of textures very much alike. Europe adjusts itself to a 
~ accompli, and so does an individual character •••• 44 
This provides an explanation for and a summing up of the necessity 
.Arthur now sees himself under to deceiVe Adam as to his true relations 
with Hetty. Each step which has brought him to this act of deception has 
been clearly outlined; each new manoeuvre, each separate stage of ration-
alisation has been placed before us so that we are in no doubt that .Arthur 
is responsible for his own situation, that his action is rooted in his 
own carel~ss self-regarding view of the world, in his discounting of 
consequences, or in his easy dismissal of them ... vith a belief that he cem 
compensate for any unhappiness he has "unvTittinglyll caused by gifts of 
money or preferment. He even has his ovm private rrovidence. "Arthur 
told himself, he did not deserve that things should turn out badly-- he 
had never meant beforehand to do anything his conscience disapproved--
he had been led on by circumstances. There was a sort of implicit con-
fidence in him that he was really such a good fellow at bottom, Provid-
ence would not treat him harshly." 45 
Vie have, in effect, watched .Arthur "making his ovm character .. " He 
has set in motion a train of events which then inexorably impells him 
and the people whose lives he has affected. There is no turning back; at 
any point the choice is between further deceptions, further sha~ resol-
'Jtions, further "vi t:'<.ati,o.,justment end. oor'£e53:, on, openness?-ud. 
a willing acceptance cfclsequenoes.. etas he SC,;D:"Ci'_<Y considers" 
./\rthur comes finally and. adly to a re<.J.isation that Adam had been 
speaking truly 'when he hc,c earlie in the book~ ~ItTherels a sort 
4" 
of wrong thnt can never l;,' made up for" 1 II \- He has learnt that he can-
notescapei'rom the consequences of hi deeds~ even :'i .• fl're may fee.l that 
it is because those'deeds have had siglificantreveroerations in the 
outside world that he is so convenient'y chastened. 
If P~thur seems rigid and two-dimensional and schematic, then Tito 
M:elema, for all that he is involved in a greater variety of [3,ctivities, 
is even more so. The various activitieE;, after all, are just diff'3rent 
facets of betrayal; he abandons his father, deceives both Romola end. 
Tessa, sellsBardi t s librerj' and becomes a political intriguer and, spy; 
47 these are what George Eliot calls "the successive falsities of his life .. 11 
But fundamentally he remains the same C'b.aracter, easy-going, hedonistic, 
morally "supple." In this novel, Romola, as in ~ we have oon-
stant authorial commentary reinforcing the conclusions we have already 
Clrawn from Tito's words anli deeds, and fro;,: his inner "oolloquies,. II And 
these emphasise constantly the fact that o is down habits, 
neurological channels even, which - deterrdne each sue. 8ssi ve This 
is made very clear in the following passage which I ",{'ill quote again, 
concerning Tito's first e with himself about wb.t he shou.ld do y;ith 
the money from his rings, whether he sho11lo. seek out~Lis father or stay 
comfortably in Florence .. uIn this first distinct colLoquy himself 
the ideas which had previcl)sly been scattered and eo.. had now 
concentrated themselves; the little rills of selfishn,;;ss had united and 
made a channel, so that they could never 
sistance. II 48 The undercurrent of authorial couunent r,'weals to us 
once this has happened, it continues to happen, until he is t en-
guli'ed by an "undying habit of fear." 49 At the very end of the book when 
he might still have been able to get safely out of :B'lorence, he is able 
to escape his physical pursuers but not the mental furies which make him 
excessively a~~{ious. He has opportunely diverted his pursuers' attention 
from himself' by throwing away his purse, has dived into the Arno and 
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swum a reasonable distance but his certainty that he is still being pur-
sued causes him to swim longer than is necessary, to over-tire himself 
and eventually to come ashore into the waiting stranglehold of his venge-
ful father. A major irony of the book lies in the f~wt that ,ve see Tito 
confidently assuming that he is in control of' events, weighing possib-
ilities I:md choosing accordingly, feeling successful iri the measure to 
which he manages to escape physical danger or public opprobriu..'ll, v:hile 
all the time the real danger lies i'rithin, in lithe contaminating effect 
of deeds." 50 His illusion of freedom is supreme; we see, howe'1er', all 
too clearly, that he is totally bound, that far from confronting poss-
ibilities flexibly and creatively, he is treading a:18xrovring and more 
circumscribed path. 
If we concede that George Eliot's belief in the the~J of psych-
ological determinism provides her with a set of assl~mptions for effect-
ively representing a character whose successive choices morally c_abase 
him, what do we make of the rever'se situation, wherE;' a character s 
choioes are positive and I1!orally superior? Does s' .. )oh a system work as 
adequately in the case of Maggie Tulli -J3r'? I al'.l IDer'E;ly posing this 
question here as I will dated. with it in detail when I 
the implications of George Eliot's intellectus.l system, but I wanted 
to draw attention at this stage to the fact that t s moral gro,yth 
is presented to us in a similar way to the moral re[s-r8ssions ofAx,thur 
and THo. 
In this chapter, I have been tracing some s of George E:1iot's 
acceptance of the 'al determini -;m, anci of t:r:c\iI:JY 
in which she shoVls a chars-Gter's estab' set p';tterns of rc}ponse 
to the situations which c)yli'ront him.:"s she says i.1 Romola., "Ou::" lives 
make a mora]. tradition :£'0:" our individual selves, as the life of man-
'-1 
kind at large makes a moral tradition for the race. H:> The laws furn-
ished by the learning theories of the ,~ighteenth .. an::i early nineteenth-
century philosophers, taken over and incorporated into neurophysiological 
and biological researches, all reinforced her belief in the strictness 
of ca.usa.l sequences. Habit formation becomes almost irreversible and it 
therefore becomes supremely important ~;o ensure that the habits 
ore acquired are those that increase a sense'of fellowship, ofs)npathy 
towards others, those, in short, that, in George Eliot's terms, promote 
moral grovrch.· And the acquisition of right habits is especially importunt 
in that our supposedly impulsive actions are decisively determined by the 
sorts of moral choices, the sorts of habitual responses we have r:lade in 
the past. When Tito disovil1s his father on the steps of the Duomo, and 
is himself bewildered at hOVl spontaneously the denunciation has risen 
to his lips, recognising that he would have saved hj.mself a great deal 
of trouble if he had lovingly acknowled.ged the old the authorial 
comment reminds u::;that o was experiencing that inexorable law of 
human souls, that we prepare ourselves for sudden dz,,;eds by the reiter-
I;? 
ated choice of good or evil vlhieh gradually determines character ~ 1/ ./~ 
These early novels, then, highlight exactly this the charact-
er with his inner battles, is foregrourded to e. degree, isolated 
from his surroundings. The pastoral com.'1lunity of Ac;.,,:::~ ;?ede, and the 
less well-real:1.sed Renaissance Florence of :.:::.::~;;;:::.::::. a:ce backgrounds 
against whieh the characters live out their livos;~h.ere is none of 
that uIlcertainty between figure and ground which Martin Price describes 
as a feature of a realistic novel like li!;i.ddle.r~~:'9h, where we cannot 
be exactly certain whether the communi is there to provide a meUium 
ago.inst which or within which e :rdalises , or whetheL' the 
story of e is to be seen as one demonstrating ;:1.8 pect s of C VL: .. illkU'" 
inter-relationships. Certainly the tech:,lique George 31iot uses in 
I,Iiddlemarch is not an new dep['2'ture; it obv:Lously offers an ex-
tension of tb() tech..."'1ique she uses in 22."~  ~ thE? F].oss, where 
are shovm in part a::o a response to her unaccepting 
and unacceptable envirOIlment. St Ogg' s ~J.vl arl'ay of (~~unts 
and uncles become, as it were, a force , :<:dmost one ce·'.Jld say, an ::~tdit-
ianal character with a organic; life of its 07rrl. ",'\na 
she wrote to R. H. Hutton !lit is the habit of' m, o 
strive after as full a ofGhe medi1.J,,'11 in 'N'hich a character ;:loves 
as of the character itself. II 54- But the:c:>e is a di:t'f8,'Emce between a well-
realised medium which provides a backgroi),nd. . rhich a charact eX' 
test and a medium shovm to exert grei.3.t on. that so 
that we are constantly aware of the process of' inter\. ;)tion betweeL the 
two .. 'rtLere is a difference of perspeoti'l6; in ~hE; ea.ly novels we trace 
the sYBtematic moral deterioration of L:';:;hur' or Titc 'lnd their 
, their moral and clecisi re-
ive comililli~ties, and although we see the raC:L .icaticns of these 
actions, moral choices and decisions, focus is 0.:. the characte:::'3 and 
the chronologically pl"'esented ae;count This a 
linear development, what Horse 
-line caus;;=;-
effeot construct;" the shift of' t£"D.t ooc~. '8 when we h.::;i,,; our 
13ttention dravm to , .j-' POSlvl ve char-
&'toter and the society in v;hich he lives ::n s.n '.vith the nccessar'J 
interaction bet~'[een an orgD,nism anc. itS··~8~j .. U.':, in Peckhar ~ 
construct" H 
In the same wa;/, the 
Tito shows us them faced 7rith or morz .. l choic8s, and there is very 
little offered of the texture of their daily lives, apart from SUGh 
crucial moments~ I maintain, therefor-e, that these early novels show 
the characters confronting "explicit mO~'al choices u but do not 
adequately the texture of their lives i:1 a "small pi::;cemeall! we.;! and 
this is itself mainly due to th~J lineae set method of charc.cter-
isation I he,lre been describing. 
The laws of associat'l.on, the sequence of c;;::,1.1se and effec-i; 
vide a very mechanistic mouel for the C " 
" 
charact er,; the 
later model of interaction a moX" flexible bl:L:;e for 
depicting chare,cter growth and change .. 
about the !!revolution in 3u:copean tnind in te:'ms of 
static rnechar1i;3ID and the redirection or the rninc. tc 
of uynamic orgcmicism. It 58 I have sho,'1l:". her cnar-
now discuse hO'w she :t"-3(drectn her mind 
the int 0 the f!"arr~e-
The:: E:x:ternal onditiens of 
In chapter 11 of 1.1icldle:narch, George Eliot vrritGs that "anyone 
wa.tching the stealthy cenvergence of human lots, sees a slo'w 
preparation of er"'fects from one life en another, vih:Lch tells like a 
calculate(l irony on the indifference or the frozen ;~t(,re with which we 
look at our unintY'oduced our. It 1 This authorial comment provides 
a useful introduction to a discussion of a shift of in 
Eliot's thought. The previous chapter examined the cox'relation between 
her psychological determinism, her stress on habit Zurmation and the 
learp..ing theories of the association psychologists. This chapter v.d.ll 
examine the correlation between George Eliot t s in "the stealthy 
convergence of hunw.n lots ll and the nineteenth centuxy , bio-
logioal, and. ultimately, psychological interest iri,:.:c'droni'11ent. The 
previous ohct:pter also attention to the moralistic slant George 
:EJliot gave to the questiun of habit forrnation .. She ,. that habits 
Vlhich reinforced selfisr..ness "Nere 
the to estab:ish habitual responses c Eel'VEl the inc s 
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of the community. Her increasing interest ern 'tlith the inter-
connectedness of human lives also take on a mor[',li8~;:::'G bias. Char'1.cters 
in the early novels can be indicted by their cre(;tc:~ for thoir fe:ilure 
to YJlO,': thoratelv,')s; characters in Inter novels, still guilty on 
this cOlmt, Gem also be cri ticiced. for not aue the 
nature of the forces cop'sronting them. Such chal~l:l.ct;el>b e,s Lydgnte, as 
I have shown, fail to make a realistic Essessment of their 
circumstances, circumstances which now include not and 
own potential for good and evil, but a wh,ole :;:-a.1158 of' environ-
ment81 fe.ct ors a.s well. 
Ylhile:re exaEline the psychological theories of the mid-ninetBBnth 
century in order to further our understanding of Eliot's novels, 
we must never lose sight of the fact that converted theories 
and theil"" assU!aptions abou.t hu.rnan naturle into the mOl"tal vlith-
in which her characters live out their lives. A char"::',cte:(' may be shovm 
to us e~lleshed in a complex enviroilluent; that one 
But his frulul'e to concede this is as e"lridence of his 
sistic, morally stance; and this is another shaping factor .. 'i:ae 
quotation from !!~ddlemar~!: introducing this chapter contains bot}: of 
these: lithe slerVl preparation of effects II on the one hand, and the 
culated irony" of our indifference to these effects on 11;h8 other .. 
I have just described a. ohara.cter 8.'3 !!er.tf:.1eshed in a e'lviron-
ment." I chose the pbrase cdvi as '.·,ceb of t 
threads, of spin..'ling an;l ':,eaving are !'E:::;urrine motif especially tho 
later novels. ~'hey provide extended t'),nc .. '.ogues for a character 1 s X'~lfltion-
ship with his ±'ellmis, with the "condit 11 e.nd "circurastances 1I 11.::'5 
life. One of the first occurrences of ,,::1:::'8 kind of' is in 
Floss. It is used as a 
Tulliver for his tendency to prompt action is st'ill constantl. l:;ft 
' .. .i.th the feeling that the 'vorld is 
the narrator, tlthat for (Setting a 
tangled, there is nothinG like snatchi 
The of a tar.t.8led th:l:'f}Q,Q is used' in to describe the 
==,;.-
heroine's incre["singly alienated vision of human.:pos:,ibilities. \1;;,; [ire 
told. that lithe vision of purpcse, any end of existence '/lhich 
could ennoble endurance e:~al t the co:arClon deeds of' a ~2.l1::t::1 lif~o vlith 
di vine ardours, 'Nas utter] e fo;~ her now by the sense of o on-
threads. II 3 
Web images are a major patterning in Middlemarch. Lydgatefs 
failure to connect different experiences or to apply the same stringent 
rules of observation and evidence to his emotional life as he does to 
his scientific researches is described as an image of a web that has not 
been constructed. The various strands are still separate. I~as it not 
ceased to be remarkable--is it not rather what we expect in men," the 
narrator asks us, "that they should have numerous strands of experience 
lying side by side and never compare them with each other?1I 4. Rose,IDond 
and Lydgate during their engagement~e described as industriously spin-
ning away at the web that binds them together. This is a salutary re-
minder that we are responsible for our ovm bondage and cannot dismiss 
our responsibility with pleas of ignorance or cries that circumstances 
have been too much for us, as Mr Tulliver, for example, or even Mr 
Farebrother try to do. 
Besides the web imagery which refers specifically to particular char-
acters or particular situations, there are in liiddlemarch other examples 
cf such images which refer to George Eliot's attitude towards the process 
of writing a novel. These refer to her own sense of the complex material 
in front of her, to the problems of selection and control if that material 
is going to present to us the required pattern. She claims apologetically, 
ItI at least have so much to do in unravelling certain human lots, and 
seeing how they 17ere woven and interwoven, that all the light I can 
command must be concentrated on this particular web, and not dispersed 
over that tempting range of relevancies called the universe." 5 She is 
iwo modest. Many critics have examined the rich historical and literary 
allusi veness of her novels and especially of Middlemarch. 6 Mr Casaubon, 
for example, apart from bearing the hame of an erudite contemporaFJ of 
William Shakespeare, is compared variously with Locke, Milton, and 
Aquinas. However, these references to scholarly gentlemen are subtly 
introduced into the novel and do not detract from her main preoccupation, 
the treatment of individual lots. George Eliot picks up the same web 
image as an analogue to the novel in the Finale when she warns us that 
"the fragment of a life, however typical, is not the sample of an even 
web. II 7 
If George Eliot has the sense that, in v.rritine; a novel, she is un-
ravelling a complex web, we will scarcely be surprised to discover that 
her method of presenting character ShOV1S a similar awareness of complex-
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ity. As early as ~ ~ ~ ~ Floss, which, as I have indicated, 
provides us with the first example of her "ecological II 8 or "organicist It 9 
approach to character, George Eliot dismisses the notion that out fate 
is dependent only on our character. ''You have knol'm Maggie a long while, II 
she tells us, II and need to be told, not her characteristics, but her 
history, which is a thing hardly to be predicted even from the completest 
knowledge of her characteristics. For the tragedy of our lives is not 
created entirely from within. tCharacter,~"says Novalis, in one of his 
questionable aphorisms, tcharacter is destiny. t But not the whole of 
our destiny. II 10 And to emphasise this point more fully George Eliot 
provides us with a different set of circumstances for the play Hamlet 
and a different possible ending. 
Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, was speculative and irresolute, and 
we have a great tragedy in consequence. But if his father had 
lived to a good old age, and his uncle had died an early de~l,th, 
we can conceive Hamletts having married Ophelia, and got through 
life with a reputation of sanity, not~~thstanding many soliloquies, 
and some moody sarcasms towards the fair daughter of Polonius, to 
say nothing of the frankest incivility to his father-in-law. 11 
Different circumstances produce different effects and no-one can 
entirely esca~ from the pressure of ~cternal conditions. In the con-
cluding section of Middlemarch, George Eliot says of Dorothea that 
IIthere is no creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not 
greatly determined by what lies out~ide it." 12 Dorothea., she ~tJuggests, 
may have had the potential greatness 0:' soul to become a St. rThe:,:,esa 
but the social conditions intowhiohshewas born did not provide the 
necessary ethos. "For these later-born Theresas," so it seems, " were 
helped by no ooherent social faith and order which could perform the 
function' of knowledge for the ardently willing soul .. II 13 
The same belief in the interaction between the inner and the outer 
is thematically important in Felix ~. The individual struggles and 
problems of the protagonists are presented against the background of the 
political conflicts of Treby Magna. George Eliot is explicit in her 
comment that "these social ohanges in Treby parish are comparatively 
publio matters, and this history is ohiefly concerned With the private 
lot of a few men and women; but there is no private life which has not 
14-been determined by a wider public life. II 
This preliminary account of how George Eliot s§w the relation be-
tween a character and the toteJ..ity of pis environment reveals her aware-
ness of the complexity of this relation and the unoertainty involved in 
any attempt at prediction. The epigraph to chapter 4- of Middlemaroh 
points to environmental influence on human personality while retaining 
a belief in psyohological determinism. 
1 st Gent: "0urdeeds are fetters that we forge ourselves. lt 
2nd Gent: tlAy, truly: but I think it is the world 
That brings the iron. II 15 
This epigraph provides a useful starting-point for a discussion of nine-
teenth century assumptions. In ~ Study £!. Psychology, Lewes, discussing 
the tlsocial medium" declares that 
The organism adjusts itself to the external medium; it creates, 
and is in turn modified by, the social medium, for Society is the 
product of human feelings, and its existence is Eari Eassu dev-
eloped with the feelings which in turn it modifies and enlarges at 
each stage. Obviously, then, our srtence must seek its data not 
only in Biology but in Sociology. 
In the mid-nineteenth centur.y, sociologists like Comte and Spenoer, and 
biologists like Darwin and Lewes .eontributed equally to the developing 
Psychology. Both schools of thought emphasised the importance of "medium" 
and the crucial interdependence of an organism with its environment. 
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"Medium" became a key assumption. Let us now briefly exC'.mine this assump-
tion before turning to a closer examination of George Eliot's novels and 
of the ways in which she incorporated this assumption into her work. 
Comte and Spencer both occupied themselves with biological as well 
as with sociological questions. Each of them at different times has been 
described as the father of modern sociology. They are both what A. N. 
V'lhitehead called "Systems Philosophers lt 17 because they: tried to incorp-
orate all human knowledge within one general, over-riding principle. 
In Comte's case it was his descriptive and progressive law of the three 
states; in the case of Spencer it was the law of progress which, he says, 
"consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." 18 
They were alike in other respects too, especially in their independence 
of thought and the "cerebral hygiene" 19which was Comtets term for the 
avoid.nnce of contamination from contemporary works. ~fuey both evidence 
a Lamarckian bias, but Comte was closer to the precursors of Darwin in 
his acceptance of the fixity of species. What is important about both 
writers is their insistence on the need for a close study of society 
under its different aspects. Spencer's Social Statics (1852) outlines 
the two main aspects he believed worthy of study: social statics, or the 
synchronic study of social order; and the contrasting social d~arnics, 
or the diacr..ronic study of movement, of progress ana. change. 
From his study of society, Comte discerned the importance of a 
healthy interaction between an organism and its medil~, or milieu, as 
he describes it.~ Th~:Ho\,;.fng quotations make this clear. 
I designate by this vlord milieu,not only the fluid in which the 
organism is immersed, but, in general, the totality of external 
circumstances of any kind whatever necessary "co the existence of 
each determined organism. 20 
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The harmony between the living being and the correspondingmediu~ 
(as I shall call its environment) evidently characterises the 
fundamental condition of life ••• one of the main distinctions be-
tween the organic and the inorgeJ1ic regions is that inorganic phen-
omena, from their greater simplicity and genm~ality, are produced 
under almost any external influences which adrrdt of their exist-
ence at all; while organic bodies are, from their complexity, and 
the variety of actions always proceeding, very closely dependent 
on the influences around them. Alldthe higher we ascend in the ranks 
of organic bodies, the closer is this dependence, in proportion 
to the diversity of functions; though, as we must bear in mind, the 
power of the organism in modifying the influences of the medium 
rises in proportion •••• At the other extremity we find Man, who 
can live only by the concurrence of the most complex exterior 
coniitions, atmospherical and terrestrial, under various physical 
and chemical aspects; but, by an indispensable compensation, he 
can endure, in all these conditions, much wid:r differences than 
inferior organisms could support, because he has a superior power 
of reacting on the surrounding system. 21 
Comte ... vas a theorist, one of those whom Gall would have castigated 
22 for working "in a closet." Spencer we.s equally so, Vie can sympathise 
with Darwin's complaint that "his conclusions never::;onvince me; and over 
and over again I have said to myself, after reading.me of his descriptions, 
tHere would be a fine subject for half a dozen year: t" work. t II 23 Spencer's 
"metaphysical" 24 theories of evolution anticipated. ·s.rwin t s genuinely 
scientific theories by several years. In an essay conceived in 18,54 and 
published in the Westminster Review in 857 with the title "Progress: Its 
b.awandCause"', he propounded. his belief, based on tLa theories of the 
German embryologist K. E. von Baer, that all organis;u3 are evolvir..g to-
wards state:;> of increasing complexity. He writes that lIit is settled 
beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homo-
geneous to the heterogeneous. II 25 His optimism recB.'.ls William Paley's 
argument from de~dgn for the existence ':>f God and tl: 
beings", the air, the earth, the water all "teem:;i.ng 
existence." 26 He tells us conf'idently, for example, 
"myrian.s of happy 
with delighted 
that "this law of 
organic progress is the law of all prog:::'ess.1/ 27 He then proceeds to 
list the vast area to which this 18.W a.P?lies. 'tl,vheth!:;r it be in the 
development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, 
in the development of Society , of GoveZ'nment , of Manufaotures, of 
Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution 
of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, 
holds throughout. 'I 28 This essay continues to enlarge and illustrate 
this theme until it arrives at the conclusion that .lIprogress is not 
an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent nec-
essity." 29 
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After such a example of facile optiBism, a comment from the twentieth-
century geneticist, Peter Medawar, is pertinent. It :'Ls lIa profound truth, II 
he maintains, "realised in the nineteer::th century by only a ha.."ldf'ul of 
astute biologists and by philosophers hardly at all, •• that nature does 
~ know best, that genetical evolution, if we choose to look at it 
liverishly instead of with fatuous good humoUr, is a story of waste, 
k h · ft . d bl d II 30 D . . Th Or" f S . rna es 1. ,comprOml.se, an un er. arW1.n ~n _.:~ ._ :.g~n ~ peC1.es 
avoids almost entirely suoh IIfatuous good humour" as well as the irnplicit-
ly teleological bias of Spencer t s thought .. However tl::.e concluding section 
of the work does contain this capitulatory remark: s natural selection 
works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental 
endowments will tend to progress towards perfection." 31 This remr::..rksits 
rather oddly alongside an earlier a.."ld more representative one, thet 
"natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, 
or slightly more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country 
with which it comes into competition.tI 
Gordon Haight claims that George Eliot Itsaw at 0110e what Huxley ad-
mitted years later, that the survival of the fittest is not always the 
survival of the best. 11 ~3.'This oontention is borne by ,George, Eliot's 
comment from a letter of 1867 that t'nat;':lral seleotion is not always 
good, and depends (see Darwin) on many., caprices of· very~ foo1i.sh;;.KClimal.s~ t,)3/+ 
On the whole) Darwin avoided the teleological bias discernible in 
Spencer. Tn The Oripin .~ -Species at leastjalthough-not·in·the,l;:;ss 
scientific \Jork The Descent of l.1an, Darwin also refrained from us:i..ng 
- -- .. 
the biological model of an organism's relation to its environment to 
support theories of social, political, economic and oultural orga~s-
ation. His concern -was with adaptation.Fran~oisJac,:)b -compares his 
. approach vlith that of Lamarck who ",las still-workingina system that 
acknowledged the fixity of species. Jacob declares that "for Lamarck, 
when a new organism was formed, its place was alread;.v: marked out in the 
ascending chain of beings. It had in advance to repr'sent an improvement, 
a progression on.whathad previously existed •••• With Darwin, this order 
was reversed: the formation of an orgaI'..ism precedes ".t3 adaptation. 
Nature only favours what alrea~ exists. Froductior comes before any 
value judgement on what has been produced. ti 35 
There has been a crucial shift of emphasis. ~Uv':.. Ellegarde suggests 
that the old question "what causes the adaptive var5 -:-!:;ions to occur?fI 
has been super"seded by Darwin's new question, "what:t\lses any variation 
that happens to be adaptive to be preserved?" 36 The .~~igin ~ S'peci~s 
provides the answer, and we read in it that lithe 8t;;:' .:>ture of every org-
anic being is related, in the most ess6'ltial yet often hidden manner, 
to that of all the other organic beingE" vrlth which - t comes into compet-
ition for food or residence, or f:rom wh~~ch it has tc escape, or on which 
it preys." 37 Later Darwin expresses hi.'3 ad.!:1iration .f' ecological com-
plexity when he remarks "how infinitely complex and ',lose-fitting are 
the mutual relations of all organic beings to each cher and to their 
physical conditions of life. II 38 In these words Darvv::.n adds his author-
itative voice to the chorus of sociolog:Lsts and psyc:lologists who Vi'Jre 
stressing the importance of IImedium lt or "milieu" and the inescapable 
inter-relationship .between an individua1 and. the soc:ety which ha~: 
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formed him and which he b helping to orm. 
G. H. Lewes was particularly inter0sted in the - iological an';. social 
effects of the environment on the deve.',.opment of tho individual. He 
rJrites as early as The Ph;/5iology of Common, Lif.~ (1 ;.:59-60) that '\'18 must 
constantly bear in mind that Life is possible only.nder the necessary 
conditions of an organism, on the one hand, and an,xternal medil~ on the 
other. It hi the mutual relations of o:cganism and me. dium which dc~ter­
mine the manifestations Vie name Life •••• 11 39 This SLOWS the biological 
aspect of his thought. Later, in his 1 (368 reviews 0.' "Mr Darwin' ,~; Hyp-
othesis II for the Fortnightly Review he bewails the 'act that 11th,s re-
lation of Organism and Medium, the most fundamental 8f biologica:;' data ... 
was very late in gaining recognition a,,> a princi .le: -::;f supreme i~:,port­
ance. 1I 40 He offers what he calls a "Cf)rrect defiL-.~onll of Medi;"m: 
lithe external conditions of existence.' 1.~1 This wor "conditions" 
occurs repeatedly in the novels of George Eliot. s.: for example in 
the following comment about Lydgate wh::"ch cont('.i~s s well the w,ird 
IIthreadlike," yet another instance of','leb" imager,;, George Elio.; tells 
us that "for the first ti.1C Lydgate Wf:.1 feelinf! th( :1ampering th,-eacilike 
42 pressure of small social :)onditions, and their fl'(;~; ra.ting compl·'!xity. II 
The two main idee.s t}·:l.t have emerg8d froL.1 this .·rief rece.pitlation 
of some of "che key notior:;s contained:' ninc';;c0nth :8ntury socio'.ogical 
and biological research 2.re: 1) the iIT, ;:)r<;~;,;~0 of r: ,lium, define_ by Lewes 
as "the external con,::itions of exister -'" .;;.no. 2) .0 problem of success-
ful adnptation betweeYl tbe organism all(;. ~l.ts m;;cl:L1.U:-:,), ·)r between to!.:] indiv-
idual and the society in which he liv~3. 
George Eliot made use of both of .. 'o:~e 80nCe')~:: She shared .JO','les I 
interest in "c~mclitions II and her atte;:)t to pro':3..1(; adequate str.~ctural 
correlatives for the interdependence r- nn indivi,b 1 anu his environ-
ment led her to develop, as I have aI, ady SnOI'i!l, h n complex ItVi~bll 
imagery. Similarly, she was concerned the proble:! of adaptation; 
this concern is most manifest in Th~ 'iIi: .2£ ~ Flo.:~ and her trE.atment 
of Tom and especially Maggie Tulliver. ~~~en...ry James may have felt that 
"Middlemarch is too often an echo of llessrs. Darvr.in r,nd Huxley" 43 but 
The Millon the Floss is rich in animal imagery and ecological analogues, 
and contains in addition the basic theffi of a~~ptation to environment. 
With her passionate, sensitive nat1"li~e, Maggie cor;,es into collision 
ruth a resistant, unfavourable environment. If she were to adapt herself 
to the demands of this environment she would lose he?:' moral super;.ority, 
which would be a tragedy; on the other l:'>.and, her faL,ure to adapt oauses 
her untold suffering and only the converient flood s::,ve's her from a life-
time of isolation and rejection, which '.,ould h~we be~n another ld.::;d of 
tragedy. Maggie quite definitely does not belong in~~er environment, and 
she herself is aware of this. Her abort5.ve attempt t) live with the 
gypsies is described ironically as the "only way!! sr.'~ could devis,:; "of 
44-
escaping opprobrium, and being entirely in harmony Y' .th circumstances. 1\ 
Her early childhood is shown as one COL3tant battle 0 be acoeptetl; her 
hair, her complexion, her impulsivenese;) her dreamix18-s are all'r:;garded 
by her mother and her Dodson aunts and uncles as un6~sirable. Eve-::l her 
intelligence is suspect and she is utts::,ly mortifieC when Mr SterLing, 
Tom's tutor, describes girls' intellig;;we as IIguicl and shallow." 45 
On the one level _Th_e @l _o~_n t_h_e ~]<M"~'" . __ • can be read as the tragedy of 
Maggie in her struggles against the Ifc'.9ressive nar:cowness" 46 of her 
corrununity, and its "errunet-like Dodsons'~nd Tulliver;:-\, It 47 a tragedy that 
George Eliot sees as indioati ve of Utr:-: sui'fering,; whether of ma.......-tyr or 
victimj' whioh belongs to every histor .. cal advance r;!~ mankind." 48 We 
are shown the effects of this "oppres;;;:' 78 narrovmes'7" in Tom's li£'e, as 
well as in Maggie's in order that we c.. 1l.."lderstand how nit has acted 
on [fhei::1 Ii ves--how it has acted on n~:ng natures in many gene:n:'l.tions, 
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that in the onward tendency of human tr~ings have risen above thellental 
level of the generat:i!on before them, to which they have been nevertheless 
tied by the strongest fibres of their hearts .. II 49 Vie may doubt wr.ether 
George Eliot has succeeded in winning our sympathy for Tom or even wheth-
er he has risen "above the mental level of the generationtl before him, but 
we have no difficulty in accepting her assessment of Maggiets situation. 
Earlier she has told us that it is "no wonder, when there is this contrast 
between the outward and the inward, that painful collisions come of it." 50 
And the painful collisions reach their climax in Maggie's return to St 
Ogg's. The community judges her an outcast and rejects her; she has re-
fused to concede to its standards. As a child she felt that the only way 
to escape opprobrium was to run away to the gypsies; there is no such 
solution now. She faces a life-time of penitential efforts to be rein-
stated with the whole of her world and especially with Tom. However, the 
flood and the reunion with Tom dispose of her so that instead of living 
a life "without opium ll 51 she succumbs, as Barbara Hardy has pointed 
out, 52 to a familiar childnood fantasy. By performing deeds pi' heroism, 
she wins respect and admiration. 
George Eliot has shown the impossibility of Maggie's ever adapting 
to her environment and even if we are diverted from a full-scale tragedy 
by the apotheosis of the ending, we tend to believe George Eliot that, 
given her nature and the conditions of her environment, Maggie did not 
have a great deal of choice. But George Eliot herself, an intelligent, 
rebellious girl,with an equally oppressive, self-richteous brother, 
found an alternative means of adaptation. It is quite inforIn.:')tive to 
consider the possibilities confronted by Maggie in the light of the 
adaptive possibilities outlined by Morris Ginsberg in his typology of 
evolution. 
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Evolution is said to be prof,res ive when it "roduces type;:' that 
are more dominant or more and abundant; or have more con-
trol over and greater independe"cefroffi the e;J.'lvironment; or have 
the ability to cope with a greater variety of environment::,; or 
develop powers of 1'twareness vlhi:;h enable ther;-. to respond ·with 
e;reater plasticity and discrimination to their environment.53 
For all Maggie f s powers 01' awareness, c;he only substantial attempt she 
makes to win greater independence from her envi:-conment is by means of 
her response to ThOITl:l.S .'8, Kempis. Vie do not see her ::respoud to her en~ 
vironment with greater plastid ty and i1iscrimination. Later I wi: 1 ex-
amine this problem more fully in terms of how far G.,;orge Eliott s scheme 
of ffioral development limited the range of choices s.a was willinr to 
allow for her characters. For the momeEt I am merel;c h~nting at tne im-
plications of George Eliot's evolution[u:Y treatment of Maggie ani:' her 
problems of adaptation. Herbert Spence:~, secure in;lis teleologioal be-
lief in evolutionary prog;:'ess could vlT'::'_te. that Hall ",viI results from the 
non-adaptation of constit~ltion to cono.:...tions" from ,mnt of cong:,'uity 
between the i'aculties and their s:phere..=.' of' action~ G~orge BLot 
might well have agreed th:0.t 11age;ie t s t::'agedy, the f; ilure of her commu.1'l-
ity to appreciate her finely-wrought netture, consti utes an evil. But 
the alternative indicated by Spencer y: ;uld have req '.red her to accede, 
! 
for example, to Stephen's pragmatic sugestion thai: must noy: "accept 1/ 
their Uactions, and start afresh from " II . (lem .. 
ively, "' our position is altered; the 
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was before. t II The term;;:; of referenc·" 
a means of judging Maggie ~ s moral 
:~ says most;>2rsuas-
courSE: no longer ,chat it 
Elio has offered 'us &,5 
such a f orrn of 
8,(Ulptation to circumsta.nc':3s would be a:lefeat, a of integrity on 
."'."'.6(",-'-'" S part, from which~ we are led 0 believe, 5:',3 \'lould never re-
cever. Viewed alongside the subtlety o.~ George Eli)I:;' s characterisation, 
the remark of Spencer I have just quot c"a. seems nai v' and far too general-
~lirectinG her irony at just the sort O~ cldn :;tation t.'at Spencer W·'.S au-
vocating. She cannotJ however, escape her bias, and we cannot 
feelinc; that her Christi[m diabili ty is Irl:)ti vated 
less by the exibencies of the plot than by her need 0 show us th~,t he 
vrill not be ["ole to continue this kind)f He represen:::s a 
survival ethic which she totally repudL.tes. 
Itr Christian, "ilho h:'l.d been remar:able life for power 
en~·bles a man to fall 
ions and escapes, 
circui:~stance to which 
of adapting himself to circur:\stv:1.C8S which 
safely on all-fours in the most >mrried 
was not exempt f'rom bodily suf'fe:::'inc;--a 
there is no knovm WHy of adaptins one t 5 
comfortable under it, or to push it off 
shoulders. 57 
':0 as to be perfectly 
on to other people" s 
The relationship of a oharacter to~he Cu"",; ... ",,,,,,, ... of his envil~on-
ment and the difficulties he may have in adapting hio;,,,;elf successfully 
to that enviro:nment are treated themati(~ally in 
However, this relationship also prOvide: exte!lG.ed and ecological 
analogies in the novels. InterestinglY:1 thp rev:i,evl(~l" )f The Millo!1 the __ IIf· ___ _ 
~~ for the Examiner, 181:0, was "SO a;-noyedl! at Eliot t S u.se of 
'tscientii'ic terminology" that he "even 1.en1:. so fnr a. +:0 accuse Lc-,1e5 
of interpolating it." 58 Direct compari"ons W:1:''::::: act',iil animals ar:.i 
~pecific characters abo~~d in Mill .:1 the ~ 
._- -- --~--,.. 
teva Stump corl1nents 
"';hat of the characterc: in the book Ok' ',;:1. vn ·t~~~ sL e exceptior of 
J)r Kenn, are characterised and developE';' in terms nimal images. t! 59 
~~ggie is an exuberant and p'.:, ,Y'1; she and ·'·Jnl together 13::--e 
~)hetland ponies. The Dodson aunts and t',;e3 are e~~:li 
fl.'ulliver is the subject of a Chauceria!l:'able in the entitled. 
ilHow a Hen ta,1ces to Stratagem" where he:: f'.1tile atteF s to diS8U8.,ie 
for the mill are COffiT:Jrect \T1th t:n~ efforts of a hen 
·!to prevail on Hod""e not to v,-ring her n; -k "' .... send hfT and her chicks o ....... .1' ..... ) vr..;. 
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Besides these direct comparisons, Iere are 1 on:r, more important 
passages of authorial comrnentary which show how George Eliot fOl.L.'1d 
metaphorical inspiration in evolutione,.J.·Y theories. I.Jr Tulliver's in-
flexibility of mind and purpose after he has heard that he has lost 
his law suit, for instance, shows that like other creatures, he needs 
to "predominate in his ovm imagination .. II We read that "there are certain 
animals to which tenacity of position a law of life--they can never 
flourish again, after a single wrench: and there are certain human 
beings to whom predominance is a law of life--they can only Busts.in 
humilia.tion so long as they refuse to believe in it, and, in their own 
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conception, predominate still. tI 
George Eliot's evolutionary imagery is not confined to animal ref-
erences or comparisons between aniw31 ~'1d human behaviour. ~ Orisin ~ 
Species also refers to plant growth ana behaviour. George Eliot makes 
the following damaging botanical reference to Mr TuJliver on the occasion 
of his inscribing his vengeful curse against Wakem in the fly-leaf of the 
family Bible. She instructs us not to feel surprise that Mr Tulliver, a 
regular ohurch-goer, could nonetheless record his vindictiveness in 
this way. "Certain seeds which are required to find ''3. nidus for them-
selves under unfavourable circumstance:::, II she remind.s us, l'have been 
supplied by nature with an apparatus ot hooks, so that they will get 
hold on very unreceptive surfaces. The spiritual seed which had been 
scattered over Mr Tulliver r...ad apparehtly been destitute of any corresp-
ondingprovision, and had slipped off to the winds again, from a total 
absence of hooks. tI ,.62 
In this chapter, I have endeavourec, to set George Eliot t s awareness 
of the complexities of 80cial interact~;_ ~'n, of the fact that "men 18 lives 
are as thoroughly blended with each ot.( r as the air they breathe," 63 
alongside the ecological and sociologiv;.l theories of the early a.nd 
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mid-nineteenth century in order to revio.'ll the simi18~dties between theql. 
The terms in which writers such a.s Com~', Spencer, Darwin, and Lewes 
present their recognition of the importmt interdependence of organism 
and medium, despite numerous biological examples in ~e Origin £[ Species, 
are inevitably abstract and generalised.. George Elic ~ t s novels, on the 
other hand, take this same recognition, a recognitic', which as Lewes 
points out always existed but which wa[; not given stc.c"ficient weight, and 
examine it in personalised, individual terms. it is the case that 
"there is no private life which has not been determi~led by a wide:,:" public 
64-life, II then, George Eliot asks, what happens wheL a passionate, sen-
sHive girl like Maggie Tulliver is placed in a narr·)w 'and rejecting 
environment? what happens when a character like Lydg!lte has to con-
tend with an environment like :Middlemarch "which co\'x1ted on swallowing 
Lydgate and assimilating him very comfcrtablylt? 65::':1e novels, !h~ Mill 
.2!!. the Floss and Middlemarch, provide answers to th~.:,e questions.' 
It is important to remember, however, toot in ac:<::epting the tenets 
of the emerging evolutionary psychology' George Eliot did not reject the 
earlier association psychology. In the same way t!Ls.~~ evolutionary psych-
ologists like Spencer and Lewes used the theories of learning-by-
association to support their evolution&.~i:·y olaims, Gf;)rge Eliot retained 
her belief' in the theory of psychologic8,l determini3!l when she acoepted 
a view of society which Morse Peckham 1'13 described S',s "ecological" 66 
67 
and "organicist. n This ecological 67T.phasis is no,,;. restricted only to 
the later novels but appeE\!'S tentative} - in an novel like Adam 
ped~" There we read that in times of sorr01<tj ;.8 sense of our lives 
having visible and invi3ible relations any "!hich either our 
present or prospective self is the cerr ,:"'8, grows l.lK(~ a muscle that we 
68 
are obliged to lean on and exert. " 1d.";hei'ollcv:'..ng epigraph from 
~tisi.dlemarch clearly illustx-ates her cOY'-::;inuing 
psychological determinism .. 
Our deeds still travel with us f~om afar, 6) 
And ... ·That we have been makes us ,,;nat we are, 
in the theory of 
When writing on t:reorge Eliot's COnC3pt of f'reedo~il, I conclude1 that, 
for her, "freedom is necessity understood." 70 In the last two cil£.pters 
I have endeavoured to outline some aspects of that IInecessity.1I In the 
next chapter I will look at a further development of the evolutionary 
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psychology and show how it adds yet anc.;her "necessaJ:"Y condition" to those 
I have already discussed. 
~ Inb orn Half.: 5!!.. Memory .. 
In The Study of Psychology (1878), LeVies writes of the four tigre at 
factors of Human Psychology: Organism, External 'Medium, Heredity" and 
"relation to a Social Medium. It 1 I have dealt with three of these, but, 
so far, have said nothing about heredity or the sorts of things nine-
teenth century psychologists believed could be inherited. Although 
theories of heredity no longer postulated an almost literal mingling 
of bloods, this was still the pre-Mendelian period. Lewes, however, 
certainly recognised such aspects of the mechanism of heredity as 
"atavism," 2 whereby a characteristic could remain dormant for several 
generations, and, what he calls the Itpotency of the individual," 3 
which are basically Mendel's dominant and recessive characteristics. 
The work in which he discusses his views on heredity, !h! PhY':liology 
2f. Common ~ ( 1859-60), shows strikingly the interchange of ideas 
that took place between him and George Eliot. At this time, George Eliot 
was researching for her second full-length novel, ~ ~ .2!! ~ Floss, 
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and the two of them visited various tidal rivers in search for a suitable 
location for this novel and its concluding flood. This preoccupation with 
mills led Lewes to think of the continuous sound of a mill-wheel when 
discussing whether consciousness requires attentiveness. 4 Conversely, 
we can detect in ~ !1f!:l2!! ~ Floss a considerable interest in the 
working-out of heredity in relation to the mingling of the Dodson and 
Tulliver bloods in the persons of Tom and 1mggie. Some of the references 
are deliberately folksy and unscientific, very much in keeping with the 
lack of scientific understanding of the character who makes them .. Mr 
Tulliver ruminates on the puzzling differences between Tom and Maggie 
and offers the following reasons for his selecting his wi~e: 
tIt's the wonderful t st thing ." .. as I pioked the mother because 
she wasn't 0' er t cute--bein' a geed-loeking woman too, ant come 
of a rare family fer managing; but I picked her ~om her sisters 
ot purpose, 'cause she was a bit weak, like; for I wasn't agoin' 
to' be teld the rights 0' things by my own fireside. But you see 
when a man's get brains himself, there t s no knowing where they tIl 
run to; an' a pleasant sort 0' soft woman may go on breeding you 
stupid lads and 'cute vlenches, till it's like as if theSworld was 
turned topsy-turvey. Itt s an uncemmon puzzlint thing. f 
Mrs Tulliver' snotions of heredity run to trivia as we might expect. 
She was "thankful to have been a Dedson, and to' have one child who took 
after her own family, at least in his features and complexion, in liking 
salt and eating beans, which a Tulliver never did. II 6 The passage of 
authorial cemment that fellows reveals Geerge Eliot- s own judgement in 
the matter. She tells us that !lin other respects the true Dedsen was 
, 
partly latent in Tom, and he was as far from appreciating his 'kin' on 
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the mother t s side as Maggie herself." The Dodsonian sternness of principle 
and self-righteousness are carried in the "richer Tt:~lliver blood" which 
had, besiCLes, "element s of generous imprudence, i';a.r:~ affection, and hot-
tempered rashness. II 7 Maggie's spontaneous, loving r.ature is shown to be 
similar to that of her I:'.unt Gritty, whO' is -described as a "patient, 
prolific, loving-hearted woman. II 8 This aunt who has, had eight children, 
but who "could never overcome her regret that the had not Ii ved.1 9 
is knewn to the children by her Christian name; the Dodson aunts and 
uncles are aunt Pullet or uncle Glegg, inviting no such affectionate 
familiarity. Tom's angular self-righteousness, inherited from his mother's 
family, is compounded with the Tulliver vindictiveness. Maggiets generosity 
and warm-heartedness are likewise tempered by her capacity for self-
discipline, which is a Dodson trait. 
From this we can see that George Eliot accepted that the possibilities 
of inheritance are not restricted to physical characteristics only but 
extend, as '.veIl, to temperamental diff'erences. Lewes vll'ites that "with 
this inheritance of the general organisation, ""-~hat is, bony, muscular, 
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nervous and glandular struoture~] f'we necessarily inh,,,rit its tendencies .. 
,~ 
We inherit the temperament, the longevity, the strength,the susceptibility 
of one or both parents •••• " Likewise, lIeven special aptitudes, such as 
those for music, mathematics, wit, and so on, will be inherited; nay, even 
. 't '. " 10 acqmrea. enaencl.es •••• 
Through this Lamarckian concept of the possibility of inheriting ao" 
quired characteristics, Lewes and, as we shall see later, Spencer and 
Darwin reintroduce a faint notion of the theory of innate ideas. The 
theory of evolution gave a greater impetus to this tentative statement of 
Lewes. For, if we have evolved over countless generations, and if the laws 
of association obtain so that by frequent and vivid repetition .ve establish 
in the nervous system certain set responses, then whot we are today!re-
presents an amalgam of ancestral tendencies and respcnses laid down over 
the centuries. Our response to the world is still ex}:erientially based but 
it no longer needs to be our own indivi:lual, separate experience; we now 
have the whole history of the race and all its attenE~J_nt experiences to 
account for the differences in response and character,. Spencer V'Jrites in 
The PrinciEles of PsychC?IJ2..€;i;Z. (1855) that "these u.l1ifcX'm ancestral exper-
iances, potentially present in the nervous structure~ bequeathed to us 
11 constitutea~ partially-inn,}te preparedness. II 
What Spencer has no\'! st:ated is that -Ne l?.J:'e not passively reoept-
i ve to experiences but in the important prooess of a:~'lptation, the adjust,;., 
ment between the inner wor:~d of "lile org<,nism and the outer world of the 
milieu, we can utilise the accumulated experience not just of our ovm past 
but that of the race from -J·,mch '."Ie have 3prung. We are no longer envisaged 
as tabulae :r:..~sae or even uCondillac t s i;c:di vi dual humeJ:1 statue.:::s • II 1 2 
Both of' these have been replaced by a "racial w.imal colossus." 13 This 
is made explicit in Spencer t s ~ Pri!];£;~:@:..e~ 2£ Psycl:'.0.l0~ where he states 
that 
rest with the urqualified assertion that, antecedent to ex-
perience, the mind is a blank, is' to ignore tIle all-essential 
questions--whence comes the power of organising experiences? 
whence arise the different degrees of that power possessed by 
different races of organisms, and different individuals of the 
same race? •• Understood in its current form, the experience-
hypothesis implies that the presence of a definitely organised 
nervous system is a circumstance of no moment--a fact not need-
ing to be taken into account! Yet it is the all-important fact--
the fact ••• without which an assimilation of experiences is 
utterly inexplicable. 14 
Spencer explains the Itdefinitely organised nervous system" in Lamarckian 
terms, as transmittable from one generation to another; we have seen 
Lewes do the same. This goes far to account for our intellectual qual-
ities, and Spencer explains our emotional qualities as originating in 
the same way, laid dovm and stabilised by vividness and frequency of 
occurrence, not only in our own, but in our ancestors' lifetimes. In the 
next chapter when I look at George Eliot's notion of moral development, 
I will show the importance of this evolutionary psychology as the pro-
vider of' a basis for and an explanation of the moral sense. This with 
its affective component, sympathy, was helo. to have been established 
in the same way as other emotional qualities of the individual. 
Spencer's !!:!!. Principles .2f. Psycholo~ appeared in its first form 
in 1855, four years before The Origin .2f. Species which, as I have in-
~?ated, gave an additional and more scientifically and experimentally 
based impetus to this emergent evolutionary psychology. Previous epist-
emological debates between tlnativists" and empiricists had been under-
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pinned by a belief in the fixity of species, which inevitably implied the 
view that if the actual physical species were fued, then mental con-
stltutions were likewise fixed and immutable. The relinquisbi.l}g of the 
belief and the acceptance of a greatly extended time-scale were two 
essential factors in Darwin's formulation of his "Development Hypothesis." 
Evolution, therefore, introduced a new factor in the debate I have just 
referred to, and, as well, the empirical position was greatly strengthened 
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by new findine:s in cornparati ve neurolOKj. 'fhus, as I have quoted before, " 
"the meaning of repetition of associaticns is broadev.ed, and the law of 
frequency or habit acquires a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic 
interpretation. II 15 The empiricists may seem to have won the debate but 
Spencer's "partially-innate preparedness" 16 and Da,r-ian's !~use­
inheritance" 17 lay both of them open to the charge or reintroducing 
the notion of innate ideas in the form of a disposition, or set, a 
readiness to learn. Gall had ea.c'lier described the same tendency as some-
thing "biologically given. II 18 
We see evidence that George Eliot subscribed to this view of' tlpart-
ially-innate preparedness It in various remarks about her characters t 
deficiencies. Hetty, for example, in Adam Bede, is de3cribed as having 
a "trivial soul. II 19 Tom Tulliver in Th,~ ~ .2!!. the E~ has a "con-
genital deficiency" which makes it enormously hard for him to apprehend 
"signs and abstraction." 20 Mr Tulliver has a "dimly-lighted soul. 11 21 
In the argument between Tito and Romola over the sale of Bardi t s library, 
this is how George Eliot presents Tito to us. lilt was impossible for him, 
---
shut up in the narro,mess that hedges in all merely c].ever, unimpassioned 
22 
men, not to overestimate· the persuasiveness of his o',:n arguments .. II 
This contrasts with an earlier descripticm of Romola' that· tlit , belongs to 
every large nature, when it is not under the immediate power of some 
strong unquestioning emotion, to suspect itself, and doubt the truth of 
its own impressions, conscious of possibilities beyond its aim horizon. II 23 
There is a strong suggestion of inequality. in these remarks; not everyone 
starts at the same point or with the same advantages. Yet a general re-
mark from 1uda.;:t.emarch implies equality. "Vie are all of us born in moral 
stupidity, taking the world as an udder tc:> feed our supreme selves •••• " 24 
This is an unfortunate image, even with the authoritative weight of 
Quarles' s'~ £f. Emb1e~ behind it. We lose the notion of equo,lity again 
in a trenchant comment in The ~ ~ ~ Floss follmving the description 
of Tom"s intransigent attitude towards his sister~": Geor-g~ Eliotwri'tes 
~"Tom, like every one of us, was imprisoned within the limits of his 
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own nature, and his education had simply glided over him, leaving a slight 
deposit of polish: if you are inclined to be severe on his severity, rem-
. ember that the responsibility of tolerance with those who have the 
wider vision." 25 And that the wider vision is something hardly and pain-
fully won she has already told us in her summing up of the iconographic 
chanter 15 in ~ B.e?:,e, after we have watched Hetty t s narcissistic musing 
in front of the mirror and the contrasting meditative yearning of Dinah 
over the world outside her window. For all Dinah's moral excellence, her 
understanding of Hetty is shovm to be deficient. George Eliot reminds us 
, 
that "it is our habit to say tha:t while the lower nature can never under-
stand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of th.e lower. 
But I think, II she goes on, II the higher nature has to learn this compre-
hension, as we learn the art of vision, by a good deal of hard experieuce, 
often with bruises and gashes incurred in taking things up by the wrong 
end, and fancying our space wider than it is. II 26 
These last quotations, while still stressing inherited nature with 
ij;s implicit inequality also emphasise the nature and quality of exper-
ience as a modifying factor. Tom Tulliver is perhaps the only major 
character to be presented as "inexorable, unbending, unmodifiable" 27 
and even he is accorded his act of generosity comparable to Rosamond 
Vincy's acknoYlledeement that Will Ladislaw loves Dorothea. 'I'he pre-
cipitate ending of ~ ~ ~ the Floss gives Tom!s act a permanence 
whereas it is most likely of the same nature as Rosamond's, a single 
act of generosity but not one which changes the whole bias of the 
personality. Both Tom and Rosamond have the experience which brings 
out, however momentarily, the finer sides of their natures; and through-
out the novels this emphasis on the necessary experience is a recurring 
motif. Felix Holt, for example, tells Esther that nit all depends on 
what a man gets into his consciousness--what life thrusts into his mind, 
SO that it becomes present to him as remorse is present to the guilty, 
t . . 'I 28 or a mechanical problem to an inven ~ve ge~us. 
This emphasis on experience brings us back to Lewes' oontribution 
to evolutionary psychology. He took the concept of biological evolution 
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from Spencer and Darwin and extended and developed it. H. C. Warren writes 
of him that he was "unique among associationists in emphasising the 
social data of psychology, which he believe[d] to be chiefly responsible 
for the tremendous growth of mind in man beyond other species. 1t 29 
Lewes' work as an experimental biologist, his fluency in European lang-
... 
uages which enabled him to keep abreast of the new developments in 
neurophysiolo{"Y in both :brance and Germuny--he would have scorned the 
notion of "cerebral hyglime" 30 practised assiduously by Comte and to 
a lesser extent by Spencer--and his early enthusiasm for the 1de.as of 
comte, all contributed to his importance in this field. ~ StuW ~ 
Psychology offers his major formulation of evolutionary psychology. In 
it, we read that "it is inc..isputable that every particular man comes 
into the world with a heritage of organised forms and def'inite tend-
encies, which will determine his feeling and thinking in certain def-
'/ 31 a inite ways, whenever the suitable conditions are present.... The 
only question, therefore, is "#hat are the conditions?' It is the 
task of the psychologist to specify them. II 32 
The study of the conditions necessary for an organism to function 
with the maximum efficiency and creativity is made possible by the 
underlying belief in the "invariability of sequence" 33 that I have 
already discussed. Identical conditions will produce L:l.entical re-
sults; a change in the conditions will necessitate a change in the 
results. This is the theoretic basis behind George Eliot's rather $elf-
conscious question to her reader in ~ ftede" after we have watch~d 
Arthur Donnithorne adopt a line of action vlhich has become a lIguestion 
of tactics," 34 a deliberate policy to quieten Adam's suspicions by 
~.>" •. --
means of half-lies and evasions. George Eliot turns directly to the 
reader with the follo'lring question. "Are you inclined to ask whether this 
can be the same Arthur who, two months ago, had that freshness of feeling, 
that delicate honour which shrinks from vlounding even a sentiment, and does 
not contemplate any more positive offence as possible for it?--who thought 
that his ovm self-respect was a higher tribunal than any external opin-
ion?" She then provides the answer herself. "The same, I 
only ~ di:f:ferent conditions. II 35 (my italics) 
assure you, 
,. 
Lewes as a psychologist set himself to specify the conditions vlhich 
lead to certain actions: George Eliot, as a novelist, set hersel:f the 
same task. As I have already suggested he VIas inevitably dealing 
generalisv:uions and abstractions, not individualised cases, whereas she 
was working with particularised, individual human beines, adjusting her 
perspective to include a character's "report" of his "own consciousness 
about his doings or capacity" 36 as well as providing an overvievl as a 
JIleans by which vie can get him into clearer perspective. Thus her aWare-
ness of "conditions II makes her write ironically of Lydgate, that "he 
was at a starting point which makes Dany a man's career a :fine subject 
for betting, if there were any gentlemen given to that amusement who 
could appreciate the complicated probabilities of an arduous purpose, 
with all the pos:j-ble thwartings and furtherings of circumstance, all 
the niceties of inward balance, by which a man swims and makes his 
point or else is carried headlong. 11 37 
In this chapter I have been indicating the importance of the factor 
38 
of heredity, especially ir. the form of something "biologically given ll 
as an additional determinant in the development of hL1man personality. 
I have sho\'m that ivhile George Eliot acknowledged this factor, she was 
far from giving too much weight to it. To overstress its importance 
would be to define human personality and the possibility of human 
growth in too rigid and too static terms. And for George Eliot, human 
growth means, almost entirely, moral growth. However, there is an addit-
ional aspect of this evolutionary psychology which appears in George 
Eliot's later works, The Spanish G;:{.Esy and. Daniel Deron~ This is the 
concept of racial memory, v:hich does impose severe limitations on a 
character t S development and the sorts of choices he can make. I will 
examine it specifically in a later chapter when I discuss .George 
Eliotts concept of duty, and I ,nll substant~ate ~ claim that it con-
stitutes a limiting factor when I examine the implications of George 
Eliot's intellectual and moral position. For the moment I will give a 
brief general outline of this concept as it belongs logically to this 
discussion on evolutionary psychology. 
George Eliot in her "Notes on The SVanish Gypsy and Traged,y in gen-
crall! discusses the theme of this long poem and says that she saw "it 
might be taken as a symbol of the part which is plEyed in the general 
human lot by hereditary conditions in the largest sen:Je, and of the fact 
that what we call duty is entirely made up of such conditions. 1I 39 In 
this poem, and age-in in Daniel DeJ:"Onda., she presents us vlith characters, 
Fe.ctalmaandDeronda., whose lives are defined in terms of a racial duty, 
1j.0 
a "hereditary'! entailed Nemesis. II roth of them spend the early part of 
their lives in exile, as it were, from their hereditary people, or at 
least in ignorance of their racial background. But we are led to believe 
that Deronda. t s Jewishness is present to his mind as a determi!'ling factor 
even before he is told of his ancestry. The consumptive visionary, 
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'Mordecai, presents this view of a Jew'ish racial memory at the gathering 
of working-class men who meet regularly to exchange ideas and extend 
their knowledge. tltThe heritage of Israel,' he says, 'is beating in the 
pulses of millions; it lives in their veins as a power without under-
standing, like the morning exultation of herds; it is the inborn half 
Ef.memory, moving as in a dream among i'lI'itings on the walls, which it 
sees dimly but cannot divide into speech.' \I 41 (my italics) 
This might seem but a chance remark of a Jewish fanatic, Vlere it 
not for other evidence. Deronda attends a J evrlsh service while visiting 
Franki'urt and is deeply moved b;:,r it. I'!hen he mentions this to Mirah on 
his return to London, she is surprised and says: "'I thought none but 
our people would feel that.' II 42 Deronda finds an explanation in keep-
\ 
ing with an anthropological and comparative view of religion and 
suggests that the Christian religion is lit chiefly a. Hebre'w religion; 
and since Jews are men, their religious feelings must have much in 
common with those of other men--just as their poetry, though ~n one 
sense peculiar, has a great deal in common with the poetry of other 
nations. ttl 43 This statement accords with a view of evolutionary 
psychology which would give all men a common heritance. His next tent-
ative remark suggests the possibility, which is borne out by subsequent 
events of the book, that there is a specific racial consciousness. He 
continues, "'Still it is to be expected that a Jew would feel the forms 
of his people's religion more than one of another race.'" 44 The sig-
nificance of this remark is missed on ~ first reading of Daniel 
Deronda but the dramatic irony is ve~J apparent to the reader on sub-
sequent readings. fit is interesting to 
L......... 
from a belief in a universal ancestral 
, 
note tha.~jGeorge Eliot t s shift 
inheritance to a spebific~ly 
Jewish one anticipates a simila.r shift in the thought of Sigmund 
Freud. David Riesman comments that 1'reud, in his study of the Jews, 
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lIabandoned the historical universalism vlhich would have given all human 
beings the same phylogenetic experience and racial memory; instead, he 
traced those particular events of Jewish religious experience which, to 
his mind, gave the Jews a distinct national character and a distinct 
racial memory. It 45 
Deronda t s "inborn half of memory," 46 t'he J ewishness he is not con-
scious of, makes him respond very sensitively and sympathetically to 
lkirah's 1evnshness. Her appreciation of his delicacy makes her forget 
that he is not of her race. I/,You know, t" he has to remind her, ,It I was 
not brought up as a Jew.' II 47 She blushes, looks disappointed and con-
fesses that she always forgets this fact. Thus, in a later conversation 
with her brother which, significantly, occurs while Deronda is in Genoa 
awaiting his mother and news of his parentage, Mirah asks: IItEzra, how 
is it? •• I am continually going to speak to lIfr Deronda as if he were a 
Jew~ttl Ezra replies: IItI suppose it is because he treats us as if he 
w~'e our brother. But he loves not to have the difference of birth 
dwelt upon. t It 48 
All these hints and undercurrents are revealed as premonitions once 
Deronda has had his interview Vlith Alcharisi and learnt that he comes 
from a line of politically active Jews, "a line of Spanish Jews that 
has borne many students and men of practical power." 49 And the final 
statement comes in a format which shows unmistakably the line of evol- X 
r-~"-.C~""'~'""~ 
utionary psychological thought implicit throughout this treatment of 
Deronda t S Jewishness. Deronda explains to Mordecai tr..at 
'It is you who have given shape to what, I believe, was an in-
herited yearning--thet'effect of brooding, passionate thoughts 
in many ancestors--thoughts that seem to have been intensely 
present in my grandfather. Suppose the stolen offspring of some 
mountain tribe brought up in a oity of the plain, or one vuth 
an inherited genius for painting, and born blind--the ancestral 
life would lie within them as a dim longing for unknown objects 
and sensations, and the spell-bound habit of their inherited 
frames would be like a cunningly-va'ought musical instrument, 
never played on, but quivering throughout in uneasy mysterious 
moanings of its intricate structure that, under the right touch, 
gives music. Something like that, I think, has been my ex-
perience.' 50 
The course of Deronda's life, as he himself accepts, has been 
shaped by this ever-present, but inarticulate yearning. The experiences 
of his politically active Jewish ancestors have laid dovm in his nervous 
system, tendencies and dispositions, which make it impossible for him 
to assuage his restlessness without acknowledging his ancestry and 
committing himself' to the cause of Jewish nationalism. The passage I 
have just quoted provides a very succint description of the specialised 
aspects of evolutionary psychology which George Eliot used to provide a 
framework for Deronda's search for "some social captainship, which would 
come to Chi~ as a duty, and not be striven for as a personal prize." 51 
This completes my account of mid-century psy~hological assumptions 
and the relationship they bear to the novels of George Eliot. She 
adapted and refined the learning-by-association of the school of assoc-
iation psychology, utilised ecological theories and the concept of 
~edium and converted far her purposes the tenets of evolutionary psych-
ology. Ii' she had lived to vlitness the new psychology oi' Sigmund Freud, 
we can well imagine that she would have f'ruitfully adapted his theories 
for her presentation of character. Her awareness.of the unconscious is 
already manifest in the following description of Gwendolen Harleth. She 
tells us that "there is a great deal of unmapped country within us which 
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would have to be taken into account in an explanation of our gusts and 
storms. tI 52 Angus Wilson indicates the shortcomings of the mid-nineteenth 
century, pre-Freudian psychology whioh provided the parameters within 
which George Eliot established and defined her characters. He comments 
on its failure to encompass greater depths; of psychological analysis. 
IIIf we look again at George Eliot's analysis of Lydgate or Rosamond ar 
Gwendolen we may feel that description of character in moral terms, 
though still adequate to her themes, is already feeling towards subcon-
acious and hidden motives for which neither terlnnology nor technique 
is available. Vie are on the threshold," he saysl(and in his opinion 
.~ ". 
only Dostoevsky was able to cross it unaided), "of a psychology for which 
the older novel forms do not provide." 53 
86. 
Moral Development. 
A belief in the possibility of moral growth is fundamental to 
George Eliot's thought. It underpins the compromise she reached between 
1 
necessitarianism and a belief in the power to "will strongly." She 
uses the psychological assumptions of the mid-nineteenth century in 
order to depict the moral growth or decline of her charaoter:;.'Any 
attempt to understand the complexity of her moral position requires 
us to range very widely and disouss eighteenth "century moral philo-
sophers such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, Balguy and Price, 
nineteenth-century scientists, moral philosophers and sociologists 
like Charles Darwin, Alexander Bain, Herbert SpenQ.er, Auguste Comte 
and G. H. Lewes, as well as the humanist ethical writer, Ludvng 
Feuerbach. If George Eliot had been willing to practise "cerebral 
hygiene" 2 like Comte, and to a certain extent like Spence:r, it would 
have been considerably easier to give an abstract of her position. In-
---, 
'---stead I am forced to take her as the centre of a set of radiating 
spokes. These spokes, Hume or Darwin or Feuerbach, for example, may 
themselves have very little in common. But they all converge on the 
central pivot of her consciousness and our understanding of that con-
sciousness .madiated thropgh her letters, articles, and novels. In a 
defence of Daniel Deronda., she wrote that she meant "everything in 
the book to be related to everything else there." 3 The same state-
ment could equally well apply to her moral thought, so that any sugg-
estion of a chronological or a linear progression is erroneous. Once 
again I am moving from an account of her thought which is general and 
abstract to an account of individual novels and individual characters 
within those novels. The current analysis is concerned with how George 
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Eliot translates particular ideas into the texture of a novel, revealing 
the particular moral dilemmas faced by individual characters. Her moral ,·i 
ii' bias was to reject rigid rules and precepts and to focus on fellowship 
and sympathy. We see further evidence of this in her often expressed 
responsibility tow~ds her readers, and her deliberate aim of enlarging 
their moral sensibilities .and increasing their capacity for sympathy. 
George Eliotts moral position, looked at in general terms, relates 
to the nineteenth century attempt, in the absence of the traditional 
belief in Christianity, to find a sanction f'or morality in the prin-
ciples of evolution. The progressivist interpretations of The Origin 
~ Species lent credence to a belief that mankind was morally advancing. 
even if that advance was very gradual. \'lriters such as Bain, Spencer, 
Lewes, and Darwin shared a common moral disourse. Their concern for 
moral betterment made them emphasise continually the importance of 
sympathy as the only sure basis for interpersonal relationships and 
moral growth. The capacity to feel sympathy ensured moral progress and 
was also an indication of the moral status of the individual. It pro-
vided a safeguard against the "amoral individualism" 4 which was another 
possible interpretation of the lesson contained in ~ Origin ~ Species 
and the phrase "survival of the fittest. II But to state that George 
Eliot believed in moral progress is not to suggest that she maintained 
with Werbert Spencer that "progress (!a~ a beneficent necessity. II 5 
She early recognised that survival of the fittest did not mean sur-
vival of the best and accordingly accepted a very conservative est-
imate of the possible rate of clli~nge. 
The nineteenth century empha.sis on sympathy and the use of the term 
"moral sense" show a continuous line of development from the moral 
thought of the eighteenth century and such men as Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson and Hume. But an emphasis on morality as primarily a feeling 
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introduces the fear of ethical relati v: sm. George Eliot's solution to this 
difficulty was to state that while mor[lity was something other than a 
rigid following of rules and precepts, yet rules ami precepts were 
necessary until man had reached a sufficiently advanced state of ;noral 
education. The rules must at all times, however, be tempered with in-
sight into individual situations and fellowship for individual suffer-
)vP J 
ing. Egoism is the barrier to moral insight. Egoists are blinkered by 
f' 
their tendency to translate all situations into vehicles for their own 
needs. It is only the rare person in a George Eliot novel who oan tran-
scend such egoism, learn to "see" rightly and is thu~ permitted to set 
aside the rules and precepts in the interests of a wider goal. I~ertain Gn.-,-i; 
~ ~-
finely tuned characters, Dinah Morris, iJorothea Bro(;:~e, Romola, and 
Deronda, achieve a state of moral growth where their moral perceptions 
become certainties. This aspect of George Eliot t s t{~JUght, which is 
{" 
one way of disposing of the "bogey of relativism,1I 0 means that, to a 
certain extent, she can be called a moral intui tiom:;;t § This connects 
her to the "intellectual" moral school of the eightennth century. 'l"he 
absolutist element in her ethical think:i..ng creates a hierarchical moral 
scale. Characters at the uDper end of this scale haY" this oapacLy to 
intuit moral truths. An anetlysis of the individual m,-,ral growth 0:' one 
character, Romola" gives some indicatic;,. of how George Eliot translates 
these ideas into the worltl of her novels. /'Cr.,-/ -r~ .. -... ~-v 
~,. 
A very significant aspect of George Eliot t s abso~i..Utism is her use of 
the concept of duty. Duty is a recurring theme andf,;nctions structurally 
in several novels, especiaJ.ly Romola and ~EJiel D.erQ:(;~. An analy:-;-;is of 
this concept thus sheds light on these novels and al~o illuminates indiv-( 
idual characters from other novels, such as Maggie Tulliver and Will 
Ladislaw. 
In her concern for the moral grol'rth of' her characters, George Eliot 
offers various ways in which they struggle upwards. Some grow through 
BufTering; others adopt an ideal self towards which they strive. The 
most characteristic way, however, in which George Eliot has one character 
"eracrae from moral stupidity" 7 is by means of the influence on her 
of some stronger, morally more sensitive person. In an atmosphere of 
openness and trust, similar to the confessional, the lesser charaoter 
achieves moral growth. In this technique of depicting character growth, 
George Eliot reveals the similarity between her thought and that of 
Ludwig Feuerbach, whose The Essence of Christianity she v:ras translating 
during the crucial time when she was deciding to set up house. openly 
with Lewes. Her compassionate concern for the individual and the import-
ance she gave to interpersonal relationships show that she belongs to 
that tradition of humanistic ethical writers which contains such diverse 
figures as Butler, Feuerb8.ch, Ms.rcel, Buber, and Kierkegaard. 
This brief analysis of George Eliot's moral thought shoVls something 
of the importance of her belief in the possibility of moral growth. We 
have ranged from a more impersonal and general world of evolutionary 
ethics to an intensely personal and individual world where the effeot 
of one personality on another is paramount. 
Let us now oXIlr:line in greater detail the nineteenth century attempt 
to find moral sanctions outside the traditional confinements of the 
Christian religion. 
90. 
Evolution~ Ethics. 
"Is it not cheering, II writes George Eliot, "to think of the youth-
fulness of this little planet, and the immensely greater youthfulness of 
our race upon it?--to think that the higher moral tendencies of human 
nature are yet only in their germ?1I 1 This rhetorical question expressed 
in a letter to Mrs Peter Taylor in 1853 indicates George Eliot's firm 
belief in the possibility of moral development. The very word "germ" 
implies grovrth and directs our attention to the original use of the 
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word "evolution" as an embryological unfolding. For, like many of her 
contemporaries, George Eliot sought a basis for ethics in the emergent 
evolutionary theories of the mid-nineteenth century. 'l'he belief' that, 
morally speaking, the world was in its infancy imposed, also, a grave 
sense of responsibility. Lewes' remark that-"culture transforms ••• the 
selfish savage into the sympathetic citizen, II 2 has the underlying pro-
viso that each one of us must keep careful watch over our contribution to 
that "culture. 11 We can better understand the moral earnestness and re-
sponsibility to her readers expressed so often in the light of this 
f'ramework of a belief' in moral development, 
The major text for evolutionary theories, whether biological or 
ethical, was obviously Darvdn's ~ Origin £t Species (1859) \mich, 
while it gave enormous support to a belief in moral development, was 
itself equivocal. This can be seen in the variety of different inter-
pretations it has given rise to. One young man wrote in a letter immed-
iately after his reading of' the f'irst edition of ~ 2F~gin of' SpeCies 
of' lithe rigorous logic that wrecked the universe for me an:l for millions 
of others, l?iving I a feeling of utter insignificance in the face of 
unapprehended processes of nature ••• a sense of being aimlessly adrift 
in the vast universe of consciousness, among an infinity of other atoms, 
~ struggling desperately to ~assert their ~ existe~ at .~ expense 
:?! ~ ~ ~tp.ers. It 3 The phrase I have underlined is crucial. The 
emphasis on competition and the danger that this would lead to a totally 
amoral individualism were most alarming to nineteenth century moralists. 
They were seeking in evolutionary theories sanctions for moral action, 
not sanctions for a code based on the principle of each man for himself. 
David Riesman comments that it is easy for us, looking back, to under-
stand how ~ OriBin of Species was 11130 completely misinterpreted when 
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it first apPiJared, as a brief for a struggle to death among individuals,," 
although in fact it has "much to say about co-operation as a technique of 
competition. 11 4 
In a previous chapter I mentioned that in The Origi~ ~ Species 
itself Darvnn almost entirely avoided placing any progressionist or 
teleological interpretation on the vast body of biological fact he had 
accumulated. I quoted the one capitulatory remark that occurs "at the 
very end of the work when in a most uncharacteristically unscientific 
mood, he writes that lias natural selection vlorks solely by and for the 
good of each being, all corporeal and mental endov~ents will tend to 
progress towards perfection." 5 
However, a later work, ~ Descent E!!. ~ (1871), which is decideil;J.y 
less empirical and less scientific than ~ Origin ~ Species, contains 
various ambivalent statements about the moral progress of the race. These 
show that D~vin, no less than his contemporaries, needed to believe not 
only that ethical improvement was possible but that it had already begun 
and would continue. According to Hans Meyerhoff, in the nineteenth 
century, "all the sciences of man--bi01 ogy , anthropology, psychology, 
even economics and politics--became 'historical' sciences in the sense 
that they recognised and employed a historical, genetic, or evolutionary 
method. 'The principle of temporality' prevailed.1I 6 
Anxieties created by the loss of belief in eternity were severe. A 
belief in development, (whether evolutionary, or progressive and dial-
ectical,) offered a sense of security, imposed a "sense of order, con-
tinuity, and permanence" 7 upon the temporal flux. In this mood George 
Eliot wrote of the "Doctrine of Development, with its geometrical (, 
progression towards fuller and fuller being." 8 We can detect a similar 
yearning for permanence and stability behind the "unilineF scheue of 
cultural development" 9 adopted by the nineteenth century social evol-
utionists, for example, Lewes t selfish savage transformed into the 
sympathetic citizen. 10 In the same way the precursors of Darwin had a 
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struggle to relinquish the "unilinear conception of organic relationship" 
whereby we would have to include molluscs in our family tree, these social 
evolutionists showed a tendency to tttake varied nonliterate cultures of 
modern primitives and arrange them in a sort of phylogenetic sequence 
leading to advanced Western culture. tI 12 Comte was even more exclusive; 
his sequence ended with France. 
This poses a problem however. The ambivalence I have detected in 
Dar'win' s ~ Descent .:?! ~ stems from the difficulty of explaining how 
our sympathetic and benevolent qualities have developed from our primitive 
ancestors. Two different passages from this work bear out this point. 
With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitatio~, EEobably 
add ••• to the power of sympathy; for we are led by the hope of 
receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic kinm1ess 
to others; and sympathy is much strengthened by habit. In however 
complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one of 
high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one 
another,.it will have been increased by natural selection; for those 
communities, which included the greatest number of the most sym-
pathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest 
number of offspring. CIl\Y italics) 13 
The word "would" is conjectural. Some twenty pages later Darwin's un-
certainty is even greater. 
It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sym-
pathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were the most 
faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater numbers 
than the children of selfish and treacherous parents belonging 
to the same tribe. lIe who was ready to sacrifice his life, as 
many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would 
often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. The bravest 
men, who were always willing to come to the front in war, and 
who freely risked their lives for others, would on an average 
perish in larger numbers than other men. Therefore it hardly 
seems probable, that the number of men gifted vnth such virtues, 
or that the standard of their excellence, could be increased 
through natural selection, that is, by the survival of.the ,. 
fittest ••• 14 
The words I have underlined, the use of the conditional mood Hwould" 
and the doubt-provoking "probably" reveal the difficulties faced by 
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sooial evolutionists in their attempt to preserve their 'bnilinear schemes 
of cultural development. n 15 In fairness to Darwin, however, I must 
acknowledge his sincere and honest admission that tithe horrid doubt always 
arises as to whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been dev-
eloped from the lower animals, are of any value or are at all trust-
worthy." 16 He is asking, in effect, how safe it is to assume that the 
moral criteria by which we judge human behaviour are valid or even re-
liable when our very judgement is the result of natural selection. 
The difficulties that were experienced in outlining a convincing-
evolutionary ethic show just how unsatisfactory was the common nine-
teenth oentury assumption that conclusions drawn from a theory of bio-
logical evolution would apply just as appropriately to the social 
sciences. Peter Uedawar justly observes that "psychosocial evolution 
differs from ordinary genetic evolution in three important ways" and 
that "differences of tms magnitude should be acknowledged by a dis-
17 tinction of terminology. It Another source of confusion is revealed 
by P. J. Bowler who writes that the use of the word "evolution" by 
Herbert Spencer 
appears to arise directly out of the embryological context, with 
the result that the idea of progression became connected indirectly 
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~dth the theory' of transmutation by adaptation ann, hence with 
DRrwinism. Spencer's philosophy seems to have been olo~ely con-
nected with the introduction of the the title "theory of evolution," 
and although the modern theoI"'J is restrioted to the study of 
'ttransmutation, it was only vdth some diff'iculty that its pract-
itioners freed themselves f'rom the progressionist implications 
of' the Synthetic Philosophy. 18 
19 Believing that progress was "a beneficent neoessity," f,Spencer 
found a oomforting teleology in theQries of evolution and is therefore 
aocused by Morse Peokham of holding a "metaphysical" 20 view of evol-
ution. Peokham claims that the majority of those nineteenth oentury 
thinkers (George Eliot included) who Vlere able to receive ~ Origin 
2£ Speoies with a tolerable degree of equanimity, did so beoause they 
were able to subtract from it a "metaphysic of goal-directed organic 
growth." 21 He deolares that "it is impossible to find in the Origin 
a basis in the biological world f'or any kind of orthogenesis or goal-
22 directed process." Nor; Spencer believed that lithe conduct to 'which we 
apply the name good is the relatively more evolved." He effectively ig-
nored the possibility that more evolved need not mean '!'better;" it 
could just as well mean "later in time" or more t1complex" or a com-
bination of both. 23 George Eliot's remark that "natural seleotion is 
not alvlays good and depends (see Darwin) on many caprices of' very f'ool-
ish animals," 24 reveals a tougher mind than Spencer's at work in her 
approach to an evolutionary ethic; however, her belief in the geometrical 
progression of Development shows us that she was not totally tL'1deserving 
of Peckham's criticism. It was not until later in the century that T. H. 
Huxley, self-styled "Dar'win' s bulldog" 25 for his uncompromising support 
of Darwin's theories, was able to express his rejection of this common 
identif'ication of' fact and value. He dissociated the biological facts of 
evolution f'rom any moral criteria. In the Romanes Lecture he gave at 
Oxford in 1893, he commented that "cosmic evolution may teach us how 
the good and evil tendencies of man have come about; but," as he 
acknowledged, "in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better 
reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than 
what we had before. II 26 
The belief in progress and the hope of founding a satisfactory 
ethic on the theory of evolution were steadily eroded by the end of the 
century •. Huxley's dissentient voice is indicative of this erosion but 
there were many . other writers who failed to share the mid-century opt-
imism in Positivistic representations. 27 ~eorge Eliot's own optimism was 
tempered by her conservatism and by her recognition that improvements, 
while possible, were inevitably gradual. · .. Nevertheless the belief 
in moral growth is fundamental to her. 
If same characters can and do achieve moral c:::cel1ence ·::he.t is the 
faculty that enables them to do so? Let us now examine what, in George 
Eliot's view, constitutes moral discrimination. The nineteenth century 
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moral philosophers borrowed the term "moral sense" from the previous cent-
ury. It is the development of this moral sense that allows a character 
in a George Eliot novel to emerge from "moral stupidity." 28 
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The article "Worldliness and Other-Worldliness: The Poet Young" 
which George Eliot va-ote in JanuDry, 1857 for the ~minstef' Review 
provides an abstract of her moral position. In it she makes a devast-
ating attacl: on the banality of Youngt s moral sentiments and the re-
sulting insincerity of his poetry. She concludes \nth a comparison 
betvl8en Young and Cowper, pointing clearly to the moral deficiency of 
the one and the moral worth of the other. This comparison is couched 
in terms which clearly anticipl1te the authorial disapproval or approval 
meted out to characters such as Tito Melema and Daniel :Deronda. She 
claims that lIin Young we have the type of that deficient sympathy, that 
impiety towarcls the present and t he visible, nhich flies for its motives, 
its sanctities, and its religion, to the remote, the vague, ann the 
unknown: in Cowper vie have the type of that genuine love which cherishes 
things in proportion to their nearness, and feels its reverence grow in 
-1 
proportion to the intimacy of its knowledge. II • Young is devoid of sym-
::;athy, where~ls Cowper is almost entirely motivated by this feeling. Earl-
iar in the same article she scornfully dismisses the notion that we re-
quire a belief in immortality in order to be moral, as if only a fear of 
consequences could persuade us to a virtuous act. j>' 
rFJ 
fear of distant consequences is a very insufficient barrier against 
the rush of immediate desire. Fear of consequences is only one form 
of egoism •••• In opposition to {lhii theory that a belief in im-
morta 1 -1 ty is the only source of ilirtue, I maintain that, so far as 
moral aotionis dependent on that belief, so far the emotion 
which prompts it is not truly moral--is still in the stage of 
egoism, and has not attained the higher development of sym-
pathy. 2 
These two quotations provide us with a clear statement of George Eliot's 
belief that moral awareness is predominantly a feeling and that the 
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main component of this feeling is G:7F1pathy. VIe can see, also, her defin-
ite claim that there are stages of moral development ranging from rank 
egoism at the lovlest level to the highest-reaching, unself-regarding 
sympathy or altrJJiJSm. And she believes that sympathy needs to be dir- /~. 
ected towarcls those who are near at hand. Part of the moral education 
of Adam Bede, that stalwart, but somewhat rie;id young man, comes from 
the tende:tt:'he~sr.> and protectiveness of his love for Hetty. tlThere is but 
one way," we are told, "in which a strong determined soul can learn 
ITellow-feelinil--by getting his heart-strings bound round the weak and 
erring, so that he must share not only the outward consequence of their 
error, but their inward suffering." 3 Romola rejects Tito and his bland 
rationalisations of his motives for selling her father's library. She 
presents a similar viewpoint to that expressed by George Eliot in 
'Propria persona in her article on Young. Romola' 8 "nature, possessed 
with the energies of strong emotion, recoiled from this hopelessly 
shallow readiness which professed to appropriate the vddest sympathies 
and had no pulse for the nearest. II 4- We can compare this with the follow-
ing tribute to Deronda whose "conscience included sensibilities beyond 
the c~mon, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself imaginatively 
into the experience of others. II 5 Tito and Deronda, by-the quality of 
their respective sympathetic response to the world and especially to 
those nearest to them, show that they occupy diametrically opposite 
positions on George Eliot t s egOism/sympathy axis. 
When we turn now to a brief examination of George Eliot's contemporar-
ies, of those whose works she is knovm to have read and whom, often, she 
knew personally, we find a similar emphasis on sympathy as the affective 
component of morality. We also find explicit reference to a faculty 
called the moral sense. Alexander Bain, in Mental ~ Moral Science 
(186R), offering the familiar opposition bet'ween egoism and sympathy) 
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writes that "there is in some minds, more than in others, a susceptibility 
to .thedisplay of other men's feelings, as opposed to the self-engrossed 
and egoistic promptings •••• The climax or completion of Sympathy is the 
determination to act for another person exactly as for self. tl 6 
This same recognition that "egoism and altruism are ••• co-essential t ' 7 
forms a major part of the thesis presented by Herbert Spencer in~ 
i"J 
Principles of Ethics (18791~ A letter George Eliot wrote to Spencer offers 
------' . 
evidence that she read and appreciated his work. 8 Sl)enCer holds that 
"regard for the well-being of others is increasing pari passu with the 
taking of means to secure personal well-being. II 9 For all his utilitar~ 
ian bias, however, Spencer is not trying to suggest that vie should be 
encouraged to feel symp~thy for others as the most certain way of en-
suring our personal happiness. He states explicitly that "in the truly 
sympathetic, attention is so absorbed with the proximate end, others' 
happiness, that there is none given to the prospective self-happiness 
which may ultimately result." 1 0 He was as concerned as other thinkers 
to determine the state of society most suited to the development of a 
sympathetic bond among its inhabitants, and discusses various manifest-
ations of sympathy. Like George Eliot and Bain, he compares an earlier 
stage, which he calls "egoistic competition" with a stage of llhighest 
altruisml/ 11 which indicates that he, also, conceived of a hierarchical 
scale of moral development. 
'Herbert Spencer, as was shovm in an earlier chapter, was one of the 
main proponents of evolutionary psychology. The following extract from 
a letter he v~ote to J. S. Mill provides a conclusive s~~ary of his 
position. He has been explaining that we have an "intuition of space" as 
a result of the "organised and consolidated experiences of all ante-
cedent individuals." Using this an an analogy to explain our possession 
of a moral faculty, he states his belief that "the experiences of 
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utility organised and consolidated through all past generations of the 
human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, 
which by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us 
certain faculties of moral intuition--certain emotions responding to 
right and v/rong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual 
12 
experiences of utility. tt 
In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin devotes a whole chapter to "The 
- --
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Moral Sense", ooncentrating, as we might expect, on the biological rather 
than on the sociological origins of this facu~~ in man. He writes, however, 
as I have already shown, more diffidently in the field of anthropology 
than in the more clear-cut scientific work !h.!::.0rigin ~ Species. VIe 
have, for example, this proferred hypothesis. "The following proposition d' 
seems to me in a high degree probable--namely, that any animal 'l?fhatever, 
endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affect-
ions being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or con-
science, as soon as its intellectual powers had become_as well, or nearly 
as well developed, as in man. 1I 13 
Darwin, in this work, sounds a triumphant note)showing that he, like 
Spencer, could not totally resist an implicit teleological interpretation 
of evolution, which thereby becomes not just a process of change, but a 
process of change towards a value-laden goal. He.writes that "looldng to 
future generations, there is no cause to fear that the social instincts 
will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow strong-
er, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle be-
tween our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will 
be triumphant." 14 This is a very optimistic, well-nigh utopian con-
clusion; we must not fail to notice, however, the use of the future 
tense and the qualifying "perhaps." In this chapter on "The Moral Sense ll , 
Darwin brings evolutionary evidence to refute J. S. Mill and Alexander 
Bain, both of whom still held the earlier view that "the moral sense is 
acquired by each individual during his lifetir:le." He states that lithe 
ignoring of all transmitted mental qualities will, it seems to me, be 
hereafter judged a most serious blemish in the works of Mr Mill." 15 
This brief survey of some representative nineteenth century thinkers 
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Showlsome of the ideas which George Eliot had in corrunon with her contemp-
oraries; ine\Qtabl~ as she espoused the evolutionary psychology she had 
greater aft" nities with Spencer and Dardn than Bain, or 1\1:ill, whom 
I have mentioned only in passing. Her closest affini;y wau undoubtedly with 
G. H. Lewes. In his vlOrk he frequently appears eitheT' to be describing 
various themes from her novels or prescribing areas ,'or her to explore .. 
I am not trying to suggest definitive influence eith'i:!!' way. Both ','lriters 
had powerful. minds and it seems a more viable conclusion to state that 
they shared certain preoccupations and concerns, tha;; one of these waS 
the potential moral development of an individual or"f a race, and that 
as a result of these preoccupations they held a vocabulary in cornmon. 
Lewes vlrote a massive work in five volumes, Problems !?f. Life ~ Jande 
The final volumes were still in manuscript form when he died and the first 
task George Eliot set herself after his death was to edit these volumes 
. and preparetllom for publication. The fourth volume f Study !?f. ~sych-
olo€,:v;: is most germane to this enquiry ,.especially tho.; chapter dealing 
with liThe Moral Sense. tt 
Lewes defines the moral sense as H."c )n of right conduct 
16 
associated vrlth more or less direct disposition to aecordant practice. II 
He shares with Darv;in the belief that C:Xr' moral sense is developed from 
the "emotions of animals" which, he feels, constitute a IIrudimentary moral 
17 
sense. It He recognises that if we assert that our moral awareness de-
rives from ancestral tendencies we are indirectly readmitting some vestige 
of innate ideas. Our moral sense is experientially based and consolidated 
over generations until it almost constitutes an intuition of right and 
'wrongconduct. He sees this as a satisfactory compromise between the 
two modes of explaining moral awareness. "The hereditary transmission of 
organised tendencies, together vdth the distinction between functions 
and faculties,1I he explains, "enables us to reconcile the !!. priori in-
18 tuitional 'ldth the experiential the.ory." However, he is careful to 
make explicit that what we inberit is .only a tendency. He has already 
specified this in ~ Physiology ::f.. Common ~ (1859-60) where he 
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distinguishes between inheriting a capacity for devotedness in general, 
which he helieved was possible, and inheriting a specific devotion for 
19 the Virgin Mar;-v which was not. 
In The Stucly of Psychology (1878) he states that "in man this moral 
sense cannot properly be said to be connate otherwise than as a musical 
sense is connate: it no more brings with it conceptions of what is right, 
what wrong, than the musical aptitude brings with it a symphony of 
Be~thoven. \Vbat it carries are certain organised predispositions that 
spontaneously Or docilely issue in the beneficent forms of action which 
th . f . t hId . ht II 20 e experlence 0 SOCle y as c asse as rlg •• 
One of the recurring features of moral discourse in the mid-nineteenth 
century, a feature as we have seen that is very much part of George 
Eliot's system, is the hierarchical view of peopJ,.e's moral standing. 
This does not imply that people occupy a fixed and permanent moral 
position but rather the possibility of people rising and falling on a 
moral scale. We find the same underlying feature in Plato's moral sys-
tem and can recognise that there is a decided correlation between theories 
of moral development and hierarchical stages. 1111'h03e who have an ethical 
bent," R. Rychlak maintains, "are naturally attracted to the growth meta-
construct II and "the growth metaconstruct has an affinity for the hier-
archical arrangement of abstracts or behaviours. II 21 
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Lewes gives three stages of moral development. The "response" of the 
"less enGowedspecim.ens of Oti:!' ra.ce" to the· llm6raX'd'emahdsofsocietyn is 
"little more than the conflict of opposing appetites, the check imposed 
by egoistic dread on egoistic desire. 1I 22 Then there are those who have 
progressed to the point where fear of' punishment is replaced by love of 
approbation,lIwhichrenders social rule or custom and the respect of 
fellow-men an habitually felt restraint and guidance .. " 23 Lastly he 
describes those rare people in any generation who are capable of "protest 
and resistance ••• the renunciation of immediate sympathy for the sake of 
a foreseen general good ••• moral defiance of material force, and every 
form of martyrdom." 24 It is easy to see how closely this resembles the 
schematic programme of Romol~. Tito is a representative of Lewes' first 
stage. Romola painfully emerges from the second. stage to grapple with 
the problem of righteous resistance. In the interests of community we11-
being, external constraints and rules are necessary in order to define 
limits of behaviour, not only for children, but also for morally immature 
adults. Those who obey the rules out of a fear of consequences are 
morally inferior to those who have internalised the rules in such a 
way that, as Lewes describes it, the fear of "the outside "Ihip has be-
come the inward sympathetic pang. 1t 25 
Jea.n Piaget, outlining the child's emergence ·into a state of IImoral 
autonomy, II describes a similar shift from a rule-dominated state to a 
state characterised by sympathy or, in his words, "ea-operation" e.nd 
"equalitarian justice." 26 The desoription of Gwendolen Harleth as a 
"spoiled child" 27 in that section of ~el Deronda whore she is 
sho1>'m to be very morally immature shows George Eliot t s awareness of' 
the similarities that exist between the egoiatic, narcissistic child 
and the egoistic, solipsistic adult. 
One last a.spect of Lewes' account of the moral senae deserves a 
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mention. He shares with George Eliot a recognition of how far remorse 
I 
can act as a spur to moral growth. It can either be remorse because of a' 
sense of falling short of a personal ideal or it can i!1trude because of 
a disparaging judgement from some trusted person. 
We have thus seen that George Eliot and her contemporaries shared a 
common language of moral discourse, stressin~ above all else, sympathy 
as the affective component of the moral senne. This sense was believed 
to be partially inherited but refined and developed by individual ex-
perience. Let us nOVI examine briefly the philosophic background of the 
term "moral sense" and of the notion of morality as a function of the 
feelings rather than of the reason. 
Darwin's and Lewes' use of the term "moral sense" does not constitute 
an innovation on their part. In fact, considering that Lewes' acceptance 
of hereditary tendencies allows him to concede an inherited moral dis-
position, which operated in a way that was little different from the 
earlier notion of innate moral ideas, it is rather ironic that the 
term "moral sense" originally entered the philosophic language of the 
eighteenth century as a defence against the "bogey of relativism" 28 
which was seen as the inevitable outcome of Locke's refutation of the 
theory of those same innate ideas. The empiricists held that all ideas, 
including moral ideas, are obtained from the ,input of sensory impress-
ions. Sentimentalists, such as Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and Hume, ruled 
out reason as a motivating force in hnman action. Hume, for example, 
29 
writes that "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions." 
How then do we come by moral truths? If we have no innate moral 
ideas, what certainty is there that we '1.'-5...11 develop mozoal sensibilities 
at all? Shaftesbury, faced with this dilemma, searched anxiously for an 
assurance that "in the course of normal expl~rience, the ideas of God, 
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order, and the rest II would "spring up in the mindI1 •• that the stream of 
impressions ll would ·!shape themselves into the great moral ideas, without 
conscious effort or willed action. II 30 He was the first to use the term 
"moral sense" and to found morality on a view of human nature that con-
tained more than the self-love of Hobbes or Mandeville. D. D. Raphael 
defines Shaftesbury's term as lithe capacity to experience feelings of 
approval and disapproval. It 31 As well as contributing the term, 
Shaftesbury sketched in the general background of an analogy between 
moral and aesthetic judgements. 
Both of these aspects of his thought were taken up and developed 
by Hutcheson; they were elaborated further and with greater subtlety by 
David Hume,''Hutcheson'sfriend and spiritual son in moral theory. II 32 
According to Hutcheson, the reactions of the moral sense are akin to the 
kind of love or admiration that naturally arises towards beauty. Virtue, 
therefore, is a kind of beauty, a moral beauty. To say this, is simply 
to express the thought that our warm reaction to benevolence 1s like 
our warm reaction to physical beauty, in t hat it i;; natural, immediate, 
and a species of love. Hutcheson claimed that the moral sense was an 
original datum of human nature. Hume shared most of his preoepts but 
introduced an all-important modification. He believed that the moral 
sense was the result of sympathy. 
Critics of the theory of the moral sense were quick to seize on 
this feeling of sympathy which was regarded by Hume in--the~-e1:ghteenth 
~tury, as well as by those nineteenth century vr.riters I have been 
examining, as/so essential. These critics were alert to the difficulty 
that to see morality in this v~y is to place too great an emphasis on 
subjective feeling. They claimed that vdthout an objective, external 
criterion, morality can easily become daneerously relativistic. 
Hume anticipated these criticisms. He stressed that the "imagination ll 
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took over the role of reason as an arbiter of the feelings and that this 
lessened the risk of a moral free-far-all. His answer to the charge that 
moral principles have a universal and law-like character in comparison 
with feelings which are particular and variable vms to agree that if 
there is to be a stability in the distinction between right and ?;rong, 
then there must be a consistency in human nature. He found this consist-
eney in the fact that man was "on balance more of a social being than 
not" and that his actions, therefore, 'were more likely to maintain soc-
iety than to destroy it. 33 The importance of man's social role was, as 
we have seen, very much a part of nineteenth century discussions of the 
moral sense. 'rhe two main contributions to the development 'of moral 
possessed of a moral sense were that they stressed the notion that \ ! 
philosophy in our time of those who submitted the claim that man is 
"morality assumes the value of society and is incomprehensible apart 
from this propositiont' and their insistence that "feeling has a place in 
morality." 34 The following quotation from George Eliot's ess?y on Young 
reminds us how important moral feeling was to her. She claims that "in 
proportion as morality is emotional, it will exhibit itself in direct 
sympathetic feeling and action, and not as the recognition of a rule. 
Love does not say, 'I ought to love'--it loves. Pity does not say, 'It 
is right to be pitiful'--it pities. Justice does not say, 'I am bound 
to be just' --it feels justly." 35 
By this brief incursion into eighteenth century moral philosophy I 
have wanted to show the continuity of moral theories between one century 
and the next. The theory of the moral sense is vulnerable to certain 
kinds of criticism and the way in which Hume, in particular, dealt vlith 
these criticisms adumbrates some of the difficulties faced b;,{ _George 
Eliot and her contemporaries. They, likevlise, had to deal with the 
problem of relativism if the moral sense was seen to be primarily a 
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feeling. Comte, for example, claims that "to leave the decision of such 
Gora~J questions to the judgement of the individual, is to give a 
:f'orrnal sanction to all the natural difference in men I s inclinations." 36 
How, then, did George Eliot cope with this "bogeyof': relativism II 37 
which first appeared with Locke's refutation of the theory of innate 
ideas? We have seen that George Eliot's thought strongly endorsed that 
of her contemporaries in the emphasis that she placed on feeling in 
matters of morality. Her position is made clear in an authorial state-
ment in Romola, where she writes that lIafter all has been said that can 
be said about the widening influence of ideas, it remains true that they 
would hardly be such strong agents unless they were taken in a solvent 
38 of feeling. II 
A "solvent of feeling" is necessary for the precipitatio:g. of ideas. 
Two statements in Middlemarch concerning the banker, Bulstrode, make it 
quite clear what sort of feeling normally provides the solvent. The first 
describes him as "simply a man whose desires had been stronger than his 
theoretic beliefs" so that he had Ilgradually explained the gratification 
of his desires into satisfactory agreement with these beliefs." 39 The 
second makes a more general comment from Bulstrode's situation and ident-
ifies "the common trick of desire,'" which "avails itself of any irrel-
evant scepticism, finding larger room for itself in all uncertainty 
about effects, in the very obscurity that looks like the absence of 
law." 40 The ironic tone does not disguise the fact that George Eliot 
is fully aware of the moral anarchy that could result if everyone accept-
ed a brief to follow his ovm feelings. It is no coincidence that I have 
drai~ my examples from Middlemarch, for this novel, above all others, is 
concerned with the nature of evidence, 'l'ti th IIright seeing, II and with 
the problems of ethical individualism. The strong emphasis it gives to 
the damaging effect of gossip is a feature of George Eliotts concern that 
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morality must not be allowed to degenerate into a platform for personal 
. preference~ ,and idiosyncrasy •. To understand this, we must take account of 
what George Eliot understood by "individualism." 
In a work called Individualism, Stephen Lukes discusses the various 
"unit-ideas" 41 encompassed by the vlord individualism. Three of Lukes's 
unit-ideas help us to specify more clearly the problem of relativism and 
to show how George Eliot responded to it. The first of these, religious 
individualism, leads to spiritual equality and religious self-scrutiQY. 
It will be immediately apparent what an important role it has played in the 
Protestant individualist ethic. Lukes mentions that the New Testament 
offers the greatest contribution to individualism. He also lists the 
re-affirmation of this individualism that occurred at the time of the 
Reformation, and Luther t s and Calvin t s preoccupation with individual 
salvation. Ian Watt places George Eliot firmly in the Puritan tradition 
along with Def oe, Richardson, and D. H. LavlI'ence; ,.lrem he declares that 
"they all seek by introspection and observation to build their' o,m pers-
onal scheme of moral certainty; and in different ways they all manifest 
the self-righteous and somewhat angular indivIdualism of the earlier 
Puritan character." lJ-2 We see an example of such self-righteous and 
angUlar individualism in George Eliot's answer to Cara Bray·s letter 
criticising her for publicly setting up house inth Lewes. 43 It is a 
quality that very much belongs to George Eliot, the author, but is sad-
ly missing in George Eliot characters whose very education is an educat-
ion away from such a quality. 
The second of Lukes's unit-ideas which is germane to this discussion 
is "epistemological individualism," a theory about the nature of know-
ledge "which asserts that the source of knowledge lies within the indiv-
idual. II 44 The logical outcome of such a theory is total solipsism, 
although this is rare. The true epistemological individualist, according 
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to Lukes, is "the empiricist who holds that we know nothing beyond our 
own purely subjective experience enclosed w'ithin the circle of the mind 
and the sensations it receives." 1 .. 5 He claims, however, that there are 
two crucial objections to such an extreme belief: an appeal to a shared 
public world and a shared "intersubjective" language which is a pre-
conditinn of knowledge. 46 Epistemological individualism taken to its 
limits may lead to total solipsism but even a more moderate position 
makes apparent the underlying relativity of knowledge. Both T. H. Huxley 
and G. H. Lewes recognised this problem. Huxley, for example, w~s 
forced to acknowledge that scientific explanations of the world were 
merely hypotheses to w~ich he had decided to give his assent. Alvar 
Ellegarde describes Huxley' s relativistic posi tioxQ, ''He realized that 
the fundamental difference betw~en empiricist and idealistic views of 
causation could not be resolved by logic or observation. It could not 
be proved. that one was right and the other ,,;rong. He justified. his 
choice of the empiricist view by pointing out that of the two, it was 
the only one that made scientific inquiry and scientific progress poss-
ible.1I 47 
Lewes, whom J. S. Mill described as having lIbuoynncy of spiritj' 48 
,,;rote in 1837 when he was ~.that "we arrive then at the conclusion 
that we can never know but relative truth, our only medium of J.cr:.owledge 
being the senses; and this medium, with regard to ~ without ~ being 
forever a false one; but ?ei~ ~ !..2 ~ we may put confidence in 
its relativity." 49 That this is not just youthful effusiveness is 
apparent from the following criticism Lewes offers in Problems Ef. ~ 
~ Mind (1874) of those who "affecting to despise the certainty attain-
able through Science, because it can never transcend the relative sphere, 
yearn for a knovvledge which is not relative, and cheat themselves with 
50 phrases." 
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The third, and for the present discussion, the most important unit-
ideo" "ethical individualism,1I can be seen immediately to be an extension 
of the ous tYro. The outline of relieious individualism particlly 
ant ed it. "Ethical individualism" as Lukes it is that view I 
of morality '.,;hich states that "the SOUT'ce of moral ve.lues and prir,ciples, 
the creator of the very criteria of marcel evaluation is the individual. II 51 
He points out that this belief is latent in Knnt and RUrne, although they 
both .avoided its implications. Hume' s belief that can form no ",7ish 
h " h f ,,52 tl t··· t b- t" \'l ~o has not a re erence to society per y an ~c1.pa es 0 Jec lons 
to the re13.tivism implicit in his theories. Such social orientation offers 
. 
a probable restraint against unbridled egoism and selfishness. 
'1'he extension of ethical indi vi G.ualism into the t,·:entieth century 
produced the "acute dilemmas" of "existentialism, emoti vism, 2.nd 
. t·· II 53 ThO tOO t 0 b I - - 4h - 0 -'-h t prescr~p 1. v:Lsm. ~s nega l ve PlC ure lS a anceCi. by v e c.La:Lm v a 
"there is an important diff'erence between autonontf" G.s:fined as beifl.g 
"self-determined deciuing and choosing on the basis c:f consciousness of 
one's self' and one's situation--and the extreme and intransigent moral 
:,pluralism implicit in ethical individualism. n 54 
k-c'.-
The saving phrase 
--
aut2!lQl1\Y, in keeping with trv& twentieth-century 
bias towards self-realisation. George , vliththe typical nineteenth-
century preoccupation with moral improvement, relies on moral awareness, 
or moral intelligence, to coin a phrase in line \'lith ~_1er own IImoral 
~tupidity." 55 The primary componeni; of this, as we L'1Ve seen, is sym-
pothy. Sympa.thy is thus the "so:]..vent of' II 56 0 f t' t;;J....L.HF, necossary l nere 
is to be Ita influence of ide8.s. u '1'he disast::,··.>us consequences 
that follow from allo".':ing OUT' egoistic bias to colour our j 
have already been sho\':n in George Eliot t s de:::criptio:r:s of t S 
self-deceptions. She is even more trenchant in the fe.fious "pier-gl'lssil 
metaphor in M1.dcllemar...£b" which describes Rosamond Viney's capacity to 
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see the world entirely in her orm terms, that is, in terms of her egoist-
ic desire. 
An eminent philosopher among roy friends, who can dignify even 
your ugly furniture by lifting it into the serene light of science, 
has shmm me this pregnant little fact. Your pier-glass or extens-
ive surface of polished steel made to be rubbed by a housemaid, 
will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all directions; 
but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illum-
ination, and lo! the scratches .... rill seem to arrange themselves 
in a fine series of concentric circles round that little sun. It 
is demonstrable that the scratches are going everywhere impart-
ially, and it is only your candle which produces the flattering 
illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light falling with an 
exclusive optical selection. These things are a parable. The 
scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of any person 
now absent--of Miss Viney, for example. Rosamond had a Providence 
of her ovm who had kindly made her more charming than other girls, 
and who reemed to have arranged Fred's illness and lKr Wrench's 
mistake in order to bring her and Lydgate 'Nithin effective prox-
imity. 57 
Feelings based on egoism are dangerous and cannot be allowed free rein; 
and yet feelings are all-important. How does George Eliot resolve this 
conflict? IneVitably, by prescribing certain kinds of feeling. Most 
feelings have to be disregarded and most people are not sufficiently ad-
vanced morally to be allowed to trust entirely to their feelings without 
reference to some socially-valuable goal or principle. For instance, this 
is how she sees the influence of Evangelicalism on the town of Milby in 
Janet's Re;eentance. By means of Evangelicalism, "a principle of subordin-
ation, of self-mastery, has been introduced into l.5t man'i] nature; he is 
1 b 0.1 f · . d' . d' I ,,58 A no onger a mere un e 0 ~mpress~ons, es~res, an ~mpu ses. l\ 
comment in The ~ ~ ~ Floss sums up in general terms why Maggie has 
been abandoned and rejected by Tom and by the inhabitants of St Ogg's. 
It reveals George Eliot's insistence on the necessity of individual 
judgements but stresses as well the quality of feeling behind those 
jUdgements. "The casuists have become a byword of reproach," she tells 
us, "but their perverted spii:it of minute discrimination was the shadow 
of a truth to which eyes and hearts are too often fatally sealed--the 
truth, that moral judgements must r~in false and ho~low, unless they 
are checked and enlightened bya perpetual reference to the special 
circumstances that mark the individual lot. 11 59 
In the same passage she extols the necessity of our acquiring the 
"insight that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or 
from a life vivid and intense enough to have created a fellow-feeling 
with all that is human. 1I 60 We can recognise here George Eliotts 
attempt to enlarge the moral sensibilities of her readers. But the 
major point is fully made. Until such time as we have achieved such a 
state of moral awareness, and such a state is rare indeed, th~n we 
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must accept and obey the social sanctions and prohibitions of our part-
icular community. Only in an ideal, utopian vlorld when we have all 
transcended our state of petty egoism will such s~nctions and pro-
hibitions be unnecessary_ She discusses, for example, in Romola, the 
part played by remorse in advancing moral awareness. Painful as it is, 
our civilisation has not yet progressed to that state of sympathetic 
moral feeling where such dread can be dispensed with. She describes it 
as lithe initial recognition of a moral law restraining desire" which 
checks the hard bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into oblig-
ations which can never be proved to have any sanctity in the 
absence of feeling. "It is good, II sing the old Eumenides, in 
Aeschylus, "that fear should sit as the guardian of the soul, 
forcing it into wisdom--good that men should carry a threatening 
shadow in their hearts under the full sunshine; else, how should 
they learn to revere the right?" That guardianship may become 
needless; but only when all outward law has become needless--
only when duty
6
and love have united in one streal!1 and made a 
common force. 1 
Vfuat can we conclude about George Eliotts relativism? The first point 
is that she saw only too clearly the dangers of a type of individual 
judgement based on egoism and on the blind certainty that there is no 
need ever to look for further evidence. I have especially mentioned 
Middlemarch in this connection. Mrs Farebrother's refusal, for example, 
1 
to scrutinise the evidence before her her to meke a harsh aLd. un-
compromising. judr'ement.against Mr Bulstrode •. She, regretfully, has to 
concede that the rumours that Lydgate is Bul~:)trodet s natural son have 
no foundation, when she learns that :Gydgate "had never heard of Bulstrode tl 
before he came to Middlemarch. She retorts, however, "with an air of 
precision:.' ••• 'That is satisfactory so far as Mr Lydgate is concerned ..... 
/)2 
But as to Bulstrode-.,..the report may be true of some other son. It II . 
The seco~1d point is that until sympathy, the necessary ingredient of \ 
moral ewarenes s, :i s eequ:ired, then :if we are to a vo:id moral snarer..)', we I 
must intensify not relax the rules. Only those who are at the upper end 
of George Eliot's moral scale are permitted, after ouch" soul-searching, 
to set aside the rules. And they are qualified to do 30 because of their 
sensitivity towards others and their capacity to empathise, to ignore 
their egoistic preoccupations and preferences in the service of others. 
Dorothea, in Uiddlemarch, is a clear example of such a morally evolved 
character. She spends a night wrestling with her grief that Vfill is lost 
to her for ever, not just because a marriage to him QuId be unsuitable 
in the eyes of the world, but because his potentially adulterous relation-
~hip with Rosamond Lydgate removes him from her respect and tarnishes his 
"brightness;t 63 She finally silences her own clammering needs and asks 
herself the question: '''What should I dr)-:...how should I act nov1" this· 
very day, if I could clutch my ovm pain~ and compel it to silence, and 
think of those three?'" 64 And the answer she offers herself, :ilends her 
again to uuddlemarch, to Rosamond, to once more to represent to her 
the truth of Lyclgate t s involvement with Bulstrode and. Raffles. George 
Eliot not only allows her, however temporexily, to stock.Rosamond (made 
vulnerable by Will's fierCe denunciation on the previous day) out of her 
egoistic narrowness so that she generously admits that it is Dorothea 
whom Will loves. She also Dermits Dorothea to take arc unusual and un-
~ ~; t . 
114. 
orthodox step, discard her fortune and offer herself to the man she loves. 
But even Dorothea is not shovm as acting "indi viduelistically" in the 
sense that she has rejected all principles of moral guidance. Before 
she asks herself the vital question, we are told that "she yearned towards 
the perfect Right, that it might make a throne within her, and rule her 
errant will." 65 The words "perfect Right II show us that Ceorge Eliot is 
setting up an absolute standard of moral goodness. She may have retained 
the rugged individuality and independence fostered by the religious indiv-
idualism of her Puritan background; she may have had the intellectual 
honesty and courage to accept relativism in the sphere of knowledge; but 
in moral matters she attacks and exposes the dangers inherent in ethical 
individualism. We can hear again the earnest and ringing tones with which, 
according to Myers, she pronounced to him that "Butyl! was "peremptory 
and absolute. II 66 In ethical concerns, therefore, G'eorge Eliot is an 
absolutist. VIe have a moral scale in George Eliot's novels but those who 
mount to the upper end of this scale are not allowed a free range of 
choices across a wide area of possibilities. In fact their range of 
options narrows; it does not open out. This constitutes a paradox in 
George Eliot's thought, not unlike her attempt to reconcile a belief in 
a causally determined universe with her belief in the possibility of 
educating the will. Her solution to this shows th\lt she is a "soft deter-
67 
minist," one of those who believe that "freedom is necessity understood." 
In the sphere of morality, George Eliot resolves the problem of ethical 
individualism in a similar way. It might be expected that if any of her 
characters should be granted the freedom to act on their own warrant, it 
would be such characters as Romola, or Dorothea, or Deronda. But paradox-
ically such characters have not more freedoo of choice, but less. Since 
George Eliot claims there is a principle of "perfect Right" and since her 
characters evolve to the point where they recognise this principle and 
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act on it, then obviously it is inconceivable that they should choose to 
do otherwise. It is the Socratic and Platonic dictum that "Knowledge is 
virtue" only from a different angle. George Eliot is not referring to a 
transcendent knowledge of the real world, but to an experientially 
based knowledge of the actual world. 
She is not the only thinker to resolve her intellectual and moral 
paradoxes in this way. I have compared her position to that of the Stoics 
before. And they posed a similar way out of this same difficulty. The 
notion of freedom and the notion of goodness are inextricablV entwined 
in their thought as the following comments reveal: 
there is to Stoicism a positive conception of freedom ••• most 
easily described as the state of mind enjoyed by good men. They, 
and they alone, are able to "act as they willI!; for freedom is 
"the possibility of determining one's O1tm action;" or lithe know-
ledge of what is permitted and what is not ". ... 8 A man can be 
free, can act as a man, if and only if the external movements of 
his body follow from a decision which reconciles his ovm will 
and moral choice to what is necessarily the case. 69 
This paraphrase of ~ogenes Laertius reveals a striking resemblance be-
tween one aspect of Stpic thought and George Eliot's moral and intell-
ectual position. It is noteworthy that, for the Stoics, freedom is a 
state of mind enjoyed by "good men," sages in fact. Similarly it is 
George Eliot's morally developed characters who come to see moral 
questions unambiguously. Their freedom consists in their acnurate per-
ception of their ov.'l1 natures and of the facts of the world about them. 
This clearer seeing confers a moral certainty. Their hardly-earned 
insight into} and sympathy) with human life have largely purged them of 
egoistic considerations. In this way it is possible to say that they 
intuit moral truths. 
This raises an interesting point about George Eliot's moral sol-
utions. By conceding that morally evolved persons intuitively recog-
nise what is morally right, she is partially offering a reconciliation 
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between two opposing ethical views. In the eighteenth century there were 
two schools, "the!intellectual' and the t sentimental' ••• representing 
two principal lines of thought •••• They are primarily distinguished by 
their adoption of reason and feeline respectively as the faculty which 
perceives moral distinctions, a faculty declared in each case to be 
70 peculiar and not identifiable with ordinary reason or ordinary feeling. II 
We have seen George Eliot's allegiance to the notion of a moral sense 
and the importance of sympathy. Let us now consider how far it is poss-
ible to identify certain intuitionist tendencies in her thought, before 
briefly examining the moral position of the eighteenth century intellect-
001 school. 
There is a famous authorial passage in ~ ~ ~ ~ Floss, for 
example, where George Eliot contrasts rigid rule-dominated moral judge-
ments with judgements reached by the exercise of lIinsight and sympathy.1I 
All men of broad, strong sense have an instinctive repugnance to 
the men of maxims; because such people early discern that the 
mysterious complexity of our life is not to be embraced by maxims, 
and that to lace ourselves up in formulas of that sort is to 
repress all the divine promptings and inspirations that spring 
from growing insieht and sympathy. And the man of maxims is the 
popular representative of the minds that are guided in their 
moral judgement solely by general rules, thinking that these 
will lead them to justice by a ready-made patent method, without 
the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination, impartiality--
without any care to assure themselves whether they have the 
insight that comes from a hardly-earned estimate of temptation, or 
from a life vivid and intense enough to have created a wide 
fellow-feeling v'lith all that is human. 71 (my italics) 
George Eliot' 5 use of the word "insight" in this passage raises the quest-
ion of how far she would have described the moral faculty as analogous 
with the ordinary faculty of sight. As P. Nov:ell-Smith states, "the in-
tuitionist is not drawing our attention to the obvious fact that we 
have moral experience; he is inviting us to construe this experience ••• 
as being analogous to seeine_ Moral judgements are reports of what we 
see when we look at the non-natural Vlorld in the same S9rt of way that 
empirical statements are reports of what we see when we look at the 
natural world. II 72 The words used by intuitionists to describe the 
faoulty by means of whioh we decide that something is good or right, 
words such as "non-sensuous intuition,1t "awareness," "apprehension," 
"reoognition," as Nowell-Smith points out, all strongly suggest an 
analogy with "sight and touch. II 73 
The following statement in Middlernarch about Dorothea's painful 
emergence from "moral stupidity" 74 illustrates that George Eliot 
certainly conoeived of the moral faculty as a physioal faculty, a 
function of the organism, to borrow Lewes' phrase. 
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it had been easier to her to imagine how she would devote herself 
to Mr Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and 
wiooom, than to conceive with that distinctness which is no 
longer reflection but feeling--£:!l ~ wrought ~ 12. ~ direct-
~ . 2f.sense, like ~ sOlidit;y of objects--that he had an 
equivalent centre of self, where the lights and shadows must 
always fall with a certain difference. (5 (my italics1 
This identification of moral and physical vision is not an isolated 
instance. illhere is a similar referenoe in Daniel Deronda in the epi-
graph to chapter 21 and the following statement in ~ ~'about 
Dinah's failure to recognise that Hetty's worries are practical and 
emotional rather than spiritual contains the same analogy. 
It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never 
understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete 
view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn 
this comprehension, as we learn the art of vision, by a good 
deal of hard experience, often with bruises and gashes incurred 
in taking thiqgs by the wrong end, and fancying our space wider 
than it is. 76 
A letter to Mrs Ponsonby in 1877 offers the same conclusion.. George 
Eliot writes that "pity and fairness--two little words, which, carried 
out, would embrace the utmost delicacies of the moral life--seem to 
me not to rest on an unverifiable hypothesis but on facts quite as 
irreversible as the perception that a pyramid v1ill not stand on its 
apex. 1I 77 
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If facts about the moral world can become as distinct and as directly 
. available to our· apprehension as the "so :.idity of objects," these f'acts 
become features of public discourse, objective, subject to public con-
sensus, and not w~tters of individual, private and inevitably egoistic 
judgement. Intuitionism also provides a convenient escape from the 
fact/value connundrum cited by Hume, when he comments on the frequency 
with which His" statements are converted into lIought" statements with-
out any warning. 78 Again, if there are objectively discoverable 
truths, we can see the f'orce of that disputed position of Plato and 
Socrates which declares that it does not make sense to state that a man 
can know what is right and still choose not to do it .. It provides a 
certainty that cannot be rejected. Intuitionism thus presents a moral 
solution which frees at least some of our moral jUdgc;ments from the dis-
torting bias of egoistic desire. If there are infallible, objective 
moral truths, then in the case of disagreement between two people, one 
of them can be charged either with insincerity, or more damagingly 
moral blindness. VIe can see with a certe.in irony, George Eliot herself 
resisting the charge of insincerity in !the following somewhat acerbic 
rebuke to Cara Bray at the time of her setting up house with Lewes. 
No one can be better aware than yom"self that it is possible for 
two people to hold different opinions 'On momen,:,QUS subjects with 
equal sincerity and an equally earnest con\~ction that their 
respective opinions are alone the truly moro.l ones. If' we differ 
on the subject of the moral , I at least cO.n "believe of you 
that 'you cleave to v/hat you believe to be Good, and I donlt 
know of' anything in the nature of your views that should pre-
vent you from believing the same of me. 79 
I view this letter with a certain irony because we have here an example 
of George Eliot in her ovm life requiring and insisting on' sanctity 
of her .subjective, individualistic moral decision, a liberty, as we 
shall see la'eer, she does not readily grant the charact ers 1m her 
novels. A discussion of intuitionism by Jonathan Harrison provides a 
gloss on this difference of opinion between George Eliot and Cara Bray. 
He describes intuitionism as "an epistemological theory concerning the 
nature of moral judgements" in that it states that "although ethical 
generalisations are not true by definition, those of them which are 
true can be seen to be true by any person with the necessary insight. II 
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As .to.the problem of disagreement there is "no reason why an intuitionist 
should not admit irresoluble differenoes of opinion on moral matters, 
provided he says that when there is such a differonce, one of the 
parties believes he is intuitine when he is not." 80 This does not en-
tirely remove the problem of relativism but partially resolves it by 
suggesting that given the "necessary insight II all differences can be 
settled. George Eliot and Cara Bray might state with equal sincerity that 
their intuitions were correct, but it might require a person agreed by 
them both to have the "necessary insight" to arbitrate between them. 
T~is would seem to require an ideal, Utopian state, unlikely, George 
Eliot thinks, to occur, if her wry comment concerning the judge who 
presided over Felix Holt's trial is representative. '~ven the bare 
discernment of facts," she tells us, "much more their arrangement with 
a view to inferences, must carry a bias: human impartiality, whether 
judicial or not, can hardly escape being more or less loaded. It was not 
that the judge had severe intentions; it was only that he saw with 
severi ty." 81 
The evidence suggests that George Eliot can be described as an in-
tuitionist but with the following qualification. The "necessary insight" 
is rare and hardly won; moral facts oan be discerned as directly as 
empirical facts but not until the person seeing has been purged of 
egoism. Such insight is the outcome and the reward of moral growth. 
Morally elevated characters such as Dinah Morris, Dorothea Brooke, and 
Daniel Deronda approach the state of moral awareness where they no 
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longer see other people as extensions of themselves 8Jnd their own "i'Tants. 
But the great majority of George Eliot's characters are locked in their 
egoistic vision and see the world and other people only in terms of 
their own personal requirements. As she asks in Middlemarch: I~Vill not 
a tin;'{ speck very close to our vision blot out the glory of.the::"orld, 
and leave only a margin by which we see the blot?" And then follows the 
82 
categorical statement: "I know no speck so troublesome as self." 
'When we come to examine the "intellectual" moral school of the 
eighteenth century, we see that its members, like the members of the 
tlsentimental" school were reacting against the "selfish" theories and 
the dispiriting view of human nature and human possibilities of Hobbes 
and Mandeville. L. A. Selby-Bigge points out, besides, that these two 
schools were "much stronger in their criticisms of each other than in 
their own solutions of the problem. II 83 The "sentimentalists" had 
attempted to show that virtue is both real and natural by rel~ting it 
to "human nature. It The lIintellectualists, II on the other hand, for 
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example, Price and Balguy, made an appeal to the "nature of things." 
• Price in the Introduction to his ! Review of' ~ Principal Question,S 
in Morals (1758) writes of himself that "his principal view has been to 
trace the obligations of virtue up to the truth and the nature of things." 85 
Intellectualists, regarding moral distinctions as a function of reason, 
could claim them as objective, and therefore in some wayan expression 
of truth, or order. For Price, moral systems are as self-evident as the 
systems of Newtonian mechanics or of Euclidean geometry. He claims, for 
instance, that he is willing for morality and abstract truth to stand or 
86 fall together. The reference to Newton and Euclid indicates a superb 
confidence in the "nature of things.1/ Such absolute faith is not so easy 
to maintain today vlhen we are faced as D. D. Raphael points out llwith 
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alternative systems of geometry and alternative frameworks for physics." 
George Eliot believed in irreversible laws and insisted that one 
element ~b. moral development is manifested in our willingness to submit 
to those laws which are unmodifiable. It is also our duty to seek out 
those laws pertaining to social and psychological development, education 
and so on, in order that wI? can further progress by co-operating with 
them. In this appeal to the IInature of things" we can see a similarity 
between her thought and that of the eighteenth cent~J intellectualists. 
In addition she draws an analogy between moral and mathematical laws as 
in the letter previously quoted. The substance, then, of her moral attit-
ude may greatly resemble that of the eighteenth century moral philosophers, 
but the framework is different. The eighteenth century belief in order 
had theological overtones, and religion and morality had not parted com-
P~o George Eliot was an agnostic and a positivist so that to her the 
phrase the "nature of things" had a very different connotation from the 
one it had for an eighteenth century divine. In addition, evolutionary 
psychologists such as Darwin, Spencer, and Lewes had introduced the idea 
of ancestral inheritance, and this marks a cut-off between their thought 
and that of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. VIe have already 
recorded Darwin's criticism of J. S. ~lill for disregarding ancestral in-
heritance and we have seen the degree to which George Eliot embraced the 
evolutionary psychology. Moral intuitions may appear to be not unlike 
innate ideas, but they have been refined and developed in our O\,ffi as well 
as in our ancestors' lifetimes. LeVies, for example, while referring to tho'" 
moral sense as a "Regulative Intuition, II makes it clear that intuitions 
are not to be confused with innate ideas. He concludes that 
while man, in his moral beginnings, has a marked kinship with the 
animals, whose life, like his own, is regulated by desires and 
intelligence, he stands apart in the attainment of moral con-
ceptions and of organised ethical tendencies, which are correot-
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ly called moral intuitions. These latter form a justif1oation 
for the ~ pr~or:L intuitional doctrine; but its explanation lies 
in the principles of experience. Y!e have intuitions of Right and 
Wrons in so far as we have intuitions of certain consequences; 
but these must have been learnecl in 0tI§ 0\VIl experienoe or trans- . 
mitted from the experienoe of others. 8 
To summarise: George Eliot's concept of morality includes an affective 
component, sympathy, and a cognitive component, right seeing, which is 
indistinguishable from intuition. Neither of these qualities is inevit-
able. We partially inherit moral dispositions and tendencies and we part-
ly develop them in our ovm lives as we are progressively purged of 
egoism. I'\Ve are all of us born in morRl stupidity," as George Eliot 
~ ~ 
tells us, IItaking the vlOrld as an udcler to feed our supreme selves." 
Dorothea, in Middlemarch, is one of those characters who achieve notable 
moral excellence. But there is a character in an earlier novel, Romola, 
vlhose moral gro'wth is presented very schematically so that an analysis 
of her painful struggle affords a clear exposition of George Eliot's 
scale of moral values. A discussion of how she achieves morai intell-
igence also provides us with a point of reference for a later exarnin-
ation of the problem of freedom and the morally evolved character. This 
involves the question of righteous resistance, "when the soul dares to 
act on its ovm warrant, II 90 whichis so important a theme in Romola. 
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Moral Growth in the Individual: Romola. 
There are three phases to Romola t s moral growth. The first shows 
her willing subjection to her f'atherls benevolent tyranny; the second 
traces her acceptance oLSavonarolals vision of' Florence; and in the 
third she assumes responsibility f'or her own decisions. 
Her early life is sketched in very briefly. We know of her mother's 
death and her virtual isolation from the outsic-:'e world. Vie hear of' her 
brother's rejection of his f'ather's classicism and his adoption of the 
despised Christian faith. The phrase "self'-repressing coiourless young 
life" 1 adequately sums up this period vlhen Romola patiently and lcving-
ly tends her f'ather in a vain attempt to compensate f'or Dinots def'ection, 
making no claims f'or herself'. (There is a certain similarity between 
Romola's situation at this time and Maggie Tulliver:in The Millon the 
..-.......----
Floss after her f'ather's bankruptcy, when all the passion and enthusiasm 
of her nature are worn dovm by the dreariness of her circumstances, by 
her mother1s grief at the loss of her household objects, and her father's 
obsessive desire for revenge.) Romola, however, unlike Maggie, does re-
ceive an answering tenderness to her ministrations; her father may self'-
ishly use her but he is proud of her, and very affectipnate towards her. 
This she. finds reward enough. 
It is inevitable that given hex inexperience of' the world and its 
ways, Romola should be overwhelmed b;ir Tito's beauty anil gentleness. In 
a manner ,,{hich pref'igures Dorothea t s seeing in :Mr Casaubon a ref'laction 
of her Ol'ffi mind, Romola f'alls blindly and trustingly in love with THo. 
If Tito had been what she believed him to be, she would merely have 
transferred the love and duty she felt for her rather to him. Her. grad-
ual recognition of' his duplicity converts her love into acmo:t'alcrepug-
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nance which, in her mind, releases her from any obligation towards him. 
Hence she feels perfectly free to leave him, and Florence, in order to 
seek out a new life for herself in Northern Italy. 
She felt that there could be no law for her but the law of her 
affections. That tenderness and keen fellow-feeling for the near 
and the loved which are the main 9utgrov~h of the affections, had 
made the religion of her life: they had made her patient in spite 
of natural impetuosity; they woulC'.. have sufficed to make her 
heroic. But now all that strength was gone, or, rather, it was 
converted into the strength of repulsion •••• She was going to 
solve the problem in a way that seemed to her very simple. Her 
mind had never yet bowed to any obligation apart from personal 
love and reverence; she had no keen sense of anY other human re-
lations, and all she had to obey DOW was the instino':t to sever her-
self from the man she loved no longer. 2 
It is for this failure to acknowledge a continuing obligation in the 
absence of love that Savonarola attacks her most forcibly. He draws a 
parallel between Tito's faithlessness and her own which reluotantly she 
comes to accept. We know more about Tito's behaviour, his "explaining 
away" 3 Baldassarre's claim than Romola does, and are in a better position 
to assess just how morally lightweight he is. Vie may feel that Tit 0' s 
£lotions are more reprehensible than Romola's, but onoe we understand the 
underlying principle by means of which George Eliot is examining the 
motivation of them both, we can see the force of Savonarola's suggestion 
that there is something similar in their behaviour. 
Under the powerful influence of the Frate's personality and despite 
her rejection of the outward forms of Christianity, Romola returns to 
Tito, and to Florence, and starts a new phase of her life .. When love and 
duty were combined, sacrifice was easy for her; now she has to overcome 
a certain inherent distaste for the tasks she imposes on herself .. Only 
the vision of a "transcendent moral life" 4 keeps her buoyant. "She had 
no innate taste for tending the siok and clothing the ragged •••• Her 
early training had kept her aloof from such womanly labours; and if she 
had not brought to them the inspiration of her deepest feelings, they 
would have been irksome to her." 5 It is quite clear that it is her re-
spect for Savonarola that preserves her, and it is this, also, that 
keeps her critical faculty in abeyance. She has abdicated all moral re-
sponsibility. Thus "Romola was so deeply moved by the grand energies of 
Savonarola's nature, that she found herself listening patiently to all 
dogmas and prophecies, when they came in the vehicle of his ardent 
faith and believing utterance.1t 6 
But this unthinking discipleship is doomed when Savonarola refuses 
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to grant the Medicean traitors the right of appeal to the great Council. 
Romola's godfather, Bernardo Naro, is involved and her love and reverence 
for the old man outweigh her love and reverence for the Frate. This 
brings her into direct collision with Savonarola and she is led to ex-
amine closely his motivation. She comes to suspect him of preferring 
self-interest, disguised as interest for the Catholic Church, to the 
vdder interest of perfect justice. This is, for her, no easy conclusion; 
it conveys all the anguish of severe mentaJ. conflict. Her problem.is that 
of reconciling the "duty of obedience" with the "duty of resistance. II 7 
George Eliot wanted her readers to see in RomOla's dilemma a parallel to 
the Frate t s own inner conflict. In a letter she wrote to Richard Holt 
. Hutton after his review of Romola in the ~ctator she explaips that 
the "great problem" of Romola t slife "ossentially coincides with a 
8 
chief problem in Savonarola's. II Romola, in a private capacity, is 
grappling with the same question concerning the justice and validity 
of the law as Savonarola is, in the public sphere. lIer conclusions 
affect only herself; he has countless faithful GOuls dependent on him. 
His injunction to them to disregard the Pope t s excommunication mandate 
may well jeaporCise their spiritual well-being. It is for them both 
"one of those moments in life when the soul must dare to act on its 
own warrant, not only without external law to appeal to, but in the 
face of a law which is not unarmed with Divine lightnings--lightnings 
that may yet fall if the warrant has been false. II 9 Savonarola has re-
presented the law for Romola. Her separation from him requires her to 
learn a hard lesson and we cannot wonder that her loss of trust in him 
should leave her totally adrift and alienated. She is in a state where 
"all motive lt is· "bruised. II 1 0 The very force and passion of her nature 
have made her insist that the person to whom she gives her trust shall 
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be immaculate. Sne has been inspired by the Frate and now her mind cannot 
accept the notion of his fallibility. This reveals an element in her oft 
self-righteousness and a rigidity. In this respect she shows certain 
similarities to Adam Bede, whose moral progress is likewise character-
ised by a greater tolerance of human frailty. 
Romula leaves Florence a second time, and although she does not act-
ually attempt suicide, she gambles on her chances of survival by casting 
herself adrift in a boat. The fairy-tale ending of the novel makes it 
difficult to sort out the myth from the actuality and the idealised pre-
sentation of Romola as a Madonna who comes to care for the plague-ridden 
village rather distracts our attention from the moral dilemma she has 
been facing. However, the setting herself out to sea symbolises not just 
the sick disillusionment she feels in her loss of faith in Savonarola. 
She has, all her life, been accustomed to surrender her vall to the de-
mands of others and suddenly there are no' others. She is left to her own 
resources and initially she drifts aimlessly. But when she comes ashore 
at the plague-ridden village, she acts instinctively from her own sense 
of what is right, and thus finds her ovm strength. This restores her lost 
balance and enables her to gain a perspective not only on Savonarola and 
the events of the previous few months but on her O"i'm behaviour and judge-
ment. Vlhen she is at leisure to examine her motives it is obvious that 
she does not like what she sees. She recognises the harsh, uncompromising 
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quality of her judsements, the rigidity t',hich has caused her to adopt a 
condescending superiority towarrlsotherpeople. Her f'irmness of principle, 
while in many ways it is shown to be a nobility, the hereditary pride of 
the Bardi family, nonetheless masks an inflexibility of purpose. Tito, 
with his moral suppleness, his lack of adhesion to any other principle 
than that of his ovm well-being, damages those with whom he comes into 
contact, especially when they have expectations of him that he is unable 
or unwilling to meet. Romola's unflinching integrity is also, in its 
way, destructive. As she asks herself, II What if the life of Florence 
was a web of inconsistencies? Was she, tilen, something higher, th!ilot she 
could shake the c1_ust from off her feet, and say tThis world is not good 
enough for me. '[" And she recognises quite truly that, "if she had been 
11 
really higher, she would not so easily have lost all her trust." 
She returns again to Florence and even to the despised Tito, if he 
should still need her, although we already know of his death. She now 
devotes her lifle to Monna Brigida, Tessa, and Tito's two children. Out-
wardly" at least, her life is very little different from what it was 
when George Eliot herself described it as "self-repressing" and "colour-
less. II 12 She still accepts the demands of outward ties, of duty, and 
indeed of sacrifice. She manifests the lIstoical resignation" 13 which 
George Eliot regards as such an essential ingredient in this life. It 
is Romola's inner life, her attitudes that have changed. At the begin-
ning she accepted her role as her father's unceasing attendant because 
. 
she loved him, and she would have done the same for Tito; later she fell 
completely under the sway of Savonarola and accepted, as a Florentine 
woman, the duties towards the sick and the poor which he laid upon her. 
But she was not acting freely; she chose, certainly" to become his dis-
ciple and therefore accepted his injunctions ~s her duty,'but she was 
still, in a sense, constrained. Only at the end of the book, where we 
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see very little of her, has she achieved a wider tolerance and aocepted 
responsibility for her arm aotions. She has become morally autonomous, 
self-directed, and we must not let the fact that the outward seewing has 
altered so little, bemuse us into thinking that there has been no grov~h, 
no development. 
This discussion of Romola's progress reveals to us how George Eliot 
dealt with the nineteenth century belief in the possibility of moral 
development. Romola's Upwl4rd growth is schematically contrasted with 
Tito's systematic moral deterior~tion. In addition, we are able to 
observe some of the features of moral gro~th that George Eliot espec-
ially emphasised. Romola's broader, more sympathetio judgement shows 
a loss of rigid egoism and her final aohievement of moral autono~ 
highlights the fact that for George Eliot, the most morally elevated 
oharaoters can be trusted to manufaoture their own moral values which 
will nonetheless be socially integrative.and in accordance wi~h a goal 
of universal good. I will return to this point later. For the moment I 
will examine ':rhat I have oalled the problem of IIrighteous resistance. II 
In Romola's moral growth we witnessed a painful emergence from de-
pendence on outward rules, even those given her by so fine a moral 
leader as Savonarola. Romola has reached the neoessary state of neutral-
ity suoh that she is no longer "distressed to discern some folly in 
martyrs and some judiciousness in the men who burnt them." 14 She has 
achieved a state where autonomy of conscience is paralJlount, but, as is 
the Case with Dorothea, this is allowed because she is Trilling to rec-
ognise and act on a higher principle than her ovm "errnnt will. I. 15 
Romola's second return to Florence represents the same victory over her 
errant will, as Dorothea t s second visit to Rosamond. Dorothea is re-
warded by her marriage to Will; Romola is rewarded by the death of Tito, 
which frees her from moral obligations to a man she finds morally re-
pugnant. We oan see in Romola's suocess, in her uncomplaining, even 
eager acceptance of t he role of guardian to Tessa and the two ohildren, 
elements that spotlight the relative failure of a previous herpine, 
Maggie Tulli ver. Romola t s decision to follow the "perfect Right II 16 
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does not set her in opp~sition in any way to the accepted mores or social 
standards of her ovm community. She has not to endure a rejection from 
an alienating and oppressively narrow community and, besides, she is 
financially secure. Maggiets moral triumph in refusing to marry Stephen 
brings her into conflict with the local busybodies of st Ogg' 5, none of 
whom has a life "vivid and intense enough to have created a wide fellow-
feeling with all that is human." 17 It is ironic that if Maggie had 
married Stephen and returned, as it is suggested, after her Continental 
wedding trip with a wardrobe of' new bria~l clothes, she would have been 
accepted and lauded. It would have been a romantic story in the neigh-
bourhood of St Ogg's and there would have been few to mourn the loss of 
integri-ty involved in such an aotion. 
Romola's non-conformity is less public than Maggie's; it does not 
involve any opposition to her own community, from which, anyway, she has 
always been somewhat isolated. Her non-conformity represents far more a 
state of mind; her freedom is in her thoughts, no"!;; in heraction~, There 
are no signs in her of any eccentric outward behaviour; unlike Maggie 
she has learnt the trick of reoonciling lIinward reality and outward 
seeming," 18 although her outer world is not described as "oppressively 
narrow" as :M:aggie t s is. Thus there is, for her, none of the dissidenoe, 
the failure to adapt whioh destroys Maggie. Romola is allowed to challenge 
the rules and customs of her ovm community. She reminds Savonarola of 
his ovm statement that "there comes a moment when the soul must have no 
guide but the voice within it, to tell whether the consecrated thing 
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has sacred virtue.!! 19 She finds in herself, accordingly, the courage to 
question Savonarola's motivation and accuses him of partisanship and in-
justice. She asks, "a1most with bitterness, U !lIDo you, then, know so 
well what will further the coming of Godts kingdom, father, that you 
will dare to despise the plea of mercy--of justice--of faithfulness to 
yourownteaching? •• Take care, father, lest your enemies have some 
reason when they say, that in your visions of what will further God's 
kingdom you see only what will strengthen your own party.'" 20 She is 
shattered at having spoken to her spiritual mentor in such terms and 
George Eliot hastens to explain to us, (intrusively r think), that "it 
was inevitable that she should judge the Frate unfairly on a question of 
individual suffering, at which ~ looked with the eyes of personal 
21 tenderness, and he with the eyes of theoretio conviction." 
We see Romola, having rejected Savonarola's leadership, seeking to 
find another basis for assessing moral situations. The ~ate's public 
insistence on his own infallibility, (Whatever his private doubts), has 
alienated her and revived her conditioned distaste for visions and 
priestly fanaticism. Romola's moral confusion is such that lithe vision 
of any great purpose, any end of existence which could ennoble endurance 
and exalt the common deeds of a dusty life vlith divine ardours, was 
utterly eclipsed for her now by the sense of a confusion in h~n things 
which made all effort a mere dragging at tangled threads, all fellow-
ship, either for resistance or advocacy, mere unfairness and exclusive-
22 
ness." 
Romola t s moral confusi on entails what would nowadays be called 
"cognitive disequilibrium." 2.3 It would be seen as a very necessary stage 
in a person's progress to a higher level of moral awareness. The follow-
ing twentieth century account of moral development offers an illuminating 
gloss to Romola's growing paint, "Moral discourse between levels, then, 
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is much like Plato's dialectical knowledge of the good. A higher-level 
conception of the good cannot be proved superior to a lower-level con-
ception; it can only be 'called out' by teaching or by natural moral 
conflict.1I Such conflict leads to processes of lldifferentiation and 
integration." 24 The revIard of higher-level moral thinking takes the form 
of a certainty and provides a guarantee, which like George Eliotts absol-
ustism, removes any risk of arbitrariness at higher levels. Morally 
mature people in Kohlberg~s hierarchy, no less than in George Eliot's, 
will act for the good of the community, will choose socially integrE.tive 
behaviour~ 
1~ggie Tulliver struggles against a resistant medium, preserves her 
integrity, suffers and dies. Romola progresses to a state of moral aut-
onomy but her sale acts of resistance take the form of a scornful rebuke 
to the Frate and a temporary flight from Florence, both of which actions 
she later repudiates. Otherwise, as I have said, she takes no defiant 
stand. The next of George Eliot's novels, Felix ~?lt" shows a 'young man 
vehemently opposed to the social and political processes of his day and 
determined to set them aside. Again it is a case of a soul daring to act 
on its own warrant. Now that we have become aw'are of' the absolutism im-
plicit in George Eliot's moral hierarchy, we will not be surprised that 
any undisciplined rebelliousness in him is purged ,away. P~ter he comes 
out of' prison he works for social reform within suitably circumscribed 
limits. Vfuile he is still at the untutored stage, he is gently remon-
strated with by JAr Lyon, the Dissenting minister, for showing arrogance 
and impatience. "'You yourself are a lover of freedom, and a bold rebel 
against usurping authority,'" Mr Lyon rebukes him. "'But the right to 
rebellion is the right to seek a higher rule, and not to wander in 
mere lawlessness. tit 25 This IIhigher ru.le" is Dorothea's "perfect 
Right" 26 described in other words. 
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I have been labouring the point in this section in order to fore-
ground the absolutist element in George Eliot's thinking. A later dis-
cussion on the implications of her intellectual and moral ponition for 
the success or failure of the novels will draw several conclusions from 
this. 
The argument so far has been concerned with George Eliot's concept 
of morality and her belief in the possibility of moral development. The 
absolutist element in her thinking has been revealed. It provides an 
answer to the threat of individualistic self-interest and of a morality 
which refuses to acknowledge social 3anctions and restraints. As a safe-
guard against such "amoral individualism," 27 George Eliot, in common 
with many other beleaguered nineteenth century thinkers, raised the stand-
ard of duty. A character's acceptance or rejection of the successive 
duties of his life becomes a signalling device to the reader informing 
him of that character's moral stature. There are certain characters who 
gladly embrace their duties, others who see in duty a way of providing 
a framework for t heir lives which can free them "from the burden of 
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choice when all motive (1~ bruised," and yet others who forcibly 
reject any notion of duty other than to themselves. Let us now examine 
this concept of duty which is sO fundamental to George Eliot's moral 
thought. 
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All the novels deal with moral growth in some form or other. As 
1 Barbara Hardy deolares, "',tlhe pattern remains, the people ohange." And 
a close study of the different novels reveals that there are certain 
encoded motifs which enable us easily to recognise the moral status of 
the hero or heroine. One of these is a character's relationship vdth 
his own past, his memory of his childhood and the place where he grew 
up, his t'rootedness. tI Another concerns the capacity for empathy, the 
2 
recognition that another person has lIan equivalent centre of self. tI 
Closely allied to this is the ability to see the world clearly and ob-
jectively without the obtruding tlspeck of self." 3 In addition there is 
the concept of duty, which George Eliot in Janet's Repentance claims as 
an indicator of moral awareness which can be "to the moral life what 
the addition of a great central ganglion is to animal. It 4 If', as 
George Eliot has earnestly declared, God is "inconceivable" and 
Immortality is "unbelievable," 5 then what is there to fill the void, to 
ensure that we are saved from "the slavery of unregulated passion or.· 
inpulce"? 6 And from that memorable evening conversation with F. W. H. 
l.f..Iers in a Cambridge garden comes the confident reply, "Duty, It a duty 
which is "perel!lptory and absolute. II 7 Not for George Eliot the sophist-
ical question, 'tvlhy should I do my duty?" The problem here is quite 
other; it takes the form of deciding wherein my duty lies? which, among 
conflicting duties vall demand my allegiance, my obedience? how, in 
situations of difficult ch9ice do I decide nnd what criteria do I bring 
to such decisions? 
If we examine the concept of duty, we find that it has had an inter-
esting growth; etymologically the word comes from Latin through French, 
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and is therefore related to the notion I!)f "debt, II of payine what is 
due. The original emphasis of the Vlord was on 11m oral or legal obligation; 
that which one oueht or is bound to do"; (OED., ''Duty'', 4). This relates 
to mants supposed contract vdth the State, (the ~ cites Hobbes's 
Leviathan). A further usage of duty includes the Christian notion of 
what is due to God, as set dovm in the Ten Commandments, as for ex-
ample, Ecclesiastes xii. 13, where we read, "Feare God and kepe his 
commandments: for this is tho whole dutie of man." And in a non-
Christian age there has been a further change of emphasis, conferring 
the binding sense of what is morally right. (OED, 'lJ)uty", 4 b). 
Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty" is offered as an example of the later mean-
ing and the following lines from that poem clearly show the elevation 
of Duty to an absolute principle. Vlordsworth refers to duty as "Stern 
lawgiver!" and then concludes with this prayer: 
Give unto me, made lowly wise, 
The spirit of self-sacrifice; 
The confidence of reason give; 
And in the light of truth thy bondman let me live! 
Earlier in the poem, Vlordsworth defines duty in these terms as 
a light to guide, a rod 
To check the erring, and reprove; 
Thou who art victory and law 
'When empty terrors overawe; 8 
From vain temptations dost set free; 
This is yhe same tone of voice, with its strong note of stoicism, as 
that in which George Eliot proclaimed her thrilling words that duty is 
peremptory and absolute. This aspect of duty implies a duty which is 
fixed and immutable, against which there is no appeal. A similar concept 
of duty is discussed in F. D. Maurice I s ~ Conscience: Lectures on 
Casuistry (186~). A staunch admirer of George Eliot's novels, he dis-
misses what he says are called ain the cant of our day elective 
affinities, II 9 a term borrowed from the lanGuage of chemical inter-
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actions and reminiscent of the title of Goethe's novel "\Nahlverwanoi-
schaften. He insists that "rel D.t:Lol1S abide y{hether we are faithful. 
10 t 
to them or neglect them, tI a statement similar to Savonarola s ad-
monishment to Romola. He also says that what we have to def;'+l with is 
"a real order not an imaginary one--not an order which I¢.ght be desirable 
11 but which exists. I ~ certainly a son, I ~ a brother, I ~ a citizen. It 
How then does this existing order square with situations such as the 
one described by Philip to Maggie The Hill on the Floss where the 
----
duty demanded of her as a deughter and a sister is totally unreasonable 
because it is a duty prescribed by her family's narr~/, obsessional da-
sire for vengeance against Philip\sfather, Lawyer Wakem? Philip, des-
perately trying to convince Maggie of the truth of his words and trying 
as well to instil into her a spark of courageous rebellioI).,' says toller 
that I"it is not right to sacrifice everything to other people's un-
reasonable feelings. I would give up a great deal for ~ father; but I 
would not give up a friendship or--or an attachment of any sort, in ob-
edience to any wish of his that I didn't recognise as right.tll 12 
But Maggie, adopting, as she often does, an extreme position, inter-
prets this as a suggestion that she should renounce all duty, not just 
that she should take a stand in a particular case. To her it would be 
creating a dangerous preoedent, 'what she calls th.inking away all her duty. 
"'But,'" as she explains to Philip, "'no good had ever come of that--it 
was an evil state of mind.ttl 13 
George Eliot has here created a rather opaque 3i tuation as U'.1Emie t s 
feelings for Philip, compounded as they are of tenderness and pity, are 
not passionate enough to create a real conflict. Although she does con-
tinue to meet him, to discuss with him books and art and music" she does 
it clandestinely, lacking the courage to stand up to hel' father and her 
redoubtable brother. It is not surprising that she feels she is tllosing 
the simplicity and clearness of her life by admitting a Ground of con-
cealmcmt" 14. and that later when Tom has discovered her meetings V'lith 
Philip and very brutally put a stop to them that she is "oonscious of a 
certain dim background of belief." 15 
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It is quite another matter when she falls in love with Stephen, with 
all the force of her passionate nature. This is not a case of resisting 
a wrongful famiJ.y mandate but of brealdng trust and faithfulness. In the 
lanes of Basset whit hex' Stephen has followed her she pleads her case (or 
may we be forgiven for thinking that George Eliot pleads it for her?) 
that it would be wrong .to ignore the claims on her of Lucy's and Philip's 
trust. To do so would "poison their love." 16 She is saying iU effect 
what F. D. Unurice was saying earlier, that it is 'twang to walk out of 
an obligation just because it has become irk;;ome. "'If,'" she says wist-
full II , l ' f di ' t 1 dut 'f b fIt II 1 7 y, 1 e Q no ma<e 1es or us e are ave comes •••• 
Trust and faithfulness remain Vlage;ie's criteria even when she is in 
the compromising situation of spending a night on the steamer'vlith Stephen~ 
but the majority of supposedly disinterested ?pectators are not equipped 
for understanding her decision not to ma...-nry him. To most of the citizens 
of St Oggts, Maggie has acted not jpst ill-advisedly but wrongly and they 
are quick to condemn her. Even Dr Kenn, while recognising that ~ggiets 
conscience must not be tampered with, and applauding her integrity as "a 
true prompting," 18 feels that "an ultimate marriage between Stephen and 
Maggie" will be "the least evil." 19 The path of duty cannot be clear and 
straightforward, and the point that George Eliot is v~nting to bring out 
here is that it is a very lonely one. As George Eliot's spokesman, Dr Kenn, 
says to Maggie, "'The persons who are the most incapable of a conscient-
ious struggle such as yours, are precisely those who will be likely to 
shrink from you, til 20 a description tailor":made for Tom who is one of 
those who believe that there is a general rule that can lead to "justice 
21 by a ready-mude patent method. II 
The theme of duty is also a major structuring device in a later 
novel, vlhere Romola and Tito can be seen, as I have already indicated, 
I 
to occupy opposite ends of a moral sca.le. Romola s fiErce championing 
of her father and of his concern for his library is sharply contrasted 
with Tito"s specious arguments to convince himself that there is no 
need for him to put himself out to ransome his elderly father from 
slavery. Romola's total moral recoil from Tito and the contempt she 
feels for him when he blandly sells her father's library are a measure 
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of her commitment to her father's wishes. This is partly a compensation 
for her brother, Dino's defection to the Church. Nere we have another 
example of a neglected duty and tlrls raises the ouestion how far Dina 
is justified in deserting his nearly blind father. Inevitably Romola 
and Bardo judge Dina's action' very severely, and equally inevitably 
Savonarola justifies it as a necessary response to an overwh~lming 
vocation. Romola is tempted to see her retreat from Florence and Tito 
as on a par with Dina's retreat but Savonarola v;ill not allow this. It 
is clear here that it is not the action itself that is being judged 
but the motivation behind the action. Dina's strong sense of vocation 
was important enough to justify putting aside all other claims. He was 
turning his back on his family, not out of hedonism, but in order to 
take up the arduous duty of service to God. Romola, on the other hand, 
is renouncing her duty to Florence and to her husband out of vdlfulness, 
and she is very distressed and "d~cclcon by the suggestion in the Frate t s 
,{ards of a possible affinity between her ovm conduct and Tito' s. II As 
Savonarola cuttingly asks, '''Who is so base as the debtor thnt thinks 
himself free?'" 22 
Yet, even if Savonarola firw~y endorses Dina's action, George Eliot 
herself is somewhat ambivalent; she can never completely conceal her 
distaste for 1'{hat she has Tito describe as a "monkish vision, bred of 
fasting and fanatical ideas." 23 Dino fails to elicit, by a little 
brotherly questioning, the facts about Romola's intended marriage, and 
George Eliot's judgement of him is quite unequivocal; she describes the 
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specifically Christian interpretation of his vision of Romola's distressed 
and alienated condition as coming from "the shadowy region where hunan 
souls seek wisdo:,,11 in contrast, as she says, to lithe human sympathies 
24 
which are the very life and substance of our wisdom." Yet, as 1/11" Lyon 
insists in Felix Holt, Itthe right to rebellion is the right to seek a 
higher rule, II. 25 and it is to seek a higher rule that Dino has deserted 
his father. Geore;e Eliot herself was unquestionably avw.re of this conflict 
between "individual suffering"and "theoretic conviction, II and says quite 
explicitly that "if such energetic belief, pursuin8 a grand and remote 
end, is often in danger of becoming a demon-worship, in ':,hich the votary 
lets his son and daughter pass through the fire \nth a readiness that 
hardly looks like sacrifice, tender fellow-feeling for the nearest has 
its danger too, and is apt to be timid and sceptical towards the larger 
aims without which life cannot rise into religion." 26 
The search for a commitment, a "duty, II is very relevant to a study 
of Middlemarch, whether we consider Lydgate's medical researches, 
Casaubon's misdirected mythological quest, Fred Vincy's discovery pf 
"work" in Caleb Garth's sense, or Dorothea's resigned acceptance that 
she can be effective only as a wife and mother. It also illuminates 
George Eliot's treatment of the much maligned character, Will Ladislaw. 
The earljr part of the novel shows Will indulging himself by chasing 
inspiration throughout the length and breadth o~ Europe. It appears that 
"Will had declined to fix on any more precise destination than the en-
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tire area of Europe. Genius, he held, is necessarily intolerant of 
fetters: on the one hand it must have the utmost play for its spon-
taneity; on the other, it may confidently await those messages from 
the universe which summon it to its peculiar work, only placing itself 
in an attitude of receptivity towards all sublime chances. The attitudes 
27 
of reoeptivity are various, and Will had sincerely tried many of them. II 
His state of mind is made very clear to us from various conversations 
vnth Dorothea, such as the following where he expounds his Shelleyan 
definition of a poet and says to her that "'to be a poet is to have a 
soul so quick to discern that no shade of quality escapes it, and so 
quick to feel, that . discernment is but a hand playing ,'nth finely-
ordered variety on the chords of emotion--a soul in which knowledge 
passes instantaneously into feeling, and feeling fLashes back as a new 
organ of knowledge. II 28 Dorothea responds with a gently prosaio but 
salutary reminder that he leaves out the poems. "'I think,'" she says 
lI'that they are wanted to complete the poet.' II 29 Here'is a case where 
Dorothea could well reproach him for his Vlant of "a sturdy neutral de-
light in things as they Care]." 30 
Under the influence of Dorothea and his desire to stand well in her 
eyes, Will first takes the independent step of refUsing Mr Casaubon's 
allowanoe, then takes an interest in political journalism and ultimately 
sets out for London, to eat his dinners as a barrister in "preparation 
for all public business. II 31 And the fact that we are told in the Finale 
that tr\![ill became an ardent publio man" who was "at last returned to 
Parliament," 32 shows that he did indeed carry out his intentions. 
I will not consider here his suitability as a second husband for 
Dorothea or how far critical objections towards him belong in the categ-
ory of complaints about his long hair and tillconventional habits, for 
example, that of lying, stretched out full-length on hearth rugs; com-
;ylaints which'ange many clitics on the side of I,~rs ? ,:=;'c"allader as up-
holders of the proprieties .. What interests r::e in so af a of 
his career is a passage of authorial comment which ():;:urs at the time when 
','!ill is rejecting his life of unf'::tterecl ana. ~s choosing a 
life of commit+,ed service. It is made quite clear to how stron€; an 
influence his love for Dorothea exerts over his enoi. of activity 
this provides a parallel to the influence Mary has over her way-
ward and undisciplined lover, Fred Vincy¥ We learn t::.at "it is under...iable 
that but for the desire to where Dorothea was, an~~. perhaps the 'h'1:lnt 
v.cknowing wLrj:; else to do, Will would not at this Lr"6 have been med-
itating on the needs of the English people or critic~; Jing J;.lLJ'E) ......... "'·u states-
manship: he vlould probably have been 
for several dramas, trying prose and 
in 
and finding it too artificial, beginnine: to copy 
leaving off because they were 'no good t, and observ~L 
self-culture VlSS the principal point; in poUL 
been sympathising vrarmly with liberty ar"i progress :.1.: 
sketching 
, tX"Ji-inC verse 
from pictures, 
all, 
he would have 
II 33 George 
Eliot's iram disrrissal of this as a p;:ogramme for -, ~.fe is obviOUS, even 
if she left:·,· at that. But she paints oontrast b: .. Clleen what 'I'(ould 
have been 8.IHi ViM t he now , rather t c hi~, S l..xrpr .. 'lG!I finds hi; 
doing and ever enjoying, and tells us t:1at l'Ot:!!' 
for some >,vorL which shall take the plaCe of dilett..:u: and us 
:1'eel that of CO'lI' action is matter indifference. II 34 
It would appear that HLadislaw had now ,-,-ccepted his l::5..'; of '~hough 
it was not that indeterminate loftiest thing Vlhich 
as alone worthy of cantintwus effort." 
In terms of this examinatl.otl of George Eliot t s 
is the opposition of dilettante~sm and 
bad once dreamed of 
ncept of II duty ," it 
same opposition is developed more fully in the case of the eponymous 
hero of her last novel, Daniel Deronda. But in this novel, and in the 
long poem, ~ Spanish Gypsl' George Eliot's assimilation of the tenets 
of evolutionary psychology introduces a new slant. 
In ~ Spanish Gypsy, Fedalma is apprised on the eve of her marriage 
to don Silva, the Spanish nobleman, that she is a gypsy princess \uth 
obligations to her hereditary people, the Zincali, which make it im-
possible for her to marry him.eDon Silva, desperate at her decision, 
follows her and renounces his own national loyalties in order to stay 
with her; a ruinous course as it turns out, causing the death of 
Fedalmats father and the probable failure of the gypsy hopes of re-
establishing themselves in .Africa.) Fedalmat'h father, Zarca, in his 
passionate attempt to persuade her to accept the burden he is laying 
on her, addresses her in words that closely resemble Maggie's just-
ification to Stephen of why she must reject him. He declares: 
for the sanctity of oaths 
Lies not in lightning that avenges them, 
But in the injury wrought by broken bonds36 And in the garnered good of human trust. 
The comparison with Maggie's situation in ~ !!h11. ££ !:..h! Floss would 
seem to suggest that this is just a further development of the same 
problem, that of finaing a duty which is consonant with the past. But 
there is an additional element. It appears that in Fedalma's past, in 
her earliest childhood before shewas separated from her gypsy people, 
an oath of allegiance was sworn on her behalf, and this is now pre-
sented as a binding force. She recognises this fully when she bursts 
forth: 
o mother life, 
That seemed to nourish me so tenderly, 
Even in the womb you vowed me to the fire, 
1 Hung on my soul the burden of men s hopes, 
And pledged me to redeem!--Itll pay the debt. 37 
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She accepts in these words a Ciuty lai(l on her long before she had a 
ohoicein the l!lr:ltter. In her ttNotes on TheS:e.anish Gypsyand1Jragedy in 
general", George Eliot describes its subject matter. "I saw, II she claims, 
that "it might be taken as a symbol of the part which is played in the 
general human lot by hereditary conditions in the largest sense, and of 
38 
the fact that what we call duty is entirely made up of such conditions." 
If evolutionary psychology indicates that we can find in a study of 
our ancestors an explanation of man's present condition, this new em-
phasis on hereditary conditions implies tl~t we are not only strineently 
circumscribed by the present state of society but that we are now further 
encumbered by a racial past which George Eliot presents as equally 
binding as our personal past. Thomas Pinney in his article, liThe Author-
i ty of the Past in George Eliot's Novels", remarks that lithe past is still 
to bind" her characters, but it has been tlnewly interpreted not as a 
39 living body of experience but as the sum of remote hereditary conditions." 
Let us nov; return to Daniel ~nda, which even more than The S.l2anish 
Gypsy shows the pressure of this "hereditary, entailed N€;}mesis ll 1 ... 0 in 
the farm of a racial duty. liThe past determines duty for Deronda, II 
Pinney informs us, IIjust as it does for Maggie, with the significant 
difference that Deronda 1 s is a 'past' he never had •••• Clearly in the 
earlier novels the authority for t he past is inseparable from the affect-
41 ions that grow out of personal experience; in Daniel D,eronda it is not." 
Pinney later describes Deronda's acceptance of his Jewish mission in 
terms which are reminiscent of Comte's belief that the ultimate moral 
value comes in service to a national, not merely a familial or social 
cause. He claims that Uloyalties •• • Dust ng¥l,be given to the service 
of the whole race. The change is away from direct personal relation-
ships and towarcls the service of collective entities. It 42 
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Deronda t S specifically Jewish racial inheritance, of \'Ihich he is 
ignorant for much of the book, provides an explanation for many of the 
seemin{';ly irrational and non-realistic elements of the book, and most 
particularly for the relationship '::ith the dying vi~ionary, Mordecai. It 
is as if, in order for us to accept that Deronda will be grateful to have 
the responsibility of his Jewishness revealed to him, we have also to 
accept that it is so strong an influence on h1s1ife that it manifests 
itself before he himself is aware of it. Deronda refers to "an inherited 
yearning--the effect of brooding, passionate thoughts in many ancestors 
43 
--thoughts that seem to have been intensely present in mygrandi'ather." 
The notion of duty as "hereditary conditions, II 44 enlarges our under-
standing of the complex interplay of plots in this novel. Daniel. Derond.,:3., 
has frequently been criticisecl for the overweighting of the IIJewish 
l .. 5 question. II F. R. Leavis even went. so far as to suggest at one stage, 
(although he later changed his mind), h·6 JGhat it would make H much more 
satisfactory novel if· the Jewish question were omitted altogether and a 
new novel called Gwendolen Harleth were salvaged from the remains. This 
complaint and others like it point mainly to the fact that in writing the 
Jewish dimension of the book, George Eliot was havinG to rely heavily on 
. research; vie have seen something similEI' in the Italian background of 
Romola. The Jewish dimension was not somethinG directly related to her 
Drm experience; it required a supreme eff'ort of imagination for her to 
construct the necessary situations and the strain is evident. However, 
we need to decide whether the complaint against Danie 1. ~onda is a re-
sponse to this feeling of strain, a recognition that George Eliot was 
not moving confidently in this un:Camiliar element, so that the sections 
dealing with beronda when he is apart from Gwendolen lack the vividness 
and spontaneous inevitability of the Gwendolen/Grandcourt sections, or 
whether it concerns a more basic structural flaw. A brilliant psych-
ological novel concealed within a less brilliant and intrinsically less 
int ere stiIlB novel is'one thing; a novel seriously flawed because the two 
main sections are only arbitrarily relatect,. is another. 
An examination of Daniel Deronda in the light of this theme of duty 
as an indication of moral standing and possible moral grmvth shows more 
clearly the connection between the two sections and the very careful 
structural patterning that George Eliot intended. This can be s~med up 
in one of her authorial statements that "many of us complain that half 
our birthright is sharp duty: Deronda Vias more inclined to complain that 
he was robbed of this half." 47 
This gives a rough sketch, an outline only, of one theme of the book. 
Gwendolen is contrasted with Deronda. She seeks to master her own life, 
to take the reins and ride skilfully. She acknowledges but scantily any 
claims upon her, but cares very greatly about the fulfilment of her 
claims on the world. Deronda, on the other hand, is reverently looking 
for lithe complete ideal shape of that personal duty and citizenship 
which lay in his own thought like sculptured fragments certifying some 
48 beauty yearned after but not traceable by divination.tI 
For both characters there arises the question of identity; each has 
to discover 'who he or she is. Gwendolen is described as having no real 
root to her past; she has not lived long enough ~n any one place to have 
formed a lasting attachment to it. She feels stifled by her family sit-
uation. She is determined that "she [!dlfl no longer be sacrificed to 
creatures worth less than herself, II 49 which undoubtedly refers to the 
four II superfluous " sisters, 50 although the degree to which she actually 
has sacrificed herself to them is left very much in the air. All we do 
knOl'l is that the "strongest assertion she vias able to make of her indiv-
idual claims was to leave out Alice's lessons (on the principle that 
Alice was more likely to excel in ignorance). II 51 G-wendolen' s ambition) 
1411-. 
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lito do what >'Jas pleasant to herself in a striking manner, II 52 is set 
within the ironic framework of her ignorance that she is "held captive 
by the ordinary '.virework of social forms II and thus can do "nothing in 
particular. II The passion in her to be independent is grand but the 
r~armfor her to achieve that independence are slight. Nothing expresses 
this contrast more vividly than the following lines of authorial com-
ment, that "she rejoioed to feel herself exceptional; but her horizon 
was that of the genteel romance where the heroine's soul poured out in 
her journal is full of vague power, originality, and general rebellion, 
while her life moves stricjly in the sphere of fashion; and if she 
wanders into a swamp, the pathos lies partly, so to speak, in her having 
on her satin shoes." 54 
This gives a portrait on two levels: ~vendolen's picture of herself 
is a portrait full of brilliancy, all foreground with scarcely any middle 
distanoe or background to relate her to the rest of the world; but George 
Eliot skilfully fills out for us the background so that we can see what 
Gwendolen cannot, that this brilliant portrait is really just a detail 
from a massively constructed picture. No wonder, then, that when Deronda 
tells her something of his plans for going to the East, lithe world seemed 
getting larger round poor Gwendolen, and she more solitary and helpless 
55 in the midst." She thought she hl3d the canvas to herself', or at least 
shared it only with the neoessary admirers, and she had no iruCling, until 
then, of the cistance between her mind and Deronda~s. 
If' we set the proud, self-contained, self-delighting ~vendolen of 
the first part of the book alongside the somewhat pathetic, self-doubting 
woman of the final pages, we can make a fairly firm judgement of George 
Eliot's intentions with regard to her. Gwendolen, after proudly reject-
ing all claims on herself, and roundly insisting on her ovm claims, has 
been chastened and subdued. The injury she has done to 1~s Glasher and 
the children--which she would perhaps have felt less if Grandoourt had 
been as she had imagined him, a man susceptible to her charm and able 
to be mastered by her so that she COtllJ have oontinued to !1nLke he.:::-
penances easy" 56 --fills her with a remorse which eats into her and. 
forces her into an awareness of the rights of other people, She has 
- 57 
come to "look at [he:J life as a debtll and instead of shunning them, 
to find comfort and surety in the discharge of quite simple duties, 
"primary duties, \I 58 defined by her position as sister and daughter. 
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In strong contrast to Gl'lendolen, we see Deronda, equally adrift and 
unbonded to the past, ~3ecretl'y complaining that because of "the way in 
which others had ordered his ••• life" he has not had the IIfull guidance 
of primary duties." 59 The not knowing his parentage gives him a sense 
of alienation and separateness; he struggles to establish for himself an 
identity. The sympathy and understanding he shows for a vade variety of 
human situations, far from giving him a sense of belonging, seem to re-
duce his contaots with the world to a mere dilettanteism. George Eliot, 
as too often with this character, chooses to "tell" us of his dilemma 
rather than "show" it to us dramatically. Thus we see his problem in her 
terms as when she says that "a too reflective and diffusive sympathy 
was in danger of "paralysing in him that indignation against wrong and 
60 that selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force." 
61 He is adrift and wandering, like a "yearning, disembodied spirit, II the 
perfect exemplar of Feuerbach's description of a man who has no aim. 
. , Feuerbach, in The Essence of Christianitl, states in George El~ot s 
translation, that "he who has no aim, has no home, no sanctuary; aim-
lessness is the greatest unha.ppiness. II In contrast with this he continues: 
Ii He who has an aim, an aim which is in itself true and essential, has, 
62 £2. ipso, a religion. II Deronda t s aimless state seems to indicate, in 
embryonic form, the state of despair which leads some Existentialists, 
us Paul Till:i.ch maintains, lito leap from doubt to dogmatic certitude, 
from meaningle:csness to a set of symbols in which the meaning of a 
special ecclesiatical or political group is embodied." 63 This antic-
ipates Derondit's leap into Jewish nationalist politics. Deronda feels 
that his life is meaningless; ~Nendolen, that hers is dreary. Both 
show increasingly the alienation from themselves and the life around 
them that becomes so strong a theme in later writers. Both respond to 
their situations with varying degrees of egoism. Gwendolen seeks to 
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achieve identity and vividness by doing IIwhatever she could do so as to 
strike others with admiratiol}, and get in that re:fnected way a more ard-
ent sense of living"; 64 Deronda keeps himself' apart, encouraging, even 
inviting, other people's confidences but not trust them 'wi th his 
doubts and difficulties in return, and occasionally even feeling a 
twinge of resentment that they fail to see him as human. Both of them 
are acting a part; Gwendolen more obviously, Dnd Vle can see how her ex-
treme sensitivity to the opinions of other people becomes a pOi'lerful 
weapon in Gr!1llc.court t s armoury against her. She exerts the utmost of her 
pride and control to conceal from her mother ana the vlorld that she has 
made a disastrous marriage, and to all but Deronda appears totally self-
contained. But Deronda, equally, is unable, as it '\'lere, to lose face, 
or to appear vulnerable; his recoil from the Jewish friend of his grand-
father, and his distancing himself from a possible friend at school, are 
equally self-protective mechanisms, perfectly credible and justifiable, 
but examples no less of mauvai~:!e foi. He certainly represents, however, 
a more advanced moral state than Gwendolen, who, to begin with, f'ee~s 
that it is the 'Norld that is to blame for her misfortunes and seeks to 
ovade rer-:ponsibilities and duties. Deronda, on the other hand, fully 
recognises the dangers of aircLlessness and insufficient motivation in 
himself and welcome!) '.dth relief the responsibilities ana. commitments 
that come vlith the revelation of his Jewish heritar.;e. 
When hi 5· mother, driven by the avenging Furies, reveals to him the 
secret of his Jewish birth, he does not just passively accept his herit-
age. It brings with it, for him, an identity, a passionate identification 
with his ancestral people and a willing assumption of any obligations 
or duties that belong to the fact of his being born a Jew. He declares to 
his mother, "'I consider it my duty--it is the impulse of my feeling--
65 to identify myself, as far as possible, "lith my hereditary people.' \I 
Ji'ar from feeling shackled by his recognition of his new duties, "he 
came back with what was better thc'1n freedom--with a duteous bond. 1I 66 His 
path is the opposite in that sense to Gwendolen's; where she is shown 
the futility of struggling to escape from any such "duteous bandit and 
of 'wanting to declare her separateness from all such moral obligations, 
Deronda is lost and adrift because he lacks the sense of purpose, as 
he defines it, 1Isome social captainship, vvhich coula. come to 1lii~ as a 
duty, ancl not be striven for as a personal prize. II 67 
Duty can be seen, therefore, to govern both their lives, and their 
final readiness to accept their obligations, eagerly in the case of 
Deronda, and more reluctantly in the case of Gwendolen, reveals to us 
their capacity for moral grovrth. It is not just that George Eliot in 
her novels creates a morftl scale related to the ,question of duty; duty 
seen as something we must perform; gladly and vvillingly if possible, 
but vlith the assistance of extern'l law until such time as "duty and 
love have united. II 68 Duty provides a conunitment, a pertisanship, but 
what 3eems to be more important, it frees the person from the necessity 
of making difficult decisions "lithout any real motivation; for example, 
Deronda's fear of having lito make an arbitrary seJ:ection where he felt 
no preponclerance of clesire," 69 or Romola t 3 awareness of "that burden 
of choice whIch presses with heaVier and heavier weight ','[hen claims 
have loosed, their guiding hold." 70 To characters who are consciously 
seekine for "that supremely hallovred mati va which men call duty, II 71 
this awareness of the loss of guidance brings .'lith it a aread. 
"'.Then we examine Maggie t s anguished self-examination as she is faced 
vrith a choice that 'Nill set her against the current of her life up to 
that point and make her betray all that she holds as sacred, one thing 
emerges very clearly; that there is in her .an underlying fear. Remarks 
like "wayward choice" and "losing the clue of her life" 72 recur. ','Ie 
find the same element of fear in WordsVlorth I s "Ode to Duty" when he sets 
duty up against his awareness of "unchartered freedom" and "the weight 
of chance-desires," 73 and similarly it appears in a letter from George 
Eliot to the Brays after the dev.th of her fD.ther when she expressed her 
concern about her isolation from any moral guidance without his restrain-
ing influence. "What shall I be without my father?" she writes. lilt 
will seem as if part of my moral nature were gone. I had a horrid vision 
of myself last night becoming earthly senoual and devilish f0r want of 
that purifying, restraining influence." 74 We can understand hovf easy 
it is for Freudian analysts to turn from an examination of Maggie t s 
fear of independence (as in Bernard Paris' recent re-evaluation of The 
~ ~ ~ Floss in Horneyan and Maslovian terms) 75 as a classic case 
of neurotic self-distrust and dependency causing, crippling anxiety and 
paralysis, to a study of the symptoms in George Eliot herself. And she 
is not an isolated case. Paul Tillich says pertinently that "if the 
spiritual contents [if lif~ have lOst their po';',er the self-affirmation 
of the moral personality is a way in ,':hich meanine; can be rediscovered. 
The simple call to duty can save from emptiness." 76 (my italics) This 
fear of tltLl'lChartered freedom" 77 ,';ould a'\;Jear to be a fundamental char-
acter trait of those living under the shadow of the French revolution, 
who had lost their religious faith but who had retained their bel:tef in 
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original sin and the need for man to be stringently guarded and pro-
tocted from himself. J..n optimistic determinist like Herbert Spencer 
could happily believe that there was taking place a steady attrition of 
the self-maintenance instincts and an equivalent development of the 
race-maintenance instincts, as our civilisation moved out of the mil-
itary phase and entrenched itself more firmly in the industrial phase 
where co-operation and fellowship become the order of the day. But 
George Eliot Vlas a less thorough-going determinist with a melancholy 
turn of mind, believing indeed in progress, but a slow foot-slogging 
progress and she would have heartily agreed vlith this stntement of 
Auguste Comte that Itself-love in the Positive system is regarded as the 
great infirmity of our nature~ an infirmity 7ihich unremitting discipline 
on the part of each individual and of society may m[lterially palliate, 
but 'i,lill never radically cure." 78 The only safeguard is tho c1o:volop-
ment of altruism to counteraot the negative effects of an egoistic and 
self-regarding vievl of other people. In The Study; S!£ Psy;chology (1878), 
Lewes maintains that "the law of animal action is Individualism: its 
motto is 'Each for himself against all.' The ideal of human action is 
Altruism: its motto is 'Each ~ others, all far each. f II 79 Leaving 
aside the ,validity of this description of animal action which twentieth 
century ethological studies have seriously dispu~ed, there is still 
contained in this statement a complete identification of individualism 
and egoism • .An early nineteenth century~sage of individualism, (1835), 
is given as " self-centred feeling or conduct as a principle; a mode of 
life in which the individual pursues his o'.::rn ends or follows out his 
own ideas; free or independent individual action or thought; egoism; 
, 
Kingsley 5 tautological utterance, "selfish individualism" comes under 
this usage. (OED, "Indi vidualism", 1) Later in the century, 1884, the 
word individualism h&s been politicised and it is now seen as the anto-
nym not of altruism but of collectivism. It is now used to describe the 
"social theory which advocates the free and independent action of the 
individual, as opposed to communistic methods of organisation and state 
interference." (OED, "Individualism", 2) 
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In ~ Open Society ~ its Enemies, Karl Popper expresses concern at 
the fact that individualism, because of these two 'quite' distinct usages, can 
be, and often is taken as the opposite of both altruism and collectivism. 
He declares that "it is interesting that for Plato, and for most Platon-
ists, an altruistic individualism (as, for instance, that of Dickens) 
cannot exist. According to Plato, the only alternative to collectivism 
is egoism; he simply identifies all collectivism with altruism, and all 
individualism with egoism," Thus !lin defending collectivism, he can appeal 
to our humanitarian feeling of unselfishness; in his attack, he can 
brand all individualists as selfish, as incapable of devotion to any-
80 thing but themselves." 
It is easy to see how this criticism of Plato could also' apply to 
George Eliot and other nineteenth century thinkers who saw no problem 
in the identification of individualism '.'lith egoism. Stephen Lukes, dis-
cussing the various "unit-ideas" of the term "individualism" comments 
on the prevalence in the first half of the nineteenth century of the 
pejorative meaning signified by the French vlOrd,·individualisme, which 
implied the "social, moral and political isolation of rootless, self-
interested, and acquisitive individuals tmco:1cerne(". ','rith social ideals 
and unamenable to social control." 81 It is individualism in this sense 
that so threatens George Eliot and explains Wordsworthts prayer in his 
-Co protect him against 
"unchartered freedom" or "the weight of chance-desires." George Eliot 
characters either embrace duty or flounder helplessly by insisting on 
their o,'m claims. George Eliot may not have been willing to go alI the 
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way with Comte t s dogmatic assertion that no one has in any case any 
82 
right but that of doing .his.duty ...... but she .comes perilously close to 
it. Deronda t s mother, dying paini'ully of what is probably cancer, in 
keeping with the poetic justice so curiously out of place in a novel 
83 of such psychological realism, cries out passionately; '~1I11 had a' 
right to be free. I had a right to seek my freedom from a bondage that 
I hated. • II 84 But events are against her, or more accurately George 
Eliot arbitrates against her. The acceptance or rejection of duty, as 
we have seen, provides a sort of moral barometer, an indicator of a 
character's moral growth and once we have decided where the characters 
fit on this finely calib~at scale we can predict broadly if not in 
detail what "lill happen to them. 
Whether we agree, tllen, with Ilhggie I s decision to reject Stephen, or 
feel that Romola sacrifices herself needlessly in her caring for Tessa 
and Tito's children, or that Deronda's eager embracing of his Jewishness 
is quixotic or dangerously fanatical, we cannot escape the conclusions 
that George Eliot puts before us. Given her premises, the conclusions 
follow inexorably. We are shown no range of alternatives, only the 
Itbarrenness of a fastidious egoism ••• where a fitful impulse springs 
here and there conspicuously rank amid the general weediness." 85 
Individualism equals egoism and is suspect, but unf'ortunately this 
means that originality, creativity, and eccentricity are likewise sus-
pect. In all? ter discussion of George Eliot • s concept of self:. I will 
examine such characters as Dorothea Brooke, Felix Holt:. and Daniel 
Deronda in order to show that their claims to originality are still 
closely confined wi thin the "ordinary wirework of social forms. It 86 Ji.nd, 
as I indicated earlier, Romola may have achieved marDI stature but she 
is no rebel. She accepts and protects the status quo. In a George 
Eliot novel, we observe the process of moral gro'l·;th but the path is 
'" 
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fixed and clearly defined in advance. There is no room for the random 
87 
or the unexpect ed. Bet' ora, however, we examine this "1053 of marginality," 
in David Riesman's phrase, there is one aspect of George Eliot's belief 
in moral growth which we have not yet discussed. :Many of the novels, 
from Janet- s Repentance to Daniel Deronda, illustrate what George Eliot 
refers to as lithe incalculable effect of one personality on another. II 88 
Various struggling characters, always women, achieve moral groy~h as the 
result of the influence of a character who is more morally sensitive. 
These "mentor" 89 characters take on a priestly and confessional role 
towards their pupils and offer them an ideal picture of themselves to-
wards which they can strive. 
Let us now examine George Eliot's treatment of these mentor/pupil 
relationships. 
The Incalculable Effect. 
The previous sections examined such concepts as moral develop-
ment, the nature of the "moral sense," intuitionism, absolutism and 
duty. I will now look at George Eliottsway of dealing with the indiv-
idual suffering human being, with the "cry from soul to soul, without 
other consciousness than their moving with kindred natures in the same 
embroiled medium, the same troublous fitfully-illuminated life. II 1 
In the essay on Young already referred to, George Eliot writes that 
"in proportion as morality is emotional, it will exhibit itself in 
direct sympathetic feeling and action, and not as the recognition of a 
rule." 2 The personal world of human relationships requires tldirect 
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sympathetic feeling and action." This phrase could serve as a summary 
for one particular kind of personal relationship which George Eliot 
returns to frequently in the novels; this is the mentor/pupil'relation-
ship where, as a result of trust and openness between two people, one 
or both of them achieve moral growth. Esther's changed conception of 
possibilities in Felix Holt~ because of her friendship with Felix is 
described as "a dissolving view, in which the once-clear images were 
gradually melted into new forms and new colours •• ~.So fast does a 
little leaven spread within us--so incalculable is the effect of one 
personality on another." 3 The use of the word "incalculable II shows us 
that we have left behind the world of irreversible laws, of rigorously 
determined consequences and effects. I am not trying to suggest, however, 
that George Eliot would have held that the laws did not obtain in such 
instances, that they had been miraculously suspended in the case of 
personal relationships. She would have firmly and bravely acknowledged 
that the laws held as rigorously in this context as in any other, but 
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that they were too complex to be formulated. But we can detect in her 
bifocal vision, a return to a more. reliGiously,,",orientedperspective. 
With the introduction of a sense of purpose, a goal towards which a 
person can direct his energies, we have a partial return to Aristotlets 
disputed "final cause, II and a language which is J.ess scientifically pre-
cise. J. Hillis Mi.ller analyses the tension arising from "the conf:j.ict 
between the '::riter's conscious adherence to scientific models, whether 
those of the physical or of the biological sciences, to descri.be human 
life and, on the other hand, his insi{,:ht into the true nature of that 
, 
life. Such insight means a recognition that human beings cannot be de-
4-
scribed in language appropriate for inanimate objects or for organisms." 
He refers explicitly to Adam Bade and Uiddle~..!£h. and talks of George 
Eliot's tlstruggle ••• to reconcile her sense of human existence vlith a 
language of causality taken from nineteenth century science. 1I 
This is obviously a recurring problem. In The Faith. .2f. the Counsellors, 
Paul Halmos discusses the difficulty experienced by twentieth century 
counsellors in findinG a scientific language which adequately expresses 
the ineffable quality of some counselling situations. They encounter 
serious problems when they attempt to quantify a qualitative relationship. 
If, as he indicates, counsellors are but "priests ,vrit large," 5 then it 
is not surprisinG that scientists should be confused by their ovm tend-
eney to re-introduce terminology they feel is more suited to a religious 
context. We must, he cautions, refrain from levelling at them accusations 
of hypocrisy or double-think, a.s th:b problem they hnve'Nith langunge, 
merely reflects the ambiguities of our hUInan situation. VIe can see the 
relevance of his comments to George Eliot. He is presenting in different 
terms the problem outlined by J. Hillis Hiller. 
I will noi'! look at I:;he terms in which ~eorge Eliot presents the very 
personalised relationships which various 0:::' her critics have described as 
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those of mentor/pupil. They ShOVI that some of her characters are priest-
counsellors, in Halr:.lOs' sense. The relation3hip between Janet Dempster 
and the consumptive Evangelical minister, Mr '!ryan from the third of 
George Eliot's Scene~ of Clerical L~fe, Janet's ~eEentance, is an instance 
of this kind of relationship. It flo'.'1e1'5 after Janet's husband has throvm 
her out of her home in the middle of the night and she is forced to seek 
refuge from a friend, Mrs Pettifer. She is no longer able to conceal 
from the world that her marriage is disastrous and this leads her to 
seek an interview with the previously despised t!r 'l'ryan. She confesses 
to him her alcoholism and ultimately, ';lith his support and encouragement, 
i8 able to overcome it. The important features of this relationship 
fall under several headings: the character of t he mentor, the dynamics 
of their relationship, and the conclusions it offers as to George Eliot's 
moral schern[;. Although this relationship is a paradiem of other similar 
relationships in the novels, for example, that, between Esther Lyon and 
Felix Holt, and the more carefully wrought account of the relationship 
between Gwendolen Harleth and Daniel Deronda, there are ways in which 
this relationship between Janet and Mr Tryan is not representative .. 
One of these is that Mr Tryan is seen to be less remote and more 
human than the other mentor figures. He confesses his own weaknesses to 
Janet and his unending remorse for his seduction, of Lucy. He admits his 
continuing spiritual struggles and his sense of his o'.'m un"worthiness. All 
this, however, is psychologically valid. C~'rent sociological research 
into alcoholism reveals that alcoholics have the greatest difficulty in 
openly admitting the nature of their problem, in !!naming" their illnes3. 
If 11r Tryan had shown the overvleening confidence and certainty of Felix, 
vlhich verge on the arrogant, or the remote goodness of Deronda, it 
would have scarcely encouraged Janet to make her confession. 
In one othor aspect there is a notable difference between Janet 
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and Esther or Gwendolen. Both of the latter in varying degrees show aspects 
of egoism which mark their kinship with Rosamond Vincy. Janet's sisterhood, 
on the other hand, contains such characters as Maggie Tulliver and' 
6 Romola and Dorothea Brooke who have "early emerged from moral stupidity" 
and have a strong capacity for sympathy. Janet, like them, is morally 
aware. Her drinting is obviously a weakness but :Lt is shoi'm to be very 
much a response to a destructive situation. 
Apart from these two provisos there are fundamental similarities 
between the Janet/Mr Tryan relationship and the others, so that we can 
detect a pattern. George Eliot is emphasising the very personal one-to- ) Q " 
one quality of such a relationship. Only within such a framework, when 
the mentor fieure is obeying what Paul Tillich has called the "law of 
listening love, II 7 is the pupil [lble to resrJond to the atmosphere of 
trust and openness and talk freely. The empathy manifested by the mentor 
takes two forms: the acceptance of the individual worth of the pupil 
and at the same time a recognition of that pupilts potential. for grm'~h. 
The first creates the atmosphere of trust; the second, by presenting an 
image of what the pupil is able to become, offers a goal or direction 
towards which she can strive. Any falling short of this goal produces a 
feeling of shame. This is very clear in the scene in Janet t s l1epentance" 
when. Janet accidentally comes across a bottle ot: brandy at a time when 
she is feeling lonely and very vulnerable. Her violent reaction in hurl-
ing it to the ground and rushing out to walk the long distance to see 
1~ Tr,yan marks the final stage in her cure. Previously, in her self-
loathing, she could find no sense of her ovm personal worth '''lhich 
would motivate her to fight against her addiction. Now the thought of 
!III' Tryan and what he. expects of her, her recognition that he will be 
bitterly disappointed if she succumbs to temptation give her the nec-
8ssary strength of mind. His actual presence even is not required. 
The important healing quality of confession and the device pf pre-
senting a 'goal in the form of an image of an ideal self are recurring 
themes in the novels. The first is illustrated in the long prison con-
fession Hetty makes to Dinah in Adam ~. Openness and confession are 
symptoms of a readiness for moral gr~nh. Conversely, lack of candour, 
, 
concealment, self-protectiveness are indications of a character s moral 
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deficienoies. Tito Melemats concealment of his father's existence, Arthur 
Donnitborl'le t s last minute failure to confide in Mr Irwine and Bulstrode' 5 
inability to open out to his wife despite her loving solicitude are all 
examples of moral decline. 
The most striking example of the efficacy of the goal of the ideal 
self occurs in Daniel Deronda. Gwendolen desperately clutches to her, as 
if it were a talisman, Deronda's belief that she Vlill "live to be one 
8 
of the beat sort of women. \I 
The importance George Eliot gives to the need for openness betvleen 
people relates to the fact that to her, moral growth conoerns not just 
the individual and his sense of his own identity but is very much a 
question of that individual's relationship with his immediate family, 
his community or even his race. Fellowship is most important and a 
character's capacity for fellowship reveals his state of moral develop-
ment and is, as well, a means whereby he can dev.elop morally. The cap-
acity for sympathy serves the same two-fold purpose. A loving, trusting 
relationship, such as the mentor/pupil relationship;generates an open-
ness which is shown to be a necessary ingredient not just for the mental 
health and moral growth of the individual but for the moral growth and 
stability of the community at large. 
The goal of the ideal self may be offered by a mentor figure or other 
respected friend, or occasionally it may be adopted as a workable myth 
or fantasy by the oharacter herself without any intermediar--J. Maggie 
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Tulliver, to a certain extent, anu Dorothea Brooke, both morally-
inspired heroines, set up their own images of a better self towards 
which they strive. More usually in George Eliot novels, hO"NeVer, the 
notion of a better self is carried in the mind of some loved one. George 
Eliot tells us in Middlemarch that "even much stronger mortals than 
FredVincy hold half their rectitude in the mind of the being they 
love best. "rhe theatre of all my actions is fallen' said an antique 
personage when his chief friend was dead; anu they are fortunate who 
get a theatre where the audience demands their best." 9 
Unfortunately the idea that other people have about us may not nec-
essarily be helpful. We have already seen the damagin{:; effect of other 
people's expectations on a character like Lydgate who W8,S partially 
defeated by Rosamond's intransigence and by the power of gossip in a 
community like Middlemarch. Rosamond expects him to play his role in 
her myth of herself as a woman with a certain class distinction; 
Middlemarch expects the worst and is too quick to come to a low est-
imate of Lydgate's actions. Lydgate's anguish at having fallen short of 
his ideal self is paralleled by Ladislaw's recognition that he is sliding 
into that "l,leasureless yielding to the small solicitations of circum-
stance, which is a commoner history of perdition than any single mom-
entous bargain." 1 0 Both Ladislaw and Lydgate show the possible moral 
failure if the goal of the ideal self is not reached, just as the 
earlier examples of Tito, Pxthur, and Bulstrode reveal the moral dangers 
of concealment and distrust. 
In this analysis, George Eliot's debt to Feuerbach becomes clear; 
his thinking reinforced and confirmed her own thoughts. A brief 
rtsum{ of Feuerbach' s intellectllal position v,ill facilitate comparison 
betneen his views and George Eliot's. 
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In 1854, George Eliot translated Feuerbach's ~ Essence of Christ-
ianity and allowedHit to be published under her own name, Marian Evana. 
Ludvdg Feuerbach Vias one of those ethical humanists who are especially 
concerned with "relationship. II In common with the more recent existent-
ialist, Marcel, and the two visionaries, one Christian and one Jevdsh, 
Kierkegaard and ~mrcel Bubel', Feuerbach insisted on a personal response 
to other people. He abhorred exploiting other people or abusing them 
by reification. Commitment to other people 'an.Q.. to the natural world 
was seen by such thinkers as a safeguard against alienation, separation, 
and distortion. 
Feuerbach is especially interesting in that he follows the other 
T~bingen philosophers, Strauss for example, in demythologising the Bible 
and the Christian message. The question which preoccupies him about 
Christianity is not, tlIs it true?" but, ''':.'hat fUl'lction has it served in 
mankind's history l' and "Vlhat can be learnt from it about men t s needs and 
how they satisfy them?" 11 This is a l:!:ne of questio!]ing v[hich can be 
traced foriv.ard to Freudian and. other psychologies. George Eliot expresses a 
similar view in a letter of 1859. 
I havo no longer any antagonism towards any faith in which human 
sorrow and human longing for purity have expressed themselves •••• 
I have not returned to dogmatic Christianity--to the acceptance 
of any set of doctrine as a creed, and a superhuman revelation 
of the Unseen--but I see in it the highest expression of the re-
ligious sentiment that has yet found its place in the hist~ of 
mankind, and I have the profoundest interest in the inward life of 
sincere Christians in all ages. 12 
The philosophic relativism of his approach to religion does not extend 
to every other area of human thought. Feuerbach/ (and here we can recog-
.f 
nise a great similarity to George Eliot), may have dethroned the ab-
solutes of religion but he has retainecl another absolute in his virtual 
deification of mankind and in his stressing the importance fif the incliv-
idual in the development of mornli ty. The stress on the inm vidual is 
somephat ambiguous. The inmvidual who is so important is not the in-
Cl.iv:i.uual self, the I, but the other inclid_c!.m.:L to ,;hOIl 'Ne relate, the 
You, of' tho I-You statement. Vlithout th::'3 You vIe would. have no sense of 
• It is here that Feue:cbach and George Eliot ~ 'Nhile to 
promulgat e an indi viduali s1:5:0 ethic, are yet vor:l airf' erent from 
'TI.btzsche with his passionate individualism and his scorrL for vihet he 
:'118u IIhercl mentality. If 13 He stands t in tion to 
oriented ethic'll systems. 'ine section on n.s"s the 
on that often occurs in ethical l",;tv:een selfishness 
and SlTI, D.nd the 0hat surrour:ds the very 0~:,(1 !Iinc.u vlckeIi s;:n. " 
ticr .. to 8.1truisffi:z in 
ch~ 
Eliot, Ua:ccol, Buber and athol'S takes t:}e form of ::i 
the indi v1.duc~,·\i ty of other people. It r31ate,' to the of main-
tainine; an I-You relation:lhip 'iii th otll8r~, not an I,,1t relationship .. 
The other factor importrmt in the of ~E:;:rGach and 
ard detectab:::_~: as well in George Eliot, ~s th.at rLl.o.ral 
becomes in effect a (livinc imperativo, 
race is sacred and to be cherisheu. ThE L'.ttributes God are meD 
less u.'1les~' they are t 0 ma:nl:in ~ ; 
ice, and are ., l hur.18n attr them t God. is 
o reduce max: t s stat m'e !i o nullif'y fc;i ve power r,ud dom-
inaTlce over s minds t () an ic1ea. Fe' :;:efut ed the 
o~ ~::o him atheisrn diel not der (._ lucl\: o:f DclieI~ in G~o~~ but 
of benevol;; :10e , 
on, a.nd therefore, n It 2c, yot 
:Uf'ficult to soe how Inlot stec 
'.,hero she found, cou.ld tl.1rn 
Cl.n. I'c:.: ::;11 
creatures, love and tolerance. Similar aspect::; of Comte' s tho:)f~ht 11150 
attracted her, but his proselytising and his demands for disciples and 
incense place him in a different category ~_~euerbach who made no such 
grandiose porsoll",l claims. It is not surprising, therefore, that George 
Eliot should have said that even if Cornte VlaS a "great thinker," she 
11t- Ii:': ;;1 fauncl Positivism liane-sided" or thnt she could not "submit L!!e::.L 
. mind and soul to the guid.ance of Comte." 15 While she was engaged in 
the translation of the Esse~ of Christianity:, she wrote that "with 
16 the ideas of Fcuerbach I everyvlhere agree. II 
Sidney Hook describes the religion of love in terms which show very 
clearly the attitudes and even the vocabulary George Eliot held in common 
vii th Feuerbach. IItfhe re liei on of love, 11 he maintains, II strengthens the 
moral relations between men, for the real sOurce of moral relation,-hips 
is love •••• Only when social relationships beeome moral relationships Cf.:n 
the oppositionsbet'lleen the egoism of the self and the needs of the species 
be resolved. And since Feuerbach held that tall moral relationships Ilre 
Eel' !!.£. religious' althou[5h not vice versa, he preached his humanistic 
'7 
religion of love as the most effective agency of moral improvemnt." I 
The stress on relationships as opposed to identity is clear. Feuerbach 
himself writes that "the species is unlimited; the individual alone 
limited. II 18 The following passage provides a most important abstract of 
Feuerbach's position and the nature of the relationship that he stressed 
"between him and another human being. 11 
thisother is the representative of the species, even thou[",h he is 
only one, for he supplies to me the want of many others, has for 
me a universal significance, is the deputy of mankind, in vlhose 
name he speaks to me, an isolated individual, so that, when united 
only vlith one, I have a participated, a human life;--betvreen me 
and another human being there is an essential, qualitative dis-
tinction. The other is my thou,--the relation being reciprocal,--
my alter ego, man objectiv~ me, the revelation of my ovm 
nature, the eye seeins itself. In another I first have the con-
sciousness of humanity; through him I first learn, I first feel, 
that I am a man: in my love for him it is fird clear to me that 
he belones to me and I to him, that we two cannot be without each 
other, that only community constitutes humanity. But, morally, also, 
there is a quAlitative) critical distinction between the!. and ~. 
My fellow-man is my objective conscience; he makes my failings a 
reproach to me; even when he does not expressly mention them, he 
is my personified feeling of shame. The consciousness of the moral 
law, of right, of propriety, of truth itself, is indissolubly 
united with ~y consciousness .of another than myself. 19 
Once we have decoded Feuerbach's rather abstruse style, we find he is 
1-
saying some very familiar things. ~ belongs to the tradition of nine-
teenth century philosophers and social scientists whom I have already 
1 
mentioned. IHe stresses the importance of community-based feelings as the 
\ 
.~ 
cornerstone of morality, as we see in the phrase "only community oonstit-
utes humanity." He emphasises the way in which we discove::." the measure 
of ourselves in the implicit or explicit judgement of our neighbours. 
The parallels between his thought and George Eliot's are immediate and 
striking; they quite obviously shared the same preoccupations and we 
can readily understand how she was drawn to translate him. The reinforce-
ment he offered t a her ideas was exclusively a moral one. The. importance 
of the other person, the need for fellowship (which, as we have seen, re-
lates to the biological and ecological emphasis on medium) are essential 
aspects of moral growth. In addition, Feuerbach exerted a oonsiderable 
influence on the political thought of Marx and Engels who criticised 
him severely for this very moralistic bias. Engels claims, for example, 
that lithe same Feuerbach who on every page preaches sensuousness, absorp-
tion in the concrete, in actuality, becomes thoroughly abstract as soon 
as he be€:,"ins to talk of other than mere sex relations between human 
20 beings. Of these relations only one aspect appeals to him: morality." 
Marx and Engels thought Feuerbach v~s mistaken in seeing all relation-
ships between men as moral relationships; critic:..: of Marx and Engels 
object to their exclusive emphasis on economic relationships. Heverthe-
less, George Eliot's OvVTI moralistic bias shows her to be closer to the 
spirit of Feuerbach than his political followers. 
I have already mentioned one other aspect of Feuerbach's thought in 
connection vdth the problems of temporary lack of motivation in a char-
acter like Deronda. I find it most pertinent to Il\Y analysis of George 
Eliot's thought because it summarises what I have indicated is her tacit 
re-acceptance of Aristotle's final cause, the goal towards which we direct 
our activities. Feuerbach w.ritesthat 
Every man ••• must place before himself a God, i.e., an aim, a 
purpose. The aim is the conscious, voluntary, essential im-
pulse of life, the glance of genius, the focus of 5e1£-
knowledge,--the unity of the material and the spiritual in the 
individual man. He who has an aim has a l.<:l.w over him; he does 
not merely guide himself; he is guided. He who has no aim, has 
no home, no sanctuary; aimlessness is the greatest unhappiness. 
Even he who has only common aims gets on better, though he may 
not be better, than he who has no aim. An aim sets limits; but 
limits are the mentors of virtue. He "ho has an aim, an aim 
which is itself true and essential, has, ~ ipso, a religion ••• 
in the sense of reason, in the sense of the universal, the 
only true love. 21 
My discussion of the opposition between dilettanteism and duty 
which is a theme in several of the novels will have already ~hown 
George Eliot's concurrence with this statement. One further quotation 
from Daniel Deronda, a description of Grandcourt points up the lawless-
ness of this unmotivated, purposeless state and shows clearly the opp-
osition George Eliot saw existing between egoism and duty. She asks in 
the epigraph to chapter 25, "how trace the why and wherefore in a mind 
reduced to the barrenness of a fastidious egoism, in which all direct 
desires are dulled, and have dwindled. from motives into a vacillating 
expectation of motives: a ~nd made up of moods, where a fitful impulse 
springs here and there conspicuously rank amid the general weediness? 
'Tis a condition apt to befall a life too much at large"unmoulded by 
22 the pressure of obligation." Grandcourt has already been described 
as one who suffers fi"'om lithe want of regulated channels for the soul 
to move in--good and sufficient ducts of habit without which our nature 
1 
Easily turns 0 mere ooze and mUQ)O and, a.n.'?" 0J·e'.'.;~'-,.:. nothi.ng 
'')ut a or a puddle." 
Eany critics have dealt with the unclt:lUbtec.. elemen-::;s in 
George Eliot's novels, concentrating on decr~istianising 
of various like VIr from J anot I S 
-,-......;..,;...;. . ...;.;. •.. 
MO:Tis, 
the Methodist preacher in ::~~ Bede, suf2ers the Sa!,'":;;' , in the 
later novels, 0specially 
-'--""'-
Holt and the mentor fig-
ure is not even remotely C1"~istian. Felix is a s<;l:::'-~ 'cla:l:'ed and 
it has been noted that Deronda' s political 
not religiouL~ Other Feuerbachian influe~ces have be~n '2here 
is U. C. Knoeflmacher' s notable account of tL~ sirni;.::'±.ties between the 
sacrament of ',8 Last Supper and the sac::''.:l.mental offE'i.ng of and. 
wine to to fortify him before i:le goes to h?';:' i S sext enee at 
2L 
court." I al[, more concerned with patterns of t . than with s;ecific 
Feuerbachian influences, but I vJill mention the in which 
Geari:':'; Eliot ieuerbacl· the explicitly 
tained in Thon21f:' of Ghri n Jre she it 
..-.... '"",-_._-, 
to Maggie in 'Lhe on the 
mediaeval, devotional work have supposedLy been 
, a reaGQr, '.',ho J ','Ie ciscover, was .me,ouot of 
do not rtJ..'1 consecuti vel;:. ::"1.:. c:f 
\ihere George ~l'..~Liot she leav~ out 
Christian refel"ences, especially those ,)LUng of II or the "love 
of !I or the t::e directi va 
her self-loy€: and 
surrender her ,',~lll a.l1d emphatically does not instruction to 
seek out the 10ve of God. God as a e not exist J.n 
i!:liot f E of beliefs.. She be.ieves Yiith ·"' ..:erbach that His 
attributes h2.ve , that oelont: to man .. 
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does not totally avoid all references t- the Christ but these 
of humanity. They thus ore in Feuerbachian terms and. tu 
become a useful symbol for t he human P1': dicamenc. 
The patterns of thought George El.~ot ;;hEJ.reCi \,iith ~'euerbach and the 
similar emotional resonance of their writings \C,-it thA reiterated con-
cern for humanity places both of them in a tX'€iC1.ition of hU:::1£11"..istic ethics. 
rhis Jr,ind of ethics is intent on propoU}:.ding the' inwerdness of an 
individual t s reaction to the v;orld. Dons.lei UacKinnon, contrasting the 
lIact-ethics n of utilitarianism \nth a h;::.'TIanistic ethic declares that 
the humanistic ethic defines a man' s mC~.al 'North in terms of IIman ; s re-
sponsiveness, II the tldisponibility" of P .tl in the p:t'es.ence of' hi~3 
fellows, the 'Jiversity of huma.'>l 10v8* worth, It he olairns, "is real-
ized by the extent to which the indivj, '·.'ll so to opens and Qeepens 
himself through his relations tobis fe~' }OVJs. II 
The mention of "openness II and Hr6sponsi 'Veness II c:mfirms the connection 
I am making between George Eliott s me:;,' 
and the other philosophers throughout 
a "shallow consec;,uentialist morality" 
ic ethic .. 
position an.:l that of Feuerbach 
centuries who have raj 
ami have promulgated a hU,Hlanist-
Preoepts ~ People. 
Our investigation of George Eliotts conception of morality has led 
into very divergent field~. We have examined eighteenth oentury moralists, 
Shaftesbury,Hutcheson and Hume; Balguy and Prioe; nineteenth century 
sociologists, biologists and moral philosophers such as Spencer, Bain, 
Darwin and Lewes; and lastly a German demythologiser of the Bible, 
Ludwig Feuerbach. These various writers ir~luenced George Eliot, or'more 
accurately, reinforced the tendency of her thought to move in a part- / 
icular direction. Her concern for moral growth, for fellowship and 
human sympathy, provides a particular mental coloration which per-
meates her whole vlOrk. We find the same emphasis whether we are examining 
her belief in "universal causality" 1 or observing the eff'ect on her 
methods of characterisation of her acceptance of the laws of association 
psychology or those of' evolutionary psychology. We have been inspecting 
a "web where each mesh Ldraw~ all the rest. It 2 
Up to this point I have been concentrating on isolating and ident-
ifying George Eliot's clusters of ideas. But an analysis or description 
of her psyohologioal and moral assumptions provides no indication of how 
she has incorporated these assumptions into her.novels. It may indicate 
t the parameters of' a character s growth or decline but convey no critical 
assessment o!' the novelist t s success or f'ailure. A know13dge of the re-
lationship between her thought and that of her contemporaries may ill-
mainate the novels in one area but cannot Df itself offer an evaluat~ve 
commentary. To briu.ge this gap between description and evaluation, it 
is necessary to examine more specifically the implications of her ideas 
for the aesthetic completeness of' the novels. Thus it is not enough 
merely to identify George Eliot's moral absolutism or her hierarohical 
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construct for moral grovnh. It is also important to decide whether 
such beliefs constitute limitations and restrictions on the manipulation 
of plot or theme, or on the development of characters and the sorts of 
choices offered them. 
I will now turn my attention to some of the issues that have emerged 
from an examination of George Eliot's moral and psychological stance. I 
vrlll define her concept of self, the ways in which she allows her char-
acters to establish themselves in the world of the novels. I vall assess, 
in terms of the individual, struggling human being, the tragic implicat~ 
ions of a framework of universal causality and irreversible laws. Finally 
I will look at representative characters in order to analyse whether 
they are allowed sufficient freedom for moral growth or whether they 
suffer from George Eliot's too-controlling hand. 
Let us now examine the ways in which George Eliot defines the self-
hood of her characters and the sorts of opportunities she provides for 
them. We will also need to decide whether these opportunities allow for 
a free range of expression, or whether they restrict the characters' 
freedom of choice. 
"Stran{Se, that some of us, II vll'ites George Eliot in I.1idd.lemarch, 
"with quick alternate vision, see beyond our infatuations, and even while 
we rave on the heights, behold the wide plain "where our persistent self 
pauses and awaits us." 1 (my italics) This indication that we have a 
"persistent self" in addition to the many other references throu{Shout 
the novels, to "Better selves,1I 2 u\'lorse selves," 3 "inner selves," 4 
and "past selves, II 5 suggests stron~ly that in G-eorge Eliot t s view the 
self is a stable entity_ This does not, of course, preclude the poss-
ibility of maturing or growing. "Character," after all, as she tells 
"is not cut in marble"; 6 it is a "process and an unfolding." 7 us, 
The embryological image indicates a blueprint for change vdthin certain 
fixed limits. Describing George Eliot t s "stable core of ego, II 8 W. J_ 
Harvey comments that 
Her characters may ask themselves, lr~Vhere or why did I go wrong 
in the past?" But they do not ask the prior questions, IIYmo was 
that tIt which went "wrong in the past',? How is that tI' related 
to the present 'I' which asks the question? How far is the 
present 'I' responsible for what that totally different past 'I' 
did?" Of course, th:1:s is not to say that George Eliot ••• denies 
the facts of change and development. But change is still recon-
ciled to the idea of a stable ego; one's identity lies precisely 
in the unique pattern of past changes whiqh constitutes one's 
individuality. 9 
10 This is a far remove from Humets "bundle" theory of the self, con-
stantly changing, and given an illus~ cohesion only by memory patterns 
in the mind. Evolutionary psychology emphasised the inheritance of 
ancestral tendencies and patterns of response (Spencer's "partially-
. t dn" 11) 1 ~ ·1' , . t 1 th t th . ~nna e prepare ess ; nne. my ana ys~s maKes ~ c ear a ase ~n-
herited characteristics were thought of as serving an integrative flimction. 
They provided the base line of a triangle; but the angles distended from 
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that base line and the height of the triangle are determined by complex 
responses to the circumstances of life. A fragmented, atomistic "bundle" 
cannot constitute a central core of ego, a "persistent self" which is 
accountable and responsible for decisions and choices. The all-important 
possibility rof moral growth is dependent on our having a oentral core of 
personality. 
Hans Meyerhoff, discussing the literary implications of such a 
view of the self, states that 
Man is shown not only as a repository of perceptions and mem-
ories, but also and predominantly as a centre of active, 5elf-
regulative functions. And it is these functions that ser~o 
convey to the person himself and to the reader that a certain 
bundle of different experiences exhibits the quality of struct-
ure and unity which enables us to say that they belong to the 
same person. Similarly, the awareness of continuity as an ess-
ent:1al ingredient of selfhood is invariably part of the literary 
portrait. In this connection, the intimate, reciprocal relation-
ship between time and the self becomes most manifest; for the 
awareness of continuity vdthin the self is correlative with the 
aspect of continuity or duration in time. 12 
Meyerhoff introduces the concepts of past and memory to show the import-
ant part they play in our awareness of our own identity. Emphasis .. on 
the importance of the past becomes a significant theme in George Eliot's 
novels and reveals very clearly the close resemblance of her ideas to 
Word&worth I s. In her "Brother and Sister Sonnets II , she appears to util-
isematerialfromherOlID past excluded from the strongly autobiograph-
ical ~ ~.2!!. ~ Floss. She spee1rs explicitly about the integrative 
nature of past experiences which! (as in Wordsworth,) derive predomin-
. ! 
§ntly from natural landscapes. 
The vade-arched bridge, the scented elder-flowers, 
The wondrous watery rings that died too soon, 
The echoes of the quarry, the still hours 
With white robe sweeping-on the shadeless noon, 
Vlere but It\Y growing self, are part of me, 
My present past, my root of piety. 13 
A similar sentiment is described in The Millon the Floss after ~---;;;..;;;.=;;.. 
Tom's and l~ggie's contented and successful fishing expedition. Specific 
refer-exk0s to the children merge into [l general clis0ssion of the univ-
ersal moral value of such early ezperience.. This experience 
is presented. to us as typical, not unique. Other sodes in 
the life of George Eliot herself or those her 
bRptiSlTk1.l fU':-::'ctioll. 
these epoch;~ closely resemble 7!ordsworth t s Itspots of time. Ii 
Life did change for Tom and IL.:.1.ggie; and were not; I:.cong 
in believing that the thoughts and loves of c. ;8::38 first YCtU's 
'llould always make part of their lives. ':Ie could never have loved the 
earth':lo well if we had w.id no childhood in it,--if it Viere not 
the earth where the same flowers come up every spring that 
we used to gather '/lith our tiny as we sat to our-
selves on the grass--the same hi1)5 andhllws on the autumn 
the same redbrea:"ts t11at we useo. to call "Go,;' s birds n, because 
they c.id no hnrm to the precious crops. Vrnat is Ylorth 
that s-.-:eet harmony where everything is known, because 
it is known? 
The wocd. I 'Nalk in on this mild May day, with the young 
brown of the oaks betvleen me and 'Glue sky, the white 
star-flowers and the blue-eyed speedw'ell 8J.'J.<J. Ht 
my feet--what grove of tropical ,what or 
splendid broad-petalled blossoms, could ever ':.r:rill such 
anddelicate fibres within me as cchis hobe 30<';,'10'1 These ftJro;.liar 
flowers, these well-remembered b-ird-notesl' tl 
fitful brightness, these furrowed and gr8.ssy' 
a sort of personality given to it by the 
such things as these are the mother tongue of 
the language that is laden with 'ill the suet:. 
etls,)ciei;ions the fleeting hours of our 
thelJ\. oi.u--·a."elight in the sunshine on the 
might be no more th.an the faint 
if it ~-iere not for the sunshine ancl the g.n~s: 
years 
love .. 
in us, and 
~,.ts 
grasf'- today, 
~ 'Slaried 
The of the past is a moti' 'l other nov(;a. 
vlhere Geor,se 
Bliot that has not had the of 
firm root·s in some such spot as Offendene vIhal"€; ~<~e 8.n{l her r'.3.mily 
have just CO:.':,8 to live • . fl..5 a result her p<~,st (io;; ll( ',' Gontain any settlecl 
memories. 
A hwt3.l1 life, I think, should be well rool.; ,,-", some spot of a 
nativ'; lan(l, where it may get the love of tl3,:H}..8r IcLnship for the 
of earth, for the labours men go forth ,'J, for the sound.s 
fu'1.d accents that h~"unt it, forwhatevE'..I' will tr..at early 
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home a familiar unmistakable difference amidst the future widening 
of knowledge: a spot where the definiteness of early memories may 
be inwrought with affection, and kindly acquaintance with all 
neighbours, even to the dogs and donkeys, may spread not by sent- 16 
imental effort and reflection, but as a sweet habit of the blood. 
The words I have underlined in this and the previous passage from 
~ ~ .2!!. ~ Floss all relate very strongly to what I am calling for 
convenience in this chapter George Eliot t S concept of self. ''Habit'' re-
fers us back specifically to the laws of association and the explanation 
they offer of how we come to know the world. In this case, however, it is 
the inner world, the consciousness of self, that is being built up by 
means of these affection-laden associations that are described as a 
"sweet habit of the blood." The circumstances of Gwendolen's girlhood, 
the lack of permanence and continuity have prevented her from laying up 
a store of valuable and integrative memories. She has no real sense of 
the past and this ab:ays suggest s in George Eliot ,.no sense of herself. 
A character's past and his healthy accepting relationship with that past 
implies, in a George Eliot novel, more than an untroubled conscience. The 
past provides an awareness of identity and offers a means of making sense 
out of the welter of ~xperiences that confront us. The pattern of the 
past suggests a pattern for the future, and provides a moral guideline 
that protects us from every "wayward choice of @urJ own passion. II 17 
Gwendolen as we follow her painful initiation into moral awareness is 
handicapped severely by not being well "rooted in some common spot of 
native land." An earlier heroine, Maggie Tulliver offers a telling"con-
trast. 
When the Tullivers go bankrupt and all their furniture is removed 
by the bailiff, Maggie t s poignant cry rings out, lit everyt hing is going 
a'?lay from us--the end of our lives wil.l have nothing in it like the be-
ginning. '" 18 This is the hallme.rk of Maggie f s sense of herself. Her 
identity is constituted for her by her past and especially by the 
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people in her past. She sees her moral dilemmas--f'irstly with Philip 
and later with Stephen--in terms of f'aithfulness to an ideal, and that 
ideal is def'ined by her past. It is the past that confers a sense of 
wholeness. The danger that this wholeness may be f'ragmented (and her 
sense of' her mvn identity, therefore~ threatened) explains 1~ggie's be-
haviour towards both these young men. It is this that makes intelligible 
the following lines about her "past self'." Maggie is finding the strength 
to reject Stephen a second time, a much harder decision now that she has 
herself tasted the bitterness of almost total rejection and also has to 
close her heart to Stephen's cry of distres~. She has almost written the 
all-important word: "t Come: ' II 
But close upon that decisive act, her mind recoiled; and the sense 
of contradiction with her past ~ in her moments of' strength 
and clearness, came upon her like a pang of conscious degradation •••• 
She sat quite still,. f'ar on into the night: with lU) impulse to 
change her attitude, without active f'orce even f'or the mental act 
of' prayer: only waiting for the light that would surely come 
again. It came with the memories that no passion could long quench: 
~ lon~ past ~ ~ :t9. her, and with it the fountains of 1 
self-renouncing pity ani af'fection, of faithfulness and resolve. 9 
(my italics) 
An attachment to the past per ~ would seem totally derisory in this 
instance; her father is dead, her brother has brutally and ignominiously 
thrown her out, and the whole of' St Ogg's is united to slander her. But 
a past self which not only provides .,a sense of continuityand:Lidentity, 
but also protects against any rupturing of th3t continuity and identity, 
presents Maggie's decision to us in a different light. This is not a 
moral decision insulated from her ovm personal needs; nor does it have 
20 to be seen as a "neurotic strategy, II as Bernard Faris, f'or example, 
has recently described it. George Eliot herself would have maintained 
that psychological and moral health are indistinguishable. 
Accordingly, Gwendolen's lack of' "rootedness" is a sign of her psych-
olbgical and moral precariousness; Maggiets recognition of the close 
bonds that tie her to her past reveals her psychological and moral 
strengths. Gwendolen has not chosen to dispense with a settled past to 
provide the kind of affectionate bonding George Eliot describes in the 
Offendene passage; the fact that she has not is one of the "conditions" 
of her life. _~d the lack of settled memories means for her no settled 
direction; she is ac1rift and aimless, like Deronda himself, though for 
different reasons. He has had a settled childhood but has not knovm bis 
21 parentage. Both of them are !lin the middest" to borrow Kermode's 
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phrase, but without an adequate relationship to their past they cannot 
shape their futures. Gwendolen may not see her dilemma in these terms; 
it is Deronda who offers this as a possible explanation of her problem, 
and attempts to create in her the awareness of a need of direction. ':lith 
hisovm experience of displacement he inevitably sees her situation, as 
also 1lirah's, in terms of his O\¥n emotional needs. 
If we look briefly at another rootless character, Tito Melema, from 
Romola, we can learn still more about George Eliot I s concept of self in 
relatiun to the past. Romola 1 s godfather describes Tito as "~ne_of the 
demoni"; "22 and certainly in comparison with the rootedness and hereditary 
bondage of Romola, he introduces a very cosmopolitan flavour. His root-
lessness at the beginning of the story, however, is no more his fault 
or responsibility than Gwendolen' s is hers. It is what he does with his 
lack of a cornmitted past that is his responsibility • .f\..nd it is shovm to 
be a characteristic related to his refusal to accept the duties involved 
in any commitment or partisanship. At a dinner party he is described as 
one who can easily "accept an entire scheme of the universe." 23 This 
reveals the facile quality of his mind, its lack of a settled belief. 
It is akin to the role-playing which is sO much part of his nature, his 
wishing, for example, that he could 'walk out of his past as if it Vlero 
but a buncile of rehearsal clothes to be diecarded at will. 24- Another 
aspect of this tendency is his adoption of the role of Florentine spy. 
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He enjoys the intellectual tlu'ill of politickine, of playing one group 
off against another because this gives him a sense of power and super-
iority. His political betrayals cannot even be justified on the grounds 
that tAey are a response to a strong partisanship or loyalty_ Tito has 
simply converted his rootlesssness, nis insufficient reletionship vdth 
his ovm past into a political advantage. 
I set Gwendolen alongside Maggie to show opposite ends of this moral 
axis: I could set Will Ladislaw alongside Tito as an example of a char-
acter who ha5 a similarly d:isplaced childhood but who, after his initial 
dilettanteism, settles dovID to a life of service to the community. Under 
Dorothea's influence and in his desire to deserve her good opinion, 
Ladislaw finds a place for himself and a "dutytl to others, which shows 
him to be of quite different calibre to Tito. Tito acknowledges only the 
one duty and that is to himself. 
In discussing the problem of rootlessness, I have shovm that George 
Eliot distinguishes between two sorts of people. There are those, like 
Gwendolen Or Deronda or Will Ladislaw, whose displaced childhoods are 
no fault of their ovm and who all, in their different ways, feel the lack 
of a settled and certain past. Then there is a character like Tito Melema, 
who-consciously exploits his lack of rootedness because such a state 
provides a freedom from bondage to his fellow creatures and an escape 
from the ties of duty. Deronda's mother, vdth her vain attempt to discard 
25 her Jewishness, and Hetty Sorrel, whose roots are shallow, we are 
told, notwithstanding her family connections, belong in the same categ-
cry as Tito, and like him, are judged to be morally reprehensible. 
George Eliot relates this question of a character's rootedness both 
to his psychological and his m0ral well-being. It is not a matter of 
denicting psychological health in moral terms or moral strength in 
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psychological terms; there is no such separation in her mind. -:lhnt we 
are examining is an identification between these two aspects of the self. 
The character of Silas Marner provides a very explicit illustration 
of George Eliot's belief that a healthy, accepting relationship with the 
past is a necessary concomitant of an integrated sense of self. We do 
not need critical analysis to make us aware of the Wordsworthian flavour 
of this short novel. George Eliot herself wrote in a letter to Blackwood 
that she had not expected it to engage anyone's interest but her own 
"since William Viordsworth ~a~ deaQ;." 26 The little novel is a blend of 
fairytale and reality. The story of Godfrey Cass belongs to the world of 
uni versal causality, where one action entails another and where "conse--
quences are unpitying"; 27 the story of the weaver in exile, regenerated 
and reintegrated into the life of the community by the offices of a 
little orphan girl, is a fairy fantasy, a moral fable of suffering and 
despair converted into healing and recovery. Silas' rejection by the in-
mates of Lantern Yard and especially by his trusted friend, Vlilliam 
Dene, sends him into a state of exile, "in Ylhich the past becomes dreamy 
because its symbols have all vanished, and the present too is dreamy be-
0t 0.. I 28 cause 1 15 11nked W1th no memories. I 
His life as an outcast and his miserly obsession with his c;old pro-
vide him with no links between his past life and his present by means of 
which he can re-establish his identity. There is a potential but tempor-
ary respi:te when he responds to the needs of Sally Oates and prescribes 
for her the herbs he had seen his mother take for the same affliction. 
"In this office of charity, Sile.s felt, for the first time since he had 
come to Raveloe, a sense of unity between his past and present life, 
which might have been the beginning of his rescue from the insect-like 
existence into which his nature had shrunk." 29 Unfortunately, however, 
the epi:1ocle \'las too ephemeral to break dO\'nl his neighbours' distrust of 
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him or his distrust of the whole world. 
It is not until the theft of his gold and the arrival of Eppie that 
he is shaken out of his habitual apathy and total separateness from his 
neighbours. The need to oare for the child, and to establish oontaots 
with his neighbours, especially Dollio Winthrop, restores him. He re-
discovers his past life and a sense of continuity between the past and 
the present. "With reawakening sensibilities, memory also reawakened," 
and, as a result, "he had begun to ponder over the elements of his old 
faith, and blend them with his new impressions, till he had recovered 
a consciousness of unity between his past and present. II 30 The most ex-
plicit description of this occurs when George Eliot is contrasting 
Eppie t S and Silas t growth. She is integrating her personality J laying 
down the foundations of self; Silas is re-establishing his identity and 
his selfhood as his memory revives and provides him with the needful 
sense of continuity between past and present. "As the child' s mind was 
growing into knowledge, his mind was growing into memory; as her life 
unfolded, his soul, long stupefied in a cold narrow prison, was unfold-
ing too, and trembling gradually into full consciousness." 31 
Silas emerges from his "cold, narrow prison," this state of stupe-
faction. Hetty Sorrel in an earlier novel is literally in prison, al-
though this, of course, is to be taken symbolically as well. Hetty, we 
are told, is "sinking helpless in a dark gulf"; 32 she has reached a 
state of blind despair where she has become virtually dehumanised. 
Silas' existence is described as "insect-like"; 3301d Mr Transome in 
Felix ~ is also compared to an insect. 34 Hetty has become an "anine.l 
that gazes, and gazes, and keeps aloof." 35 Silas' sufferings are 
brought on by an external agency; they express his bewildered reaction 
to his rejection by those he trusted. Hetty is a partial agent in her 
ovm suffering. She may have been deluded by Arthur's charm, but her 
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vanity and her longing for social status are also factors in her do\vnfall. 
Yet we feel that with the "trivial soul II 36 George Eliot has given her, 
she is made to endure too much. The account of her wanderings in the 
chapter called "The Journey in Despair" ends with a rhetorical question, 
"What will be the end?--the end of her objectless wandering, apart from 
all J,.ove, caring for human beings only through her p1"'ide, clinging to 
life only as the hunted wounded brute clings to it?" 37 This question 
mainly describes Hetty's situation in realistic terms and emphasises her 
extreme suffering. But moral emphasis is not lacking. The oomments that 
she cares for others only though her pride and that she has an anxious 
desire not to lose face remind us of earlier remarks about her lack of 
feeling for the family who have brought her up as a daughter, and her 
indifference to her young oousins. George Eliot has told us that she 
has shallow roots. 38 The severance of Silas' roots almost destroys his 
human personality. Hetty, likewise, loses human stature. She is compared 
to a "brutel! 39 or an "animal" 40 but it is she herself who.:-haa;:,diacarded 
her roots. 
In various ways, then, the importance of the past and of the char-
aoter's relationship with that past enters into all George Eliot's novels 
as a oonstituent of selfhood. Alienation from one's fellows leads to a 
breakdown of mental stability and is a depersonalising, dehumanising con-
dition. Health is restored or stability is maintained by the aoceptance 
of a bondage and a duty towards onets fellow creatures. If the self is 
defined in such social terms, it is inevitable that it vl'ill be presented 
vl'ithin moral boundaries; moral and psyohological functions are seen as 
inseparable in the total functioning of the self. 
Ian Watt sets George Eliot firmly in the tradition of Puritan writers 
with their intense moral preocoupations. Such v~iters as Defoe, Richardson, 
George Eliot, and D. H. Lawrence, he claims, 
inherL.ad of h1rita:lism eve~:'ytili ,.,c·:-elie:ious f'rdth .. 
They n.1. t hs,ci an int'2nsively aoti" ccnce;:·t
"
o::- " life as a 
continuous moral an:..' social st:n":~le b see every event in 
onlinc<.y life as proposing an inv::'inc;ical1.7 G1."1'[11 issue on 'iThieh 
re[1~;or' ana. con~cien(;e must be ex(:"tecJ. to the ~. III before riCht 
action is possi'Dle; they all selO by intro~pe':ion and observat-
ion tc 1)uilci their ovm personal ";r,,;;::r;c' of "lor 1. certainty ...... 41 
l"or these vrr: .8rz, life i:: a moral cant.. ,?lUU'::. I~~; sir. 'ar terms Jerome 
Thale cieserioes what goes on in a Geort:=: EIJ,ot n'JY81 liThe moral process 
'-. 
she deals y/i..t: can be ciescribed as CllOo.iing one~ s li II She saw that 
"character ae.n come to terms vlith it3cl~:' only action with the 
outer vlorld. .,In(;hi~, ;;,;;;arch for perso::la
'
, ideni;ity ~i character ane. 
society come . 'h '1 42 ;oge1; ero' a focussi!1..g 
selves vlitLL :;;> social dirnension. Rejec:ioD. of' socie y or rejectic·n of' 
the past are '';cually S}'!ll;)toms of mora12ixit;r. 
It is Int. c::rcstint: to exam:1..rie the sc d~6~11ed rel:'f·j of G80rge E iot's 
novels for tr~ light their choices anci:er::isions OLt. cP.X'ov; on Gee. ~;e 
Eliot's concc;)t of ~::::lf. J . .:::t us nov/lol.': at those ch.:c8.cters with the 
most clD.im 1; origino.llty Jr even eccer ,ricity to 
life in oro.")":' 1,;0 discover ahether Geor!: 
.. In «[1 earli or an~ 
J..';:.~, m. 
" I O;;Her s guid .;.H:.e.. ,3h8 evel' grapples wi' 
jcL.ion agai: VJtlat :. s gC.:1erally cons'. :~ "'t, rj_,ght ,.'2.0 recognl se :.' i:rt 
he:cself th,," ~it:v that other right(~ C!: ,. E~.,Jv s, ,,[~_m Bede, fo..': crxarnple, 
" 3\)<, what does S' 
Deeds her. his 
self- sacrifiee is akin 'c Dorothea's .pt the 1.l.Dl:X'·'ID 
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tllat Casa;.1bon seeks to impose on hE.c. J30th ROirw- (mil Dorothea 
h~ve the same merciful release. As Calvl~l Bedient .~ the unregenerate 
s conveniently die. 43 Since Tito· death .. eady been reported, 
\i8 mev, that Romola will at least be of a continuing 
x'elationship 'J!ith him. However, we are not _ her to 
Tessa and the 
1:lcter for her to have provided them with em ):18 could t'n,en have 
made some life of her mm .. But from the novel's , it ~I.S obv'ious 
that Romola is leading a tranquil domestic life after these 
three as well as her elderly and foolish She has 
education, independence anll youth but her o',;n free 0]::;:;.08 is to remain 
quietly at home caring for her adopted of she 
has achieved I1S a result of her suffering , nas not to her any 
new or UYi0xpecl.;ed opportunity, nor does the novel prcvic:e any real 
alternative. 
There is not a great deal E'.ore to say when we Ct)T,' to Dorothe2, .All 
+':le youthful plans she has for using hel money 
come to And she takes the of me;rrying 
out of her class in Will Ladi is spent 
in enc his career 
could have liked nothin::. 'oct, 3r, s:i..~;(. wrongs 
than tl~lat her husband should be il1 the thick .2. struggle 
them, a.nd that she shaul( h:Lm wi; help. 
who knev! her, it a pity ::Iat so suhs1.:;;,,).tive and.. rar'e a 
creature .sno·;.llcLhavebeen absorhed into i;be of ",nother, and 
be only known in a oertain circlE as wife mother. But no 
0118 .st'~'.tGJ. \'"lha~t e1se tr16.t" .~,~"'&,S in 
l'acb.0.c to llU.V8 0.011,:;-- not even ~'iL' 
furth(;l' t!lan chi;) ne;;a:tive prescrintj .. on tiV:l.t 
have married '.ViII L~{dislaw. 1J1- ~ 
for us, ::rithO\.lt ro-v{;' 
• "Lin, who went no 
ought not to 
the novel, 
to devise SO!:!::: occupation .2'or Dorothea chat vloul:i tely extenJ her; 
within the f::C'J.mewprk of social pressure: depicted :Lr:. :~;~,;.ldlem:.;.rch, there 
are undoubtedly few opportunities. If, as George Eliot insists, "there 
is no oreature whose inv~rd being is so strong that it is not greatly 
determined by what lies outside it," 45 and if what lies outside it in 
46 this oase is "an imperfeot social state," then we can aocept that fla 
new Theresa will hardly have the opportunity of reforming a oonventual 
life, any more than a new Antigone will spend her heroio piety in 
daring all for the sake of a brother t s burial." 47 But if we are to ao-
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cept this conclusion, we are required also to acoept the first premises: 
the interdependenoe of character and environment, and the insuffioiency 
of that environment as a medium for heroic deeds. And even if we aocept 
these premises, it is still noticeable that the two examples George 
Eliot offers:us, St Theresa i and Antigone, are both desoribed in sooial 
terms. They are serving what they feel are the needs of their respective 
communities, not developing their potential for it.s oVin sake. An ":i:.m-
perfect statel! by that token would surely offer ample opportunity for 
benefioent aotivity. We have only to think of Florence Nightingale and 
other women sooial reformers in George Eliot's time ii to reoognise that 
George Eliot has deliberately presented to us a situation where 
Dorothea's opportunities are narrowed to two possibilities. She oan eith-
er stay at home at Lowiok and pursue a rather vaouous sooial and oharit-
able round or she can marry Will Ladislaw, care ~or their children, and 
support his political objectives. We may well feel that Dorothea is 
wasted, that her life presents a II [sad] sacrifice"; 48 but we must not 
i George Eliot leaves out the indisputable faot that her mission 
was union with God and that she accepted reluctantly the o<mventual 
reform enjoined on her as a duty and a discipline by her spiritual 
father, John of the Cross. 
ii Octavia Hill, for example, was the sister of Lewes t daughter-
in-law, Gertrude. 
ignore the fact that we have only the one set of alternatives. Dorothea 
is regarded as unconventional and daring in marrying a man whose geneal-
ogy is as confused as 1adislaw's; unless we are very much on our guard, 
we find ourselves accepting George Eliot's presentation of the possibil-
ities which confront Dorothea and we do not recognise the sleight-of-
hand involved. Given the available choices, Dorothea is :Yndoubtedly re-
bellious when she decides to discard her fortune to marry Will, but in 
a wider context than the novel such rebelliousness surely does not count 
for much. 
The third rebellious character, Catherine Arro .... 'lPoint in Daniel 
Deronda, has an amusing interview vdth her outraged parents when she 
tells them she is going to marry Herr Klesmer. They had fully expected 
her to sacrifice herself by marrying some impecunious, but high-ranking 
gentleman. Informed by her mother that it is her duty '''to place a great 
property in the right hands,'" she answers tartly that Ilf people can 
easily take the sacred word duty as a name for what they des~re any one 
else to do. t II 49 It is a sentiment t hat we might vlell wish other of 
George Eliot's heroines had been able to utter. But Catherine is not a 
protagonist. Her function in the novel is to provide a foil to Gwendolen. 
T~Air respective attitudes to music, for example, are contrasted. 
Catherine's character shows strength and integrity and her approach to 
the sacred world of art is a mark of her moral worth. A fine musician, 
she would never have contemplated using her music as a mere means of 
earning money as Gwendolen does. The scene I have just referred to, 
shows her choosing comparative poverty for the sake of love. Gwendolen 
will shortly accept a loveless but wealthy marriage. But Catherine is a 
static character of little account in her ovm self and appears only in 
explicitly patterning episodes. Therefore, it is safe to entrust such 
a subversive speech to her. Besides, her parents' expectations of her 
are treated vath such irony that her dismissal of the claims of duty 
beoomes less signif'icant. Her aot of rebellion in the end amounts to 
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no more than this monentary defiance of her parents' wishes. Faced vdth 
the problem of where to leave their V8st fortune if they disinherit their 
only child, they pragmatically decide to accept the marriage after all. 
Catherine marries a notable musician who is quite I3:ble to support her, 
even without her fortune, and devotes the rest of her life to him and 
his musio. 
This survey of these three so-oalled rebellious woman oharacters 
reveals a clearly repeating pattern. Not one of them seeks a life of 
her own. The only woman to do so, Deronda' smother Alcharisi is punish-
ed remorselessly. She gives up her career as a singer because she be-
lieves her voice is going; she has some painful terminal illness--prob-
ably cancer--and is haunted by superstitious guilt for her concealment 
of her son's Jewish birth. The others give up any olaims of their own 
in order to devote themselves to caring for others, and in tne end 
their acts of rebellion can be seen to be negligible. 
If this is the fate of the women rebels, what opportunities does 
George Eliot offer to her male rebels, Felix Holt and Daniel Deronda? 
Falixdeoides to give up his white-collar job ~d reject t_l:te p~th 
of upward mobility for which his education has fitted him. This decision 
is shown as a commitment to his own class and a passionate desire on his 
part to improve the conditions of that class which he feels he oan best 
do if he identifies himself with their interests and preoooupations. The 
novel oontains a chorie disapproval of his intentions and the strongest 
dissentient voioe is that of his querulous and disappointed mother. But 
the thing is, of course, that his education and intelligence, his peda-
gogic passion, all set him outside the olass he feels he belongs to. He 
may dress the same and do the same work but privilege oonsists in more 
than work and money. The very fact that he can choose to remain poor, 
that there is another kind of life available to him (which he has de-
cided to reject) places him in opposition to those of his own class who 
cannot make such choices. His supposed eccentricity has to be seen 
against his political views which are reactionary, authoritarian, and 
paternalistic .. His electioneering speech against the widening of the 
suffrage until everyone is deserving of the voiie reveals that he fully 
shares his creator's distrust of democracy. The sanctimonious "Address 
to Working Men by Felix _..Holt" contains more of the same sentiments. 
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Ignorant self-seeking voters are a threat to the well-being of the state. 
"The nature of things in this world has been determined for us before-
hand," he declares, "and in such a way that no ship can be expected to 
sail well on a difficult voyage, and reach the ~ight port, unless it is 
well manned: the nature of the winds and the waves, of the timbers, the 
sails and the cordage, will not aooommodate itself to drunken" mutin-
ous sailors. It 50 Vie must not imagine, therefore,' that Felix 1;s actually 
achieving anything new or original; he is preaching resignation and co-
operation. 
Deronda's break with his Etonian-, Oxonian-educated \'I'or1d is pre-
sented as entirely justified; the upper middle-class society we are 
sho1m in this novel is tedious and artificial. Deronda feels that the 
sorts of professions open to him, politics or law, for example, are in-
sufficiently demanding. He is secretly seeking some quest, some row~nt-
io challenge. It comes in the form of a duty laid on him by his whole-
hearted acceptance of his Jewishness and his resolve to follow faith-
fully the trail that Ezra started. He sets out for the Middle East. 
There is no ironic reporting of Deronda's decision; it occurs near the 
end of the book and we do not even have the choric disapproval and 
ribaldry that is accorded, by unimaginative characters certainly, to 
Felix's decision to embrace the cause of the working class. Deronda sets 
out with the full weight of his author's approval and as I have shown 
with Dorothea, unless we are careful, we find ourselves accepting too 
uncritically the terms in which George Eliot presents her characters' 
choices. In this case we may tend to forget that when Deronda sets out 
to slay dragons he is far from penniless; he is provided with a 
gentleman' 5 annuity and a tender, submissive wife to administer to his 
needs. 
In Individualism Reconsidered, David Riesman bemoans the loss from 
life of what he calls "marginality,1I which includes possibilities of 
originality and creativity, as well as the capacity to stand somewhat 
outside the existing systems and redesign them. In discussing the shift-
ing balance between what he terms "inner-direction" and "other-direction, II 
he writes that 
no ideology, however noble, can justify the sacrifice of an indiv-
idual to the needs of the group. Vfuerever this occurs, it is the 
starkest tragedy, hardly less so if the individual consents (be-
cause he accepts the ideology) to the instrumental use of himself •••• 
Sometimes the point is pushed to the virtual denial of individ-
uality: since we arise in society, it is assumed with a ferocious 
determinism that we can never transcend it. A1lsuch concepts are 
useful correctives of an earlier solipsism. But if they are ex-
tended to hold that conformity w'ith society is not only a necess-
ity but also a duty, they dest~oy that margin of freedom whioh 
gives life its savour and its endless possibility for advance. 51 
In defining her characters in moral t~s, stressing relationship 
as opposed to identity, George Eliot effectively limits the "margin of 
freedom" that Riesman is tal1i:ing about. Her characters undoubtedly 
accept the instrumental use of themselves. They define themselves, choose 
their own lives, as Jerome Thale puts it, 52 in ways that are in con-
formity with an idea of universal, social good. Hence the three women, 
Romola, Dorothea, and Catherine, can find no greater area of self-
definition than in the quiet domestic ','Jorld of caring for others and 
especially for children. They are not constrained by social pressures 
to do this; they ·willingly end freely choose •. And the two men who 
choose somewhat unusual life-styles, manifest, for all that, a very 
limited marginality. Political conservatism or gradualism on the one 
hand and a well-heeled expedition to the Middle East on the other, do 
not constitute any drastic eccentricity. The evolutionary typology I 
quoted earlier from Morris Ginsberg's Evolution ~ Progress gives, as 
an example of a more evolved person, one who has "more control over 
and greater independence from the environment." 53 A moral absolute 
that defines the self in terms of relationship, that defines psychic 
well-being in moralistic terms, does not constitute an environment 
where such evolved persons can test themselves. We seem to have been 
offered freedom, but it turns out on a closer analysis to be a very 
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limited freedom. George Eliot characters are constrained and bound >'lith", 
in the causal patterning of the universe, by the laws of association 
that govern the way in which they build up their knowledge of the wprld 
and their lcnowledge of themselves; they are hemmed in and th~arted by 
the pressures of their environment and whatever conditions it offers 
for growth and change; they carry an hereditary vleight, a burden of fact-
icity which is not just a question of sex and age but governs their free 
choices within their particular environment by "fixing" in their nervous 
systems ancestral responses •. ~d lastly they are defined morally in such 
a way that they· can never see themselves as acting in isolation. Separ-
atism is lethal; those few who advocate it in George Eliot's novels 
always draw dOV'ffi on themselves the all-pervasive moral condemnation 
meted out to those who do not conform for the good of society. 
This reduction of the individual's claims for the good of society 
is not merely a feature of George Eliot's novels. It pervades nineteenth 
centur$pocial and moral thinking. Calvin Bedient strongly contends that 
fn George Eliot's world, submission can be made sweet by affection 
and easy by dullness. But the intelligent and passionate--those 
who havo selves to 10sc--ure put upon the cross. Their misfoft':j 
une is that they kno,'j anci feel that their 11fe has become "a~" 
lonG suicide." George Eliot bore no brief for the extraordinary 
nature--for individuals like herself •••• Ofcourse it was not an 
individual invention: it '1[as the aberration of the age. George 
Eliot's distinction lay not so much in devising it as in color-
ing and shaping it against the contours of everyday life, in 
demonstrating its Glory throueh the medium of narrative. 54 
A partial explanation of how this surrender of personal freedom 
came to be the aberration of a whole ace is offered by',': .E. Houehton 
in The Victorian Frame S!£. Mind. He al~Jo suggests an interesting distinct-
ion between nineteenth century morality-slanted psychology and twentieth 
century amoral psychology. He mainte.ins that "the inner life of Christian 
discipline is the clue to another Victorian phenomenon which now seems 
so strange, the endless concern with self-improvement. Modern psych-
ology has led us to focus on what we are, not what we should be; and 
the collapse of the relieious tradition with its fixed principles of 
right and \,lrong has left us looking rather for a brosis than a ceiling 
for our lives. II 55 
We can see the differing emphasis between vThat we are and what we 
should be in the possible interpretation of' a striking general cormnent 
in Middlemarph. It emerges from an appraisal of Lydgate' s failure to 
override Rosamond's will. George Eliot I'lrites that "it always remains 
true that ifvrehad been greater, circumstance would have been less 
strong against us." 56 'The greatness George Eliot feels that Lydgate 
needs, in order to surnount the strength of the circumstances ranged 
against him, is not the greatness of an autonomous self-realised indiv-
idual. It is a greatness that requires him to understand himself and 
his own limitations as vlel1 as the environment that both sustains and 
restricts him. In the context of George Eliot's moralistic conception 
of the self, his failure in greatness signal::. a failure in moral ·worth. 
But taken out of the context of t he novel and interpreted in the light 
188. 
of more recent psychological theories of indivic1uation (-lung), self-
actualisation (Maslow), or learning to be free (Carl Rogers), this 
statement of George Eliot could serve as a warning against.loss of aut-
onom;y and a submergence in the banal. Greatness in these terms is not the 
achieving of fame or notoriety but is defined as a capacity to keep on 
striving (in the Goethean sense celebrated in the character of Faust). 
It expresses the refusal to be at the beck and call of countless small 
and trivial circumstances, the refusal to accept anonymity and mediocrity. 
But such an apotheosis of psychic strength, of the separate individuality 
of her characters is not for Geo~gg Eliot. Calvin Bedient suggests some-
thing of the sort when he says that "it ,vas in morality that George Eliot 
believed; (gf life itsei!J in the sense of spontaneous self-expression 
she was shudderingly skeptical." 57 rfe are left regretting, therefore, 
that the possibilities she offers us of selfhood are so one-sided and 
reductionist. Service, subwission, duty; these are the watchwords of her 
novels. The self is defined and revealed to us only through relationship; 
identity as identity is morally suspect and therefore the novels contain 
no situations which lead to the glorification of individuality for its 
ovm sake. The kind of moral absolute discussed in the chapter on moral 
development operates strongly here. 
George Eliot's conception of the self is undeniably authoritarian. 
She allows her characters only a limited range of possibilities, and 
exarts inflexible control over their freedom to do anything original. 
Her "struggling erring human beings" 58 are oonstrained by a moral 
absolute. In addition, they have to submit to the inexorable laws, the 
"hard non-moral outward condi tiona. II 59 What effect do such preoccupat-
ions have on George Eliott s narrative technique? Let us now discuss the 
"binocular vision" 60 which results from George Eliot t s need to show both 
the individual characters and the inexorable forces ranged against them. 
Objeotive:Subjeotive. 
One might as well hope to dissect one's own bod;y and be merry in 
doing it, as take molecular physics (in which you must banish 
from your field of view what is specifically human) to be your 
dominant guide, your determiner of motives, in what is solely 
human. That every study has its bearing on every other is true; 
but pain and relief, love and sorrow, have their peculiar hist-
ory which make an experience and knowledge over and above the 
swing of atoms. 1 
This statement occurs in a letter George Eliot wrote to Mrs Ponsonby in 
1874 and provides a very succint account of the opposition she saw be-
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tween two different ways of viewing the world. I have called this chapter 
"objective:subjective" but I could equally have said public:private, 
scientific:poetic, or general:individual. As D. H. Lawrence said, there 
are "two ways of knowing for man ••• kno-wing in terms of apartness, which 
is mental, rational, scientific, and knowing in terms of togetherness, 
whioh is religious and poetio. It 2 The tension generated by such an opp-
osition, which oan lead to "a tormenting inner oonflict ••• between the 
two systems of value" 3 is very much a feature of the complexity of 
George Eliot' s moral and intelleotual schema. Her desire to reconcile 
the possibility of Uwilling to will strongly" 4 with a view of the 
world which accepts "universal oausalitylt 5 --man ~'in subjection to the 
external world, though •• • also to a certain extent controllIi ri!l1t" 6 -
represents one such tension. Another lies in her seeking for her char-
acters an opportunity to preserve a measure of individuality at the 
same time as they are asked to see themselves as an "insignifioant part 
of a divinely-guided whole." 7 Such paradoxes or unresolved or unreaolv-
able opposites do not vitiate the novels; we do not feel seriously 
tempted to accuse George Eliot of hypocrisy or double-think. Rather, 
they generate a fruitful tension and by leading ;eorge Eliot frequently 
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to alter perspeoti ve on her charactersl are the main source of dramatic 
irony. Very skilful balance is necessary, however, if this tension is to 
be maintained. Occasionally George Eliot loses her narrative control and 
then we have either a too schematic, undigested novel like Romola, or 
moments of emotional identification with her characters, which critics 
like F. R. Leavis oomplain of so bitterly in her treatment of Maggie 
Tulliver and Dorothea Brooke. 
I intend to approach this problem in three different ways. The first 
will briefly recapitulate George Eliot t 5 system of beliefs and show how 
they provide a metaphoric frame. as well as a point of reference in our 
identification of the moral worth of individual charaoters. The second 
deals with whether or not George Eliot's novels can be acourate~ de-
scribed as tragic, which leads to a discussion of the melancholy res-
onances that emanate from her whole work. The final section discusses 
the narrative implications of her ''binocular vi sion't 8 and examines 
the structural correlatives of her shifting points of view, her ironic 
tone, and her handling of .aesthetic distance. 
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Metaphoric Frame. 
The world that George Eliot portrays in her novels is determined 
and bound by a universal causality. Vlhat freedom there is, consists in 
an adjustment of attitude and in an aoceptance of the hard necessity 
laid upon us. It is our responsibility to find within the strict laws 
of antecedent and consequent narrow loopholes through which it is poss-
ible to co-operate with those same laws, and thus manipulate them to 
our advantage. It is instructive to compare this situation, as George 
Eliot describes it, with the example of the dog chained to the moving 
chariot, a favourite analogy used by Stoic philosophers to illustrate 
their understanding of the position of man in the universe. As the 
chariot moves, the dog can either resist and be dragged against his will 
or he can accept the inevitable, consent, and thus appear to run with 
the chariot of' his own free will. For both the dog and for man, it is 
a question of adopting the right attitude. One aspect of morality for 
George Eliot is the capacity to recognise the reality of forces in the 
I • 
'if" t'f 
world, and to be able to co-operate with such,as further human progress 
/1 
even at the cost of saorifice to ourselves. This means learning not to 
waste valuable time and energy struggling to chaqge what cannot be 
changed. Knowledge of self is a correlative of knowledge of the Vlorld, 
as my analysis of Lydgate and his moral failure has indicated. Ignorance 
of the laws is no excuse or protection as transpires very blatantly in 
the story of Gwendolen Rarleth who, in fact, is the "single lot" of the 
following quotation. It is her "mistaken soul" which is being precipit-
ated on destruction. nAnd looking at life parcel-wise, It George Eliot 
asks us, "in the growth of a single lot, who having a practised vision 
may not see that ignoranoe of the true bond between events, and false 
conceit of means whereby sequences may be compelled ••• precipitates 
the mistaken soul on destruction?tt 1 
Gwendolen's determination to be free of the petty restraints that 
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bind the people she sees about her is frequently presented to us within 
the ironic frame of her general ignorance of the world and its conditions, 
as in the following comment of her conception of the marriage state. ''For 
what could not a woman do when she was married, if she knew how to assert 
herself? Here all was construotive imagination. Gwendolen had about as 
acourate a conception of marriage--that is to say, of the mutual in-
fluences, demands, duties of man and woman in the state of matrimo~--
2 
as she had of magnetic currents and the law of storms. tl 
As Gwendolen' s moral education progresses her "ignorance of the true 
bond between events tl and her "false conceit of means whereby sequences 
may be oompelled" are presented less ironically. Her mistaken belief that 
the world is ordered for her convenience is still contrasted with the 
actuality of a world governed by universal laws; there is thf;} same met-
aphoric frame,)but her sufferings now call forth the compassion of her 
creator. For instance, the final description of her distress when she 
realises she has lost Deronda, that they inhabit totally different 
mental spaces, is couched in terms which emphasise the pathos of her 
ignorance. Her: sense of loss is presented as an awareness of her own 
insignificance and powerlessness and a corresponding awareness of the 
immensity of the world, which "seemed getting larger round poor 
Gwendolen, and she more solitary and helpless in t he midst •••• She was 
for the first time feeling the ~S$ure of a vast mysterious movement, 
for the first time being dislodged from her supremacy in her own world,. 
and g.~tting a sense that her horiz on was but a dipping onwe.rd ot an.~ ex-
, ,., .. ," ., '-
istence With which her ownwasr§Jvoiving." 3 We need to reJ.l.!.6!1l1t~; .. £tP. earl-
ier comment_$bout Gwendolen if ... wfJ f:lZ'e- to feel :tb~ full p§.tn.~s .... 9f'. tl:Q.s de-
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scription. Soon after our introduction to her we have been told that 
"solitude in any wide soene impressed her with an undefined feeling of 
, 
immeasurable existence aloof from her, in the midst of whioh she was 
.. helplessly incapable of asserting herself." 4 
Vfuether it is presented ironically or vdth pathos, Gwendolen's fail-
ure to "knowt' the world is still shown to be a moral one. Thus when we 
read that she has "no permanent oonsciousness of other fetters, or of 
more spiritual restraints," 5 our notion of her moral flippancy is re-
intorced. On the one side is the confused, ignorant individual and on 
6 the other, the inexorability of the ''hard unacoommodating Actual." 
Only those George Eliot characters who are able to make a realistic 
appraisal both of themselves and of the forces ranged against them 
show true moral worth •. There is no escaping the stringency of this 
message; it is reiterated in novel after novel. 
Gwendolen is presented with irony and later with compassion. More 
frequently a charaoter's failure to see clearly is 8 major s~urce of 
dramatio irony, a valuable source of tension in the novels between what 
is the case and what a character hopes is the case. The more generalised 
perspective we are given ana charaoter enables us to see what he cannot: 
the reality of the situation in the external world to which he is blind, 
and the mauvaise.!2!. by which he tries to oonvince himself that he is 
behaving honourab~. George Eliot is masterly in her analysis of such 
bad faith, "the twists and turns of the corrupted self as it seeks to 
evade truth and responsibility." 7 
:Arthur Donnithorne's meditations about Hetty at the beginning of their 
affair provide a striking example of how the exposure of bad fa! th gen-
erates irony. Arthur recognises fully the dangers of continuing this 
relationship and sensibly resolves that ''he must not see her alone again; 
--
he must keep out ot: her way." 8 We then follow the convolutions of his 
1 
thought processes as, f"ee:Ling secure i taking this res-
olution, he 'chen allows himself' to :fan~l.s. about :f'~ture 'I f"orbidden 
meetings with Hetty. 
The soft air did not help his re~olutions, e::; he leaned out and 
lookGd into the leaf"y distance. Jut he consifered his resolution 
suf"f"iciently f"ixed: there was n( to ·is: with himself any 
longer. He had made up his mind not to 'I:.eet Potty again; and now 
he might give himself" up to thinld.ng how irnme:lsely agr~e~bl:.e .. it. 
would beif'circumstanoeswere dif"ferent--hovl pleasant' it would 
hayebeen to meet her this eveni:lg as she cam'" back, and put his 
a:r;j.; around her again and look into her :'5weet "a. lie wondered 
if" the dear little thing were ;.hil'l.king of him too-twenty to one 
she was. How beautifJ,ll her eyes 'were with the tear on their 
lashes! He would like to satisf"y his soul for a day with looking 
at them, and he ~ see her again. 9 
This is a very successful account of the behavior of a weak-willed 
man under extreme temptation and presents no jarrin~ false note. However, 
in other parts of ~ Bede, George Eliot is not alYiB.Ys so sure of her 
narrative teohnique. \llhen she turns directly to the reader with, "Are 
you inclined to ask whether this Can be the same krt';:ur?" 1 0 we become 
aware of an instability in her relation to her ohars'Jters
,l a 
stridency of ef"feot. Disoussing this failure of" 
Laurenoe Lerner oomments that Itto expose self-decepti.',ln is to point out 
an inoongruity: between tr'ue and false versions of world or the self", 
between what is seen and what is. In Adam Bede Gear;;;, Eliot shows one-
-~ '.-~ 
,half of the .. ncongruity (what is seen) with COllSUID.m.",e skill ..... 1ne f"ail-
ure comes in her rendering of the other half;. for at" sometimes :tells, 
us Wliat is, a.t effusive, even embarrass:lng length, 
betrayal of uncertainty. II 11 
with a frequent 
By the time she came to write Romol~ however, G~.;;orge Eliot had 
gained considerably in assurance and the ironic 'ntation of the 
dissonance betweon what Tito thL<;:s is ';;ha case and ",.i:,at actually is 
the case, betrays no such uncertainty ..m fact, his ·tubborn belief 
that he is in control of ciroumstanges 
of" his moral deterioration. His view of' himself and wf his possibilities 
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for effective aotion is distorted by his egoism; he persistently thinks 
of himself as a free agent, able to oontrol and manipulate oiroumstanoes 
to his own ends. But, far from aohieving a greater measure of freedom, 
he is effectively binding himself tighter and tighter. The steel waist-
coat he wears oonoealed under his jaoket to guard himself against un-
expeoted attaok is but the external manifestation of thestraitjaoket of 
fear he oarries within him; the "undying habit of fear" 12 as George 
Eliot describes it. 
George Eliot handles this opposition between reality and the distort-
ed view of reality produoed by the solipsistio, egoistio assumptions of 
her oharaoters with increasing skill. She explains in l4iddlemarch that 
the distorted view is caused by the "speck of self" 13 and we can see 
such a speck of self operating in Lydgatets attempt to reassess the part 
he played in voting for Tyke. 
He vms really uncertain whether Tyke were not the more suitable 
candidate, and yet his consciousness told him that if he had been 
qutte tree "trom ind:irectbias be. should have voted for. Mr 
Farebrother. The affair of the chaplainoy remained a sore point 
in his memory as a case in which this ~ medium of Middlemarch 
had been too strong for him •••• So the Re~-Walter Tyke became 
chaplain to the Infirmary, and Lydgate continued to work with 
&:: Bulstrode. 14 (II\Y italiCS) . 
The clause I have underlined shows the self-interest which, .in fact, mot-
ivates Lydgate's choioe, for all its apparent impulsiveness. The word 
"petty" shows his actual attitude towards Middlemarch, and reveals un-
arguably one aspect of Lydgate's "spots of commonness," 15 his arrog-
ance. In the discussion of Lydgate in the chapter on determinism, I 
indicated how far this arrogance contributed to his moral deoline by pre-
venting him from making a realistic assessment either of himself or of 
the environmental pressures on him. 
These various examples show George Eliot's metaphorio use of the 
''hard non-moral outward conditions." 16 They provide a frame and a 
point of reference for her novels. Soientific allusions, laws, sequences 
and so on, all establish the inexorable oausality of her deterministio 
world. Against their baokground we have the struggles, oonveyed mostly 
ironioally, but sometimes with oompassion, of individual human beings 
who have to oome to terms with this inescapable reality. By indioating 
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a oharaoter's relationship with these laws, George Eliot oan provide the 
reader, most eoonomioally, with information about that oharaoter's 
moral stature and how far his egoism blinds him to the reality of the 
external world. Sympathy iathe all-important affeotive oomponent of 
morality; right seeing--in the sense of olearly reoognising what laws 
are modifiable and which are not--is the oognitive component. 
Tragedy, .. 
George Eliot t s novels present us wi:~i'l the suffering of individual 
human beings 3_5 they struggle to come to terms with. ' .. :;').6 Ithard unaccom,·"" 
modating Act'val whioh has never eon::mlt,,,,d O'l.ll" taste is entirely un-
select." 1 This would seem to offer a bi.ueprint :rar :'::;ragedy in the 
opposition it suggests between individual Llsignificance and the vast, 
impersonal,',law-governed forces of the world. I N. Whitehea.d, disoussing 
modern soience, refers to the "vision of fate U held. by the Greek dram-
atists. He cla.ims that it is this same vision, t'remox'seless and in-
different, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue" that is 
possessed by science. tlFate in Greek tragedy,tI he maintains, Itbecomas 
2 the order of nature in modern thought. If George Eliot develops the 
same idea in her "Notes on The Spanish Gypsy and Tra.{;sdy in general II .. 
"Our determination as to the right, It she claims, "would consist in an 
adjustment of our individual needs to the dire necessities of our lot, 
partly as to our natural constitution, partly as 3h£~.::cers of li:fe llUth 
our fellow-beings .. Tragedy consists in the terrible rlif'ficulty of' this 
adjustment. II 3 She analyses "the good tragic subject whioh. 
to be x"..:lally tragio "*. must represent irrepa:t'able collision 
between the individual and the general •••• It :~.s the indivi<iual 
with wr...ich we sympathise, and the general o£',,/hich we reoognise 
the ir~esistible power •••• A trage~ has not to expound why the 
indivi,.LU'll must give way to the general: it hFS to shovi that it 
iscor:,pelled to give way, the tragedy conaist5.ng in the struggle 
invclved, and often in the entirely calaroitoui:'! issue in spite of 
a grani submission. 4 
Does this Itirresistible power" of the general, ";;i;ich, as I have said, 
constitutes a metaphoric frame for the novels, opera in such a way 
that we can meaningfully describe them as tragedies J:Wo separate dis-
eus .ons of the nature of tragedy indicate pertinent objections against 
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suoh a description. The first of these relates to the problem of deter-
minism and the allowanoe of freedom required by the protagonists in a 
tragedy. Donald MaoKinnon talks of the "intraotable surd element in the 
soheme of things, a destiny whioh shapes the history of an Eleotra, a 
Hamlet, a Phldre, whioh is their ineluotable inheritanoe." He oonoludes 
that", \ r~:~ 
~ven where Raoine's explorations of derangement and bewilderment 
are oonoerned it is impossible to avoid seeing in his work Cor in 
that of Sophooles or Shakespear~ a paradoxioal affirmation at 
onoe of human freedom and of an irresistible element in the soheme 
of things that brings even the most steadfast moral fidelity to 
nought. No determinist oould write an effeotive tragedy, oould 
aohieve the sort of deep exploration of responsibility, justioe, 
guilt, that we find for instanoe in Eleotra or in Hamlet. Both 
Sophooles and Shakespeare take for granted, even if they do not 
explioitly admit the faot, the reality of a "freedom of open 
possibilities". 5 
MacKinnon's "intraotable surd element in the soheme of things" is un-
doubtedly George Eliot's "irresistible power." But the determinist 
strain of her thought would have kept her from admitting "the reality of 
a 'freedom of open possibilities.'" The tragio oollision between the 
individual and the general is a oontinuing element in her novels. At the 
same time the moral absolutes whioh govern her thinking preolude the 
freedom MacKinnon is talking about. Yfuat freedom she does allow is min-
imal and consists more in the adoption of a realistic attitude tov~ds 
the world than in any real possibility of aotion, ,although she totally 
rejeots the nihilism that regards all effort as useless. The moral worth 
and the moral benefit are all in the trying even if the results are in-
signifioant or pitifully slow. She herself writes of the piety inherent 
in "loving, willing submission, and heroio Promethean effort towards 
high possibilities." 6 George Eliot's possibilities are for moral aotion, 
not the "freedom of open possibilities" MaoKinnon is referring to. 
George Eliot enjoins submission on her charaoters. No George Eliot 
novel 60ritains the splendid d:efiance ,;hicn characterise~ in6cii!hi~ 
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Antigone, fo:~' instance, where the heroine refuses tc submit. The pro-
tagonists of the greatest tragedies may be reduced the dire hand of 
necessity but they do not consent to their reductior.~ An explanation of 
why they continue to fight, however uselessly, their lots is 
offered by George Steiner who writes that there :.'/'l tragedy "a v.rild-
ness and a refusal running against the grain of rrdd{le-class sensibility .. 
Tragedy, II he maintains, "springs from 
conditions of life. It carries "lith it the of disorder, for 
-, 
all tragic poets have something of the rebelliousness of Antigonoolt I 
If freedom and rebelliousness, as ~~cY~nnon and Steiner suggest, 
are constituents of tragi'i(ly, then George Eliot;' s novels do not deserve 
such a title~ But this is not to deny the umloubted elements of 
many of the novels. Gwendolen Harleth ':: story the possibility 
of tragic rebelliousness. But Gwendolen ~s purged of her defiance. Her 
protest against the conditions of her 7.ife i.s shown evidence of her 
"moral stupidity"; 8 her final resigna.'-:ion~ her state of "peaceful 
q 
melaLcholy" J is proof of her moral grr,vrth" There if:' as 'I{ell in 
Hetty Sorrelis bewildered journey. The intellectual moral failures 
in Middleme2'2h; show a tragic waste of potential "I'/b.:' -:;1'. ma.ny contemporary 
readers found deeply depressing. This . 8 rem:i.niscel1' of the distinction 
between the "painful It and the "tragic II offt::,;~ea by lv:thew Arnold., The 
"painful" in his terms, i3 where there is t!everyth~ l?, to be 
th O t - d I' 10 no ~ng 0 De one. 
George Eliot's novels may not be , but ~:iley undoubtedly 
give off a m,:Hancholy resonance. She d" d not regar,':. ;'jerself as a pess-
-'l ~ 
imiat, preferring the description, mel:i,orir,t" " HQ·"7er, her gradualism 
and her insistence on th", inexorabilit;> of eonsequc:J;es produce ~~. V<.';i'Y 
dispiriting 'rlew of human possl.b litie;,~ It is not:; ~;herefore:l dif'fic-
ult to understand how, having lost her ict~l '8.ith, she carne to 
aooept the Positivistio faith in irreversible laws. Neither an implao-
able deity nor a rigid set of laws provides muoh leeway for the individ~ 
ual. G. :M. Young attributes the power of Evangelioalism to "its rigorous 
logio, the 'eternal. miorosoope' with whioh it pursued its argument into 
the reoesses of the heart, and the details of daily life, giving to 
evf!1."Y aotion its individual value in this life, and its eternal oonse-
quenoe in the next." 12 T-he "eternal miorosoope" he refers to produoes 
an anxious, introspeotive -analysis of all thoughts, attitudes, and 
a.ctions whioh, while it was no doubt exoellent training for a potential 
novelist, was soaroely oonducive to optimism. George Eliot's schooldays 
were imbued with the strict Calvinism of her teachers, the Misses 
Franklin, and not even the more sanguine beliefs of her :Methodist aunt 
and pncle could temper suoh a gloomy religious baokground. George Eliot's 
own description of her feeling once she had rejected her early Christian 
beliefs shows her immense gratitude fm: a release from the "wretched 
giant t S bed of dogmas ft on which her soul had been "racked and stretched 
ever sinoe it began to think." 13 Offering a clear indictment of the 
oppressive nature of Evangelicalism, she writes or her 
inexpressible relief to be freed from the apprehension ••• that 
at each mQment I tread on chords that will vibrate for weal or 
woe to all eternity. I could shed tears of joy to believe that 
in this lovely world I may lie on the grass and ruminate on 
possibilities without dreading lest ~ conclusions should be 
everlastingly fatal. 14 . 
There is no mistaking the emotional consonance between Evangelicalism 
and a Positivistic faith in the "consequences of deeds." 15 The "solvent 
of feeling" 16 described in Romola if we are to be receptive to new 
ideas is· obviously the sense of "individual nothingness" 17 in the face 
of forces beyond our control. Science, as U. C. Knoepflmacher olaims, 
may have removed the Calvinist deity, but it allowed "George Eliot--and 
fellow Puritan renegades such as T. H. Huxley--to convert it into an 
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equally implacable but this-worldly pO·l:.I' C.S pu.."'lishing • the 
S::'Bat evils of disobedience to natural . S:G.;i as of :'~'; a submission 
to 'the great and fundamental truths of Nature and the lm'ts of her 
'Jperation. t Science reduced the salvatLm of' the 80U.1:0 the survival of 
the species, but its grim emphasis on • .;on;';.ijqueJ:::;es: :.3,.s almost iw.entical 
to that of the old religion. tI 18 
There has been a· shift from one mine,r key to anO":ler but no change 
19 
of mode. The belief in "universal oausaJ.ityl! 
work for the ~lovels can be seen to originate in 
;;:. frame-
Eliot's mel an-
choly, anxiety-ridden natu.':"e. It is this very a'fla:re::.;;::.., lithe pressure 
of hard non-mOI"al outward conditions" that 
ion for the struggling, suffering individual .. This '1' 
yearning hope that "the effort of growing moral fore 
lighten that preSSl:lre a little. The intellectual 
the emotional resonance associated lIdth this 
vision in the novels. Felicia Bonaparte 
Barbara Smalley in a comparison between George P; uses 
the term "binocular vision." 23 George Eliot' 3 pers .. ;~.tive con-
tinuously from the general to the individual~ f en the tiirresist-
24 2~ ible power" . of the one, the tlnothing:;16sS'" '"" other- and the 
painful collisions that ensue. 
I will nOVl look at the structural c ;''J.cn a shifting 
focus and thE' stringent technical requi:'eroent S U3 George Eliot 
is to keep the essential balance between the points of 'new. 
It is a question of controlling aesthetic have already seen 
her progressive control of balance from 
Middlemarch, ;Nhere Lydgate 1 s dismissal of the tow1'1 its inhabitants 
as a "petty medium" 26 contains in the one 
the reality of his situation and his o~n a~Lse asses of 
22 
it. Let us now oonsider in greater detail George Eliot's manipulation 
of' this balanoe. 
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Aesthetic Ba1ance.~ 
If we examine the potentially tragic character of JIr Caaa.uboD in 
lliddlemarch we can see that by a skilful. control of focus George El.iot 
offers usa great deal more than the caricature of a pedantic scholar. 
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The various reports ofJlrCasaubon that accumulate in the early chapters 
of the book, reveal that we are being presented with a picture of him 
in diverse reflecting mirrors. The different comments made about him' 
by Dorothea, Celia, 'Mrs Cadwallader, and Sir James Chettam superficially 
describe him, but in fact, tell us far more about them and their pre-
judices. The first exchange between the two sisters offers us a choice 
of attitudes towards 'Mr Casaubon. 
,~ ,-~thet"b;'girls were intha~-X"oOlJ al()l1eJ'~"~­
l'!iO\V.* ugly J4r Casaubon isl'I 
"Celia! He is one of the most distinguished-looking men I ever 
saw.;-g~ is remarkably like the portrait of' Locke. He has the same 
",deep eye-sockets." . 
''Had \ Locke those two white mo:).es with hairs on them?" 
"OhlI daresay: when people of a certain sort looked at him; It 
sai:d·,Darothea, walking away a little. 
''AIr Casaubon is so sallow. It 1 
This conversation is typical of other representations ot Yr Casaubon, 
whose physical attributes appear to arouse intense disgust. He 'has ex-
cessively thin calves, a generally grey and desiccated appearance, and 
he scrapes his spoon on his plate when he is eating soup which partic-
ularly offends Celia. Mrs Cadwallader is wittily scathing about his lack 
of vitality. This reinforces pur impression that the Vicar's wife enjoys 
her reputation of being direct and outspoken, even somewhat eccentric, 
but our impression of Hr Casaubon's arid style ot speaking and writing. 
lends credence to her view. "'Somebody put a drbp @' his blO~ under 
a magnifying glass, t It she retorts in answer to a disgusted remark from 
2 Sir James Chettam, uland it was all semicolons and parentheses. tll 
It is Do; )t;hea t s engagement to him hat 
~tion. She h2):~3elf is II ardent ly tl self"'c/:ludecL ,",bout ~J.c;r future husband. 
l'Dorothea by ~i;his time had looked deep reservoir of 
-~.ir Casaubon's mind, seeing refleoted th3re in vagu6 -. ~.byrinthine extens-
3 ion every que.lity she herself brought.'~ But at th )oin-!; the a .. t;hor-
ial comment 7 silent up till now, warns Brooke was 
hasty in her trust, it is not therefor(O olear that -. (' Casaubon '(las un-
t " f' - .. 4-wor uy 0 ~t~" 
Usuallyil€! omnisoient narrator s an ironi::. one towards 
Casaubon as in the following passage hi:lting at hie impotence. 
His year:;; 01 aevotion to scholarship heve 1Jeen very lonely ~ and r.,:-JW "he 
determined to abanCi.on himself to the streaD of fee')._ and perha,!s was 
surprised to find what an exoeedingly rill~' WI::H3.. As in :iroughty 
regions baptism by immersion could only be 
Mr Casaubon found that sprinkling was 
which his st;i~eam would afi'ord him. II 5 
Dorothea is in his some way deficient t'e 
much exaggelated the force of masculinE; passio:l." n 
Our perspective on }Ix Casaubon has 
different sc~,mes; we have observed him 
reet vdtnesses and have ai_so been give). a 
him through the ironic eyos of the ornr:::"sciD):r'c na:{'x'," 
sO 
0ach to a 
-the idea that 
shad 
during 
~ At this 
the angle of vision narrows exoeeding} ;~nt", his ovm consoiolls-
ness. George Eliot signals clearly Vlh&; see ii" 8.S her n.arr,?ti ve 
voice from an ironic to a 
Suppcse we ttu~n from outside e~ :~imates of' [' 
keens!' interest, what is the rE:;)ort of hi, 
about hiE or capacity: "Lth 
on hL" daily labours; what-'1g cf 
of sell-delusion the years are :1arkinc 01'+' 
what spirit he wr<!i3tles againsi; univerEB,l 
to wonder 1 1;n th 
~ consciousn 8SS 
,:enoes he is 
Yfnn t fixity 
tl'lin b.irr~; and y;itl1 
sure, which v..-il1 
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one day be too heavy for him, and bring his heart to its final 7 
pause •••• Mr Casaubon, too, was the centre of his own world •••• 
And accordingly, we are invited to enter the narrow circle of t hat world 
inhabited by tta small hungry shivering self. II 8 We observe his loneliness, 
his despair at his unfinished scholarship, his anxious concealing of his 
self-doubts, and his dread of sympathy. In ~ ~ .2!!. ~ Floss our 
attitude towards Tom Tulliver is strongly influenced by our sense of out-
rage at his treatment of ~ggie; this means that we have difficulty 
sympathising with his undoubted suffering and the bleak narrowing of his 
life following Mr Tulli ver t s "failure. tt It is a mark of George Eliot' s 
matured control that despite a similar identification with Dorothea we 
are capable of feeling compassion for Mr Casaubon.Actually our ident-
ification with Dorothea is an important aspect of our compassion for Mr 
Casaubon. As she painfully comes to realise that he has "an equivalent 
centre of self, It 9 we also have to reconsider our assessment of him. 
Our appreciation of the fineness of Dorotheats character requires of us 
an attitude of tolerant sympathy towards her husband. This is one of the 
ways George Eliot seeks to enlarge the sensibilities of her readers by 
inducing that sympathy which, to her, is the essential mark of the 
moral sense. 
Dorothea's changed perspective of Mr Casaubon is presented metaphor-
ically in terms of the opposition between the "hard unaccommodating . 
Actual tI 10 and the blurred conception of that ac,"tual offered by the 
egoistic imagination. Indeed her changed way of seeing is as much a re-
vised perception of herself. She recognises how far she has only herself 
to blame if her idealisation of her husband has raised false expectations 
in her. She realises that the "new real future which was replacing the 
imaginary drew its material from the endless minutiae by which her view 
of Mr Casaubon and her wifely relation, now that she was marri ed to him, 
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":hanging wit'"; the sElcrElt, a 'oh-hand f'rof;'. what 
• ".:l_ 11 mh-, . it had been j;:' her mal.c.en V-\."eam." 1, ,"{f'i ')n cantly con':"· 
trasts the objective and measured IJ:·~oce time 'id.th the sub-
jective and individual notion of' time hela by the iml".gination. 
I have said that some of our accephmce of Mr C~;saubon as an object 
of compassion rather than of amused scorn derives the fineness of 
Dorothea t S fI..ature. But the authorial com.rnentanddramatic presentation 
of Mr Casaubon are also important beClause they show lKrth his suffering 
and his Itpassionate egoism. II 12 George Eliot tells us, for example, that 
He had not had much foretaste of happiness in his previous life. 
To know intense joy without a strong bodily frame, one must have 
an enthusiastic soul. Mr Casaubon had never a strong bodily 
frame, and his soul was sensitive without being enthusiastic •••• 
His experience was of that pitiable kind which sp.rinks from pity, 
and fears most of all that it should be knovr.n: it was that proud 
narrow sensitiveness which has not mass enough to spare for trans-
forma.tion into sympathy, and quivers thread-like in small curre~ts 
of self-preoccupation or at best or an egoistic scrupulosity. 1 
It is a sad picture but we are not to let pathos interfere with our 
moral judgement. George Eliot is cueing us as to ~{r Css8.ubon's character. 
The fact that his soul has not "mass enough to spare for transformation 
into sympathy" reveals unmistakably Mr Ca.saubonfs moral worth. 
To preserve aesthetic distance, a ublend of s;Y'1llP1' and detached 
b t . II i 4 . I th f u_ ,.. • th b o serva :ton :ta necessary. n e case 0 j,;U: vaSa,7iJOn ere was 0 -
viously a risk that the detached observation would obsoure the sympathy. 
George Eliot is perfectly aware of this and shifts our attention sudden-
ly and surprisingly: from Dorothea to Mr Casaubon as to chastise 'Us 
for refusing him an equal share of humanity. 
One morning, some weeks af'ter her arrival at Lo'wick, Dorothea--
but al~~y8 Dorothea? Was her pOintoi' view the only possible 
one with regard to this marriage? I protest against all our inter-
est, all our effort at understanding being to the YPULCb 
skins that look blooming in spite of trouble; for these too will 
get faded, and will know the older and more eating grief's which 
we are helping to neglect. In spite of the bl:'_nking e,Y6S and 
Vlhite moles objectionable to Celia, and the want of muscular curve 
which was morally painful to Sir James, Mr Casaubon had an 
intense consciousness within him, and was spiritual.ly a-
hungered like the rest of us. 15 
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The insufficiency of the various people who judge Mr Casaubon so harshly 
blends with the ironic authorial commentary and the low-key compassion-
ate reporting of his consciousness. There is a oonstant shifting of per~ 
speotive. The authorial distance ranges from a remote generalised port-· 
rait, through opinions and attitudes expressed by the other characters, 
through dramatic presentation until it homes in on lithe oharacter's re-
port of his own oonsciousness." 16 The devioe George Eliot frequently 
uses in presenting the thought processes of her oharacters in the third 
person, a device linguists refer to as erlebte Rede, is functionally 
significant in these shifts of perspective. It oreates no hiatus between 
George Eliot's own generalised commentary on her oharacter and the ohar-
acter's own inner dialogue. This makes for. an extreme density of effect 
and requires great concentration from the reader if he is to pick up the 
changes in direction. The "first distinct oolloquy" 17 Ti to Kelema has 
with himself, in Romola, illustrates this. 
Tito's thoughts, ~emories, rationalisations, and self-justifications 
merge almost imperceptibly with passages of authorial comment and neoess-
ary descriptive pieces. We watch Tito oonvinoe himself that it is not 
oertain that his father, .Baldassarre, is still alive; we ~hare hislllemory 
of his early ohildhood. Quite separately we get a glimpse of that ohild-
hood viewed through other eyes than his. In this way, we register both 
the strong argument in favour of his~feeling gratitude towards his father 
and the equally clear exposition of those features of Tito's charaoter 
which even then would preolude gratitude and make him feel that he was 
getting from his father only what he deserved. We read, for example, 
that he was ria radiant presence for a lonely man to have won for him-
self. If he were silent when his father expeoted some response, still 
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he did not look mood;y; if he declined ~'ome labour--why, he flung himself 
down with such a charming, half-smiling, half-pleading air, that the 
pleasure of looking at him made amends to one who had watched his growth 
with a sense of claim and possession. n 18 The next two sentences show 
the skilful interweaving of the two viewpoints. The ironic question, 
''Would anyone have said that Tito had not made a rich return to his bene-
factor, or that his gratitude and affection would fail on any great de-
mand?tt shifts almost imperceptibly into Tito' s musing with the quick 
rejoinder that ''he did not admit that his gratitude had failed; but 2:i 
!!!. !!2i certain that Baldassarre was, in slavery, mot,;eeJrl;:ain:!bhat'hha"fuls 
living." 19 
In this instance, it would not be appropriate to describe the second 
narrative voice as sympathetic; it would be even more accurate to say that 
here there is only the one narra.tive VOice, the ironic. The iron;y occurs, 
as with .Arthur Donnithorne, because of George Eliot' s skilful present-
ation of the two points of view. We see Tito from the" outside" the extra-
spective view, and we see the workings of his consciousness, the intro-
spective view. Thus we are constantly aware of the contradiction between 
what is the case and what Tito thinks to be the case. It is not merely 
that he is mistaken; it is the element of self-deception which is em-
phasised by George Eliot's subtly controlled narr.ative voioe. 
The examples I have offered so far, Mr Casaubon and Tito Melema, 
• 
illustrate sucoessfUL oontrol of aesthetic distance in George Eliot's 
presentation of character. However, there is a group of idealised cbar-
acters towards whom George Eliot fails to achieve the necessary blend 
of detached observation and sympathy; instead of the double narrator 
we have only the sympathetic narrator and the tone of ironic detachment 
is missing. George Eliot' s failure to maintain an adequate aesthetic 
distance is a major factor in the general dissatisfaction felt with 
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these characters, Romola, Felix Holt, and Daniel Deronda, and with 
the novels that bear their names. 
\Yhen we look at George Eliot's presentation of Romola we see instant-
ly the damaging effect of the loss of the ironic narrator. Romola is a 
stilted two-dimensional character, who, for all her painful moral 
struggle, never takes on the roundedness of living flesh. She is ideal-
ised and towards the end of 1(Jle novel when she drifts in the boat to the 
plague-ridden village, ~hologised. It is not just the omission of the 
ironic narrator that makes her remote; unlike Dorothea, she has no pro-
saic younger sister to comment on her excesses. Celia has, for example, 
the uncomfortable belief that theories, and Dorothea is given to theories, 
are not unlike spilt pins and cause a comparable inconvenience when you 
sit or eat. And Ceorge Eliot satirises with gentle irony, her own youth-
ful asceticism, when she makes the following comment about Dorothea and 
her horse-riding. t'Riding was an indulgence which she allowed herself in 
spite of conscientious qualms; she felt that she enjqyed it in a pagan 
20 
sensuous way, and always looked forward to renouncing it. II 
Such a range of varied comments is lacking in the presentation of 
Romola. The follOwing description of her patience under the boring de-
mends of her blind father's scholarly pursuits is characteristic. 
As Romola said this, a fine ear would have detected in her clear 
voice and distinct utterance, a faint suggestion of weariness 
struggling with habitual patience. But as she approached her fath-
er and saw his arms stretched out a little with nervous excite-
ment to seize the volume, her hazel eyes filled with pity; she 
hastened to lay the book on his lap, and kneeled down by him, 
looking up at him as if she believed the love in her face must 
surely make its way through the dark obstruction that shut out 
everything else. At that moment the doubtful attractiveness of 
Romola's face, in which pride and passion seemed to be quivering 
in the balance with native refinement and intelligence, was 
transfigured to the most lovable womanliness by mingled pity and 
affection: it was evident that the deepest fount of feeling with-
in her had not yet wrought its way to the less changeful feat-
ures, and only found its outlet through her eyes. 21 
This authorial portrait of Romola is repeated in the various comments 
\'he crusty, 
;t:"ic painter, nero di Cosima, and inevit;.ply her fatht>x and god.fat~,el" .. 
Her foolish cousin, Monna Brigida$ contr':;.butes the f'c11owing descr',ption 
Romola's striking appearance when the two of the;i1 ,u:"e going, di;,;;guised!J 
;;0 San »area for an interview with the c.7ing Dino .. 'lIq~et Romola muE'fle 
herself as she will, t II she declares, Itt everyone wants to see what there 
ts under her yeil~ for she nas that way of 
When Romola rescues Tessa f'rom the importun~,-te ine youths, -.:e 
read that "smidenly a gentle hand was on her arI~!, and a 30ft l' wonder-
ful voice, as if' the Holy j.ladonna were r ~Do not be 8.fraid; 
no one shall harm you. • II 
Even if we make a1lov;ance for Tessa; ·:'.:::duli ty and 
the tone of tais description differs ve.x'y little 
adopted towards Romola by her creator. We a.o not ::h;;: :In 
flashes of temper, as Dorothea does ove:: "'.. obsel JatioTo 
of her enjoyment of their mother's jewe:",s .. 
to pique, inventing an instant opinion (-' .. ::1,1 
it, as happer.l.s when Dorothe:a. in:forms SL: 
going to ride again. IT;; sb.:>rt, we do nc nu"'~ 2;;,::/ 
the treatm&nt of Romola. 
The idealisation 0'£ Rom.ola blinds ,:' 
loss of trust in Tito is i;(litially a rna te".~ ::)i' 
er than a jmlgement based ')n evidence", '':lOSUS';; MOVl tn." ~H~ 
has betrayed his father an.a have accord 
itude towards him ll we ignflX'e the fact ',at; 2(';t s him on n-
sufficient grounds .. We !me''! he is guilt)' a:c:J so "e 'that he ::tn· 
tuitions are right and we d.o not quest:: self, 'c'hteous tone eX' her 
failure of trust. We learr, of her grOVe: .. g ,;ent in her 
and watch her attempts to makeallowanc)s f'or the d::.';'ferenc9s of;empel'-
21 i .. 
the ;,ode where S.,.~ acc-
identally sec of being 
Glutched by 
·'mola at only as th, escaped 
)risoner and ,:;: him and Tito .. 
.?iero does L~" best to avert her attelT ',,1 ['rom the. e.inting but had 
shown a 11t1;.;';'; too muehanxiety in put t '1g "t,he skate, out of her , 
had the very impression he t, prevent--th:;:t 
there was re[·J.ly something unpleasant ,Jmetl'd.ng o 
Tito, in the:;,irculUstances out of which the Fiero 
di Cosima himself has no evidence f'or a:,,:; su.et} suppa: tion about 
Later when she learns that Tito has her s trust a: all ow-
ad the library to be dispersed, in the niolence of ._ reaction S}'"f'~ 
rounds on him passionately and asks, 'It,lave you rob': somebody 
who is ~ dead? Is that the rel.l.son you wear 
tOld:f "had been driven to utter the wora.s as ':fi.E:::11 J?W:' ''fen to us!, the 
lash of the II The word liar:. s that 
anot7l'Y questioT15 are not random rhe'>oribllt 
lr ...nowledge. Yet it is we mow tr. 
~s "Yes," that we pass ,va'!' the coincic )10,,,1 of 011 
that accusatilJn. L 1; pm guess-work 
on hel' autho:c s" 
;0 believe th runs the 
rest of the 01 to 
ours, althOlJL she lesf. wall-informE:;d." '1""+' "(:~:.) ~~. ~.', 0>,. V 
ataly we can that she ·"aI'l..ifests mue:! tr.~~3 Sc~,,;LJ 
righteousnas ;:-1;11o.t th,,: character :)f 
oertainly cor,r;s to sa this but that her in-
itial reject: Ti () s~: ",';uS from her ~hat he is out 
so much in '~ ;f'athe:t.', a1':.d that 
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he is more inclined tovmrds lightness and pleasure than she is herself. 
When, for example, during their courtship, he says that he would like to 
take her away from the grimness of Florence t s grey slate, Romola's re-
sponse is indicative of her reluctance to surrender herself, even temp-
orarily, to a life of sensuous ease. Tito ·says persuasively, 
'I should like to see you under that southern sun, lying among 
the flowers, subdued into mere enjoyment, while I bent over you 
and touched the lute and sang to you some little unconscious 
strain that seemed all one with the light and the warmth. You 
have never known that happiness of the ~phs, ~ Romola.' 
~but I have dreamed of it often since you came. I am very 
thirsty fora deep draught of joy-- for a life all bright like 
you. But we will. not think of it now, $ Tit 0; it!'>seems· to IDAESS . it' 
there would always be pale sad faces among the flowers and eyes 
that look in vain •. ' 26 
Taken out· of context, Romola' s response to Tito' s honeymoon suggestion 
is dauntingly moralistic and certainly lends credence to the view of a 
critic like Calvin Bedient when he claims that George Eliot, like the 
majority of Victorians, was terrified of the flesh. 27 In the context 
of the novel, however, we a1rea~ know of Tit 0 's hedonistic assessment 
of claims on him, and "the pale sad faces 'I and "eyes that look in vain" 
are inevitable reminders to the reader of Tit 0 '5 betrayal of his father. 
In this way Tito's vision of joy is debased and Romola's rejection of it 
becomes a further mark of her moral worth. 
The absence of any ironic perspective in the treatment of Romola de-
stroys some of her credibility in our eyes. Her progress out of '*moral 
stupidity" 28 beoomes a model for moral development in general, a kind of 
textbook example. Tito, for all his creator' s moral disapproval, is 
presented more in the round and achieves a greater degree of autono~. 
The loss of a sympathetic narrative voice is less damaging to a novel 
as a whole than the loss of the ironic voice. 
Felix Holt and Daniel Deronda, and Dinah Morris from ~ Bede, all 
suffer in the same way as Romola. They are scarcely allowed to exhibit 
~ redeeming human weaknesses. Felix's tendency to adopt the rQle of 
the "angry pedagogue" 29 still has George Eliot's approval; Deronda's 
vacillating over a career and his habit of acquiring lame dogs are pre-
sented as desirable character traits. These characters are winners and 
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even if we do not necessarily feel that their rewards are enviable--
marrying Adam, caring for Tessa and the children, social work in a slum, 
and crusading to the Middle East-we are enjoined to feel the utmost 
respect for these characters. However, for all their moral failings, Mr 
Casaubon and Gwendolen Harleth, for example, are more memorable than this 
gallery of pious characters I have been describing. We feel more sym-
pathy for their tortured humanity than we do for those characters where 
George Eliot's sympathetic voice dominates. 
These are some of the triumphs and some of the failures of George 
Eliot's characterisation. Where she finds a satisfact ory structural 
correlative for her two-fold vision, she succeeds admirably; where her 
perspective is insufficiently varied or her control of aesthetic dis-
tance is disturbed by an excess of sympathy, she is considerably less 
successful. 
Let us now examine other implications of her intellectual and moral 
standpoint. 
Preoepts ~ People. 
If we plot the co-ordinates of George Eliot's intellectual and 
moral position we oan determine how she achieves a "philosophioal 
equilibrium. II 1 We can detect unmistakable signs of her allegiance to 
association or evolutionar,y psychology and oan uncover her adherence 
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to a belief in the possibility of moral progress, whether of the indiv-
idual or of the raoe. But George Eliot was not 1(riting philosophical 
treatises. Consequently we need to approach her novels differently from 
the way in which we confront such works as J. S. Mill' s !!!!. System £!. 
Logic or G. H. Lewes' ~ Stud&y' 2!. Psychology which provide method6-
logies for discussing aspeots of human behaviour in general and ab-
straot terms. A novelist has rather to present convincing personalised 
and individual descriptions of human behaviour and motivation, and has 
to aohieve a "practioal equlilihrium" 2 in terms of plot and charaoter-
isation. Thus, an'..ana.lysis or description of George Eliot t s psyohologioal 
and moral assumptions provides no indioation of how successfully she has 
incorporated these assumptions into her novels. It may indicate the para-
meters of a oharacter's growth or decline but oan conve.y no critical 
assessment of the suooess or failure of her aohievements. A knowledge of 
the relationship between her thought and that of her oontemporaries ~ 
illuminate the novels in one area but cannot of itself offer an evaluative 
oommentary. To bridge this gap between description and evaluation, it 
is necessary to examine the implioations of George Eliot t s framework of 
belief. 
We have already discussed the ways in which she defines the selr-
hood of her characters, and the sorts of opportunities she offers them. 
We have examined her control of narrative balance in the shifting of 
perspective between the "hard unaccommodating Actual" 3 and the 
struggling individual. But when we come to analyse George Eliot t s 
215 .. 
world view in terms of her treatment of individual characters, we find 
ourselves predominantly conoerned with her allowanoe of freedom to those 
charaoters. 
In an early novel, ~!ll1. 2!!. ih2. Floss, Maggie Tulliver struggles, 
falls short of her self-imposed ideal" and ultimately triumphs. In her 
last novel, :Daniel Deronda, George Eliot shows us her hero willingly 
accepting the dictates of a duty which is laid upon him by the faats of 
his Jewish parentage. To show us Maggie's upward progress, George Eliot 
makes use of the assumptions underlying the theor.y of psychological 
determinism, which, as we have seen, owes much to the laws of associat-
ion. These describe how we learn in any given situation and especially 
how we come to acquire habitual responses. Thedo\mward moral graph of 
such characters as Arthur Donn1thorne, Tito Melema, Godfrey Cass, 
Nichmlas Bulstrode and, even to a certain extent, Tertius Lydgate, has 
been plotted by means of this theor.y of psychological determinism with 
its emphasis on cause and effect and its rigid straightline development. 
But as a means of depicting the upward development of a character like 
Maggie, it is less satisfaoto~. In much the same way as Tito ielema is 
bound more closely by his choices, Maggie's successive choices do not 
enfranchise her but instead they constrain and limit her freedom. In 
Daniel Deronda. we see a comparable loss of freedom. In this novel, we 
can recognise George Eliot 1 s acceptance of the tenets of evolutionary 
psychology. Deronda's search for a commitment, for a duty, takes on the 
form of a search for himself. His, ignorance of his parentage becomes far 
him an ignorance of his identity. The revelation of his Jewishness is 
eagerly welcomed by him as an indication of where his duty lies. We are 
led to believe that he chooses freely and willingly. But if we scrutinise 
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the ''heredit~ entailed Nemesis," 4. the duty, which George Eliot im-
poses on him in the form of his "Jewish ancestry, we can see that she 
does not provide him with a free range of choices. In fact, she is pract-
ising sleight-of-hand and offering him very limited options. 
Let us now examine in some detail the measure of freedom allo.ed to 
these two characters, Maggie and Deronda, in order to decide how far 
George Eliot's system of beliefs imposes limitations on their develop-
ment •. 
Morally ascending characters in George Eliot's canon most usual~ 
achieve their growth as a result of the influence on them of some other 
character. (I have called this the mentor/pupil relaticnship.) Other-
wise, like Adam Bede or Dorothea, they grow through sufferirig. Dorothea 
is different in another respect, in that she presents to herself a goal 
of idealised behaviour; it is not suggested to her by some other charact-
ere Maggie Tulliver is also treated differently. Her menter is no living 
person; it is a mediaeval, devotional text which Offers her an ideal of 
behaviour with special emphasis on renunciation of claims for herself. 
In The Imitation of Christ, Maggie found Itan effort and a hope that 
helped her through years of loneliness, making out a faith for herself 
without the aid of established authorities and appointed guides." 5 
This "faith" which she makes out for herself'develops her conscience 
and heightens her moral sensibility. Her goal of self-denial is shown 
consistently to be moral and secular, not Christian. And we can recog-
nise a relationship between the way in which Maggie inte:rni11isesthe 
message of Thomas 'a Kempis and the explicit formation of George Eliot's 
system of psychological determinism with a consequent loss of freedom. 
Let us now examine the impact that ~ Imitation S!!. Christ had on 
Maggie's life and moral development. 
The most direot effeot of Maggie's submission to the spiritual 
guidanoe of Thomas 1 Kempis is to be seen in the developing sensitivity 
of her conscienceo Her initial reading of the marked passages is de~ 
scribed as if she is not merely reading, but listening to an aotual 
person, "seeming rather to listen [t~ a low voioe. It 6 And the suggest-
ion is early made that she oan find. the muoh sought-for guidanoe in her 
own self, im. her own moral and. spiritual awareness. She disoovers that 
"here was insight, and strength, and oonquest, to be won by means en-
tirely within her own soul, where a supreme Teacher was waiting to be 
heard. tI 7 The effect of Feuerbaoh' s demythologising of the Christian 
message is unmistakable here. It is the human soul which is divine, 
therefore the word "Teachertt is given the upper oase. To find this 
Teacher, Maggie internalises the "quiet voioe" and makes its teaching 
her own. Thus, when Philip offers Maggie his company and shared dis-
course about books and. musio and painting, his tempting voioe is oon-
trasted both with the inner voioe of her conscience and with the "voioe 
of a brother who, ages ago, felt and suffered and. renounoed--in the 
cloister, perhaps, with serge gown and tonsured head, with much chanting 
and long fasts, and with a fashion of speech different fran ours--but 
under the same silent far-off heavens, and with the same passionate 
desires, the same strivings, the same failures, the same weariness." 8 
It is an amalgam of both these voioes, the distant voice of Thomas ~ 
Kempis and the inner voioe of her conscience which interrupts Fhilip t 5 
tempting offer of friendship. In this way "the voioe that said this made 
sweet music to Maggie; but athwart it there came an urgent monotonous 
warning from another voioe which she had been learning to obey. It 9 And 
later when she is grappling with the full force of the temptation, 
longing to enjoy his proffered company and free herself from "the narrow 
valley of humiliation," the "severe monotonous warning came again and 
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d . II 10 an agal.n. 
When she wakes in the steamer which is taking her and Stephen to 
Mudport, she stiffens her resolution in dread "lest her consoienoe 
should be benumbed again. tl 11 And in her final moments of Itwrestlingll 12 
with herself, she' waits for the inner "light" 13 and gives herself 
" 
strength by uttering memorised words from The Imitation of Christ. 
- -
In this way Maggie uses Thomas 'a Kempis as a spiritual mentor, but 
it is important to remember that this work oontains no partioularised 
instruction. Rather it disousses the general duties of a Christian 
suppliant. No more than George Eliot herself does Thomas 'a. Kempis pre-
scribe speoial behaviour for partioular oiroumstanoes. Towards the end 
of her life George Eliot expressly denied ~ suoh intention. t~ 
funotion, II she wrote, "is that of the aesthetic, not the doctrinal 
teacher--the rousing of the nobler emotions, which make mankind desire 
the social right, not the prescribing of special measures." 14 Thomas 
a Kempis has served to rouse in Maggie the "nobler emotions" .or mjGre 
accurately to reinforce them. We can see that Maggie already has a moral 
sensibility far in advance of her family and ver,y well developed in so 
young a ohild, in her sensitive response to Philip's deformity, for ex-
ample. 15 The goal of ideal behaviour whioh Maggie sets herself after 
her reading of ~ Imitation .2!. Christ is elevated into a general prin-
oiple, akin to Mr Lyon's Ithigher rule" 16 and Dorothea's "perfeot 
Right." 17 We read that she has "years of striving after the highest and 
best," 18 of "longingsafter perfeot goodness," 19 that she responds to 
lithe possibility of shifting the position from which she looked at the 
gratification of her own desires--of taking her stand out of herself, and 
looking at her own life as an insignificant part of a divinely-guided 
whole. II 20 And, in addition to this central aspect of Maggie's moral 
. development, there is a background of moral commentary, sometimes 
authorial and at other times placed within the thoughts of George 
Eliot' 5 spokesman, Dr Kenn. He extols the same moral virtues as Maggie 
aspires towards and defines the nat'lU"e of morality as George Eliot 
sees it. There is an insistence, for example, that there is no short-
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cut to moral decisions, that what is indispensable is profound sympathy 
and insight into human motivation and suffering, and a wide tolerance. 
Dr Kenn, approving Maggie's decision not to marry Stephen, comments on 
the moral laxity he sees around him. "At present," he declares, "every-
thing seems tending towards the relaxation of ties-- towards the sub-
stitution of wayward choice for the adherence to obligation, which has 
its roots in the past. It 21 
By converting the guidance of !h2. Imitation ::!. Christ into an inner 
voice of conscience, George Eliot is not significantly diverging from 
the original intentions of Thomas 'a Kempis. But in ttn"ning the principle 
of renunciation of self into a moral principle and diluting the specif-
ically Christian message of The Imitation ot Christ, she is altering its 
- - ---"'--' 
original conception. Thomas "a Kempis advocates self-renunciation so that 
the soul of the suppliant may be cleared of egoism to make room for the 
love of God; it is a means to an end, not the end itself. The difference 
between George Eliot's interpretation and use of !h2. Imitation ::!. Christ 
and the actual meaning of the work becomes clear when I re-insert a 
missing passage. The last section that George Eliot has Maggie read has 
an important omission. I will now write it out in full but first must 
mention that the "I" of the passage is not Thomas 'a Kempis but Christ. 
5. I have very often said to thee, and I say it now again, 
forsake thyself, resign thyself, and thou shalt enjoy a 
great inward peace. 
~ all f2!:.~, ~ nothing, ask f2!:. nothing back, ~ 
stand p'lU"ely, and with !!::!! confidence !!! !2., ~ ~ shalt 
have Me. 
Thou Shalt ~ ~ !!! !.bl. ~ heart, .2 darkness shall e21 
overwhelm thee. 
Aim only !.t this, l!:.!l. ~ this, desire this t:!:!!!i ~ mayest 
be stripped S!!. self-seekineaJ 2 ~ naked, follow Jesus 
naked; ~ ~ mayest £!!2. i9. thyself, ~ 1!!!. eternally 
to Me • 
220. 
. Theil"'allvainimaginations shall vanish, all evil disturbanoes, 
and superfluous oares. 
Then also immoderate fear shall leave thee, and inordinate 
love shall die. 22 
The missing sections I have underlined reveal that the surrender or the 
will is required so that the suppliant can be ruled by the will of God. 
Maggie, however, surrenders her will as a good in itself. She asks Philip, 
"'Is it not right to resign ourselves entirely, whatever may be denied 
us? I have found great peace in that for the last two or three years--
even joy in subduing II\Y own will.'" 23 And we have earlier been told of 
her mother's ttpuzzled wonder" at the change in Maggie. ·'It was amazing 
that this once 'contratr,y' child was become so submissive, so backward 
to assert her own will. II 24 
This brief discussion of the difference between Thomas 'a Kempia' 
aotual instruotions and George Eliot's, and therefore Maggie t a, inter-
pretation of them reveals a possible danger to Maggie in the ~doption 
of a prinoiple of renunoiation without the promised reward or guidance 
of Christ. And this leads us to an examination of another aspect of the 
influence Maggie reoeives from her mediaeval, devotional text. We have 
seen that she internalises the general preoept until it becomes the 
voice of her oonscience and that she uses it as an abstraot guiding prin-
oiple at times of moral orisis. It reinforoes her natural tendenoy to 
give importanoe to faithfulness and to loyalty towards the bondage of 
the past. We need now to consider how this comes about. The surest clue 
that we get, apart from the reference to the "voice, tl 25 ocours when 
Maggie catches a glimpse of Philip on his visit to the mill with his 
father. She wonders whether he would still admire her eyes and has to 
beat down her impulse to fetch the mirror and look at herself. We read 
that "she cheoked herself and snatched up her work, trying to repress 
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the rising wishes by forcing her memory to recall snatches of iwmns. 1t 
Later we learn that she ''had long ago learned by heart" 27 the words of 
the little book. In this way she has "filled her mind with a continual 
stream of rhythmic memories t' 28 and inoidentally has satisfied some of 
her aesthetic hunger. The "rhythmic memories" and her frequent recalling 
of them show that she is utilising a learning method based on associat-
ionist priciples. At moments of crisis she repeats "snatches" of l\'Ymna, 
or of the Bible, or of ~ Imitation !!!.. Christ rather in the same way 
as IIl\Ystics use a mantra for meditation. In this way she traina her mind 
to a practised and habitual response. Ultimately, this differs little 
from George Eliot's description of Tito J(elema.'s Itun~ng habit of 
fear" 29 or Maggie's own comparison of herself with the unhappy white 
bear pacing the boundary lines of an imaginary cage. 30 Haggie has ac-
quired a technique by constant repetition which helps her to persevere 
in her conscious intention of "taking her stand outside her.self. t; 3L The 
intention may well be admirable but the technique with its conatant re-
inforcement means a lessening of Maggie's freedom to choose. The very 
gbal of surrendering her will inevitably means that she is abdicating 
from the responsibility of choice. 
There is a strong contradiction implicit in the fact that as Maggie, 
with the aid and guidance of The Imitation of Christ, becomes moral~ 
- - . 
more sensitive and aware she appears voluntarily to choose not to exert 
her will, which means in effect that she does not choose. I quoted 
earlier J. S. Kill t s affirmation that tlwe are exactly as capable of 
making our own character, !!. ~ will, as others are of making it for 
us." 32 When this principle is applied to characters like Arthur 
Donnithorne or Tito }klema, it reads somewhat wryly. The whole point 
about their moral decline is their ignorance of the modifications they 
are making to their own personalities by their successive choices. They 
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do not "choose, ~ in Mill t S sense, to make their characters base ar.d 
ignominious. On the other band, Kaggie can certainly be said to have 
chosen to make her character. She decides consciously and deliberately 
to practise self-renunoiation until it becomes an habitual response" 
part of her oharacter. The theory of psyohologioal determinism showing 
how bondage is created by laying down and "fixingll of habits works 
supremely well with a morally decliningcharaoter. It is strangely in-
appropriate for George Eliot to have used this same technique to por-
tr~ the moral asoendanoy of her heroine. The reader aooepts that habits 
of conoealment, or prevarication, or fear entail loss of freedom. This 
leads to no oontradiotion within George Eliotts own soheme, so that a 
oharacter like Tito can have increasingly less freedom while he per-
sists in not reoognising the fact. We aooept that ~dgatets arrogant 
assumption of superiority over oiroumstances, whioh is indioative of his 
sadly lower moral stature, is entirely delusory. The enooded messages, 
however, that surround Kaggie tell us firmly that she is not. of their 
kind; she is warmly sympathetic and "sees" more truly than the people 
around her. Her deoision to rejeot Stephen is diminished if she is not 
seen to have a genuine freedom of choioe at that moment, if she is oon-
strained by habitual self-renunoiatory responses. George Eliot oertainlY 
wants us to' feel that she is free to choose, but a close analysis Of the 
text reveals that we are on uncertain ground, that even George Eliot has 
doubts as to the nature of Maggie' 5 two major moral decisions; the one 
affecting Philip at the time when she is determined not to oontinue see-
ing him, and the other when she rejects Stephen, espeCially the second 
time after reoeiving his anguished letter. 
There is a piece of authorial commentary following Maggie's first 
unexpected encounter with Philip which shades almost imperoeptibly into 
. Maggie' $ own thoughts about the situation by means of the teohnique, 
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erlebte Rede. 
Here suddenly was an opening in the rooky wall whioh shut in the 
... narrow valley of humiliation, where all her prospect was the re-
mote unfathomed sky; and some of the memory-haunting earthly de_J 
lights were no longer out of her reaoh. She might have books, 
converse, affeotion-- she might hear tidings of the world from 
whioh her mind had not yet lost its sense of exile; and it would 
be a kindness to Philip too, who was pitiable--clearl:y not happy 
~ she always live in this resigned imprisonment? 33 
This indioates that George Eliot herself regarded Maggie's self~~ 
renunciation as somewhat perverse, and oertainly we have already been 
warned that Maggie adopts this praotice with "some exaggeration and 
wilfulness, some pride and impetuosity. II 34- The phrase "resigned im-
••• 
prisonment It recalls as well her statement to the reader that Mawe "has 
not perceived--how could she until she had lived longer?--the inmost 
truth of the old monk's outpourings, that renunciation remains sorrow, 
though a sorrow borne willingly. It 35 
. George Eliot's eonoern for her heroine becomes even more marked after 
Maggie has reoeived Stephen's letter. 
When Maggie first read this letter she felt as if her real temp-
tation had only just begun. At the entrance of the chill dark 
oavern, we turn with unworn oourage from the !!!:!. light; ~how, 
when we have trodden far in the damp darkness, and have begun 
to be faint and weary--how, if there is a sudden opening above36 us, and we are invited back again to the ~-nourishing day? 
(ll\Y italics) 
The juxtaposition of warmth and chill damp, of light, life-nourishing 
day and dark suggests unmistakably that George Eliot, despite her con-
scious intentions with regard to Maggie, is nonetheless somewhat un-
nerved by the impasse into which she has led her heroine. This anxiety 
runs counter to the surface development of Maggie's charaoter. There 
have been several attempts to account for why George Eliot should have 
chosen to end the novel in the way she does; Maggie's spiritual worth, 
the ~ ~ machina of the flood, and Tom's final recognition of his 
sister's true character have all called forth different critical re-
spones. Psychoanalytic critics have mooted either George Eliot's re-
lationship with her brother, Isaac Evans, 37 or have seen Maggie's 
supreme moral victory as rather an instance of an immature dependence 
and a "neurotic strategy. II 38 Feminist critics have likewise objected to 
the masochism 39 of George Eliot's treatment of Maggie expressed in such 
statements as "she had made up her mind to suffer. II 40 These critical 
theories all endeavour to explain the reason for George Eliot's treat-
ment of Maggie and as such are not susceptible of proof. I am offering 
explanations of h2! George Eliot brings Maggie to this pass, of how it 
is that so many readers of ~ ~ 2.!! ~ ;;;.,Fl;;;;.;;;,o,;;.ss,;;. are dissatisfied with 
George Eliot's solution for Maggie and detect that she herself is un-
easy. I am not denying the validity within the world of the novel of 
the motives George Eliot supplies. I am merely seeing them as ration-
alisatioris of a decision that was inevitable, not because of Maggie's 
moral stature, not because she had a neurotic fear of asserting her-
self but because like the "poor uneasy white bear tt 41 she haa,. acquired 
an habitual response; a response of submissiveness and renunciation 
of her own claims. Maggie is no more free to choose to behave differ-
ently than Arthur Donnithorne can avoid the t'vitiating effect" 42 of 
his actions or Tito can a:et aside his lIundying habit of fear. II 43 The 
.ntrain of causes" 44 binds her as irrevocably as it binds Bulstrode. 
George Eliot's trenchant comment that "our deeds determine us, as much 
as we determine our deeds" 45 applies as forcibly to Maggie as it does 
to Arthur. Maggie is as much a victim of a deterministic and mechanistic 
world view as the other characters I have been st~dying. 
I have shown that a habit whether of fear or of renunciation is 
binding and the fact that George Eliot brings the weight of her author-
ial approval to bear on Maggie and the full bent of her irony on Tito 
Melema should not disguise from us that each character is equally con-
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strained. I have also indicated that choosing to surrender one's will, 
whether it is done for moral or spiritual reasons, mlso inevitably 
implies a loss of freedom. It now remains for me to substantiate this 
claim that the technique by whioh Q.eorge Eliot has chosen to present 
Maggie to us, based on the theory of psychological determinism, leaves 
her less free to choose than other morally evolved heroines, Esther 
Lyon, or Romola, or Dorothea, and in fact as restrioted in her freedom 
as Arthur Donnithorne or Tito Melema. 
According to W. J. Harvey, "the two most important fa.ctors determining 
the freedom of a.~ oharacter are ••• the range of ohoioes open to the 
oharaoter and the kind of ohooser he is, as shown by the history of 
choices displayed by him or imputed to him in the past." 46 One of the 
interesting points about Maggie as a ohooser is the division in her be-
haviour effected by her adoption of ~ Imitation of Christ as a guide. 
Before this time she is wilful, impetuous and assertive; she cuts her 
hair, spills grav,y over the hated cast-off dress of aunt Glegg, pushes 
Lucy into the mud, and runs away to join the gypsies. While these act-
ions do not manifest ~ real deliberate choice (they are all rather 
spontaneous attempts to solve impossible problems) they are undeniably 
the aotions of a passionate and impulsive girl. Her decisions after read-
ing Thomas 'a Kempis are of a different nature; th;ey are no more choices 
than these previous acts of oofianoe but they are shorn of any wilfulness 
or impetuosity. They constitute non-aotions in their passivity and 
submissiveness, a following a line of least resistanoe. Her o~ action, 
her decision to teaoh rather than live with Tom or aunt Glegg, is re-
ported retrospeotively so that we do not see any struggle she may have 
had to assert her will. When she ttohooses" to see Philip, it is only be-
--~ 
taqSe she snatches at his sophist~ that if he should oome along that way 
/"" 
",~"..< 
and meet her by aocident then that would not be her fault. She does not 
remonstrate further nor does she change the direction of her daily 
walk. 
The whole relationship with Stephen is characterised quite specif-
ically by "drifting, If 47 which suggests that Maggie is envelopp4:in.a·· 
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sensuous haze and is not in her more usual state of . olear' rEUU'.Ion"j:'biUty. 
She walks in the garden with him, she walks through the Conservatar,y and 
then runs away mortified that he has kissed her arm. The quick comment 
is very revealing; "that momentary happiness had been smitten with a 
blight--a leprosy: Stephen thought more lightly of ~ than he did of 
Lucy. If 48 There is no doubt that the wilful assertive Maggie of the 
~ll~book has not been complete~ assimilated to the new quietistic 
llaggie. Fihal~ she drifts down the river with Stephen. This is an un-
conscious surrendering of her will in comparison with the earlier delib-
erate submissiveness. But the final decision to walk out of the inn, 
leave Stephen, and return to St Oggt s, although it seems like an assert-
ive action, is yet another example of 'Maggie's habit of self-l'enunciation. 
To have decided to stay with Stephen would have meant discarding this 
habitual response. It is only when he pleads his desperate unhappiness 
that she !Jlomentar11y wavers. In terms of her life history and her prev-
ious pattern of choices it would have been harder for her to stay with 
Stephen than it is for her to leave him because this habit of se1£'-
renUnciation is now so firmly entrenched. Although outwardly she struggles 
against the temptation of Stephen's marriage proposal, her walking out 
of the inn is really her taking the . line of least resistance. Because 
we commend the choice, we are asked to admire the moral courage of the 
chooser. Maggie is meant to seem free and untrammelle4,,~&;pe~J.Y 
in this crucial final decision whioh reveals her moral superiority. 
Close analysis, however, reveals that she is as trapped in her habit of 
self-renunciation as Tito Melema in his habit of fear. Her decision to 
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reject Stephen, because it is totally in keeping with her years of long-
ing af:t;er "perfect goodness, II 49 effeotively disguises from us at first 
that her habit of self-renunciation constrains her to perform her act of 
moral courage. 
This analysis has revealed that we are asked to approve Maggie for 
something she cannot help but do, and that George Eliot herself feels a 
vestigial uneasiness about her treatment of her heroine. Maggie is the 
only one of George Eliot's morally ascending characters whose presentat-
ion contains elements of psychological determinism, even if she is not 
depicted entirely in a straightline, cause and effect way. The fact that 
George Eliot rejects this technique for showing the upward movement of 
her characters after The Millon the Floss supports ~ contention that 
- ---- ....... -.....-.. ~=;;;. 
she recognised its limitations. 
George Eliot converted the learning theories of the school of as soc-
iation psychology into a technique for demonstrating character change. 
This technique works extremely well as a means of revealing the success-
ive stages by which a character morally degenerates. But when it is used 
to depict the moral growth of a character, it introduces a contradiction. 
We are meant to feel that Maggie chooses to reject Stephen because of 
the years she has spent '·longing for perfect goodness, " 50 in the same 
< 51 
way that Dorothea, in Middlemarch, yearns for the "perfect Right, It 
subdues her own pain and jealousy, and visits RoSamond for the second 
time. We have seen, however, that Maggie cannot help her choice, because 
her years of practising submission make it impossible for her to assert 
herself. It therefore comes as no surprise that George Eliot rejected 
this technique in her presentation of the moral growth of her later 
charaoters. If moral deoline is characterised by a narrowing of focus, 
a rigidity and a stubborn egoism, then we can expect that moral aware-
ness will demonstrate a breadth of sympathy, an opening out, and a 
greater degree of freedom. Strict habit formation does not suggest a~ 
of these. This is not to say that the laws of causation are miraculoua-
ly suspended in the case of the later characters. The strict sequence 
of cause and effect is no less binding. It is merely that other aspects 
of moral growth are foregrounded and the formation of habits, even of 
suoh morally reputable habits as renunciation of self, is no longer 
emphasised. The prinoiples underlying the thear,y of psyohologioal de-
terminism allow for trenohant analyses of moral deterioration; they 
provide too rigid a frame for the presentation of a oharacter pain-
fully aOhieving moral awareness. 
The framework of belief that pervades ~!!ll. .2!l !!!! Floss limits 
the freedom of the heroine. Let us now consider whether the tenets of 
evolutiOnary psyohology whioh George Eliot utilises in Daniel Deronda 
allow the hero a full development. 
He came back with what was better than freedom--with a duteous 
bond which his experience had been preparing him to accept 
gladly. 52 
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These words describing Deronda' s state of mind after he meets his mother 
in Genoa reveal the opposition that George Eliot saw existing between 
freedollLand duty. But does Deronda accept this "duteous bondlt freelY or 
is he oonstrained by his experiences, his ancestral yearning, and his 
creator's firm and ~ielding hand'? In answering this question I will 
briefly recapitul~te what evolutionary psychologists have to say about 
anoestral memory and relate it to leorge Eliot's oonoept of duty. This 
will enable me to consider the implioations of this theory for Deronda I s 
freedom of choice and to analyse exactly how much freedom a morally 
evolved oharacter can experienoe in a hierarohical moral scheme gov-
erned by suoh moral absolutes as duty and renuno~atioD. 
Evolutionary psyohologists of the mid-nineteenth oentur,y reinstated 
the "something biologioally given" .53 that the Frenoh scientist, Gall) 
had recognised some fifty years earlier. Acoording to this theory, an-
cestral experiences extending right baok to the beginnings of mankind 
have left in the neurological cirouits oertain modified traoes which 
determine our response to particular sitiations. Herbert Spenoer has 
desoribed how we have "intuitions of spaoe," .54- and he, Darwin and 
Lewes all state explicitly that feelings are developed in the same way 
(and it must not be forgotten that nineteenth oentur,y exponents of the 
moral sense regarded morality as primarily based on a feeling, namely 
sympathy.) Here they parted oompany with suoh earlier empirioists as 
Bain and Mill who still attributed individual differences to individual 
experienoes within the one lifetime. In The Study 2!.. Psyoholos.y:, Lewes 
neatly summarises this theory of anoestral inheritanoe with the dog-
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matio statement that IIi t is indisputable that every partioular man oomes 
into the world with a heritage of organised forms and definit$ tend-
encies, whioh will determine his feeling and thinking in oertain def-
inite ways, whenever the suitable oonditions are present. II 5.5 Spenoer 
refers to "universal anoestral experiences" 56 but I have already in-
dioated that George Eliot has broken away from this "universality. It 
She provides her oentral Jewish oharacters in Daniel Deronda with speo-
ifioally Jewish anoestral experienoes whioh have a determining and 
thereby a limiting effeot on their personalities and lives. Anoestry 
is another hereditary condition like sex, or time of birth, or eye 
oolour, against which it is impossible to' rebel. It is no ooinoidenoe 
that the two George Eliot oharaoters, Deronda and Fedalma, who are the -
most stringently bound by their anoestry are kept in ignoranoe of this 
anoestry until they reaoh maturity. If they knew all along there would 
be no dramatio ohange of direction. Fedalma renounoes her marriage to 
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don Silva and accepts her gypsy allegiance; Deronda gives up the idle 
life of' an unproductive member of' the upper middle class to set out on 
a ref'orming and hazardous mission to the East to f'oster Jewish nation-
ali sm. In both cases, however, the ancestral heritage is oonstantly f'ore-
shadowed and anticipated and both of' them recognise a certain inevit-
ability in the revelation of their birth. Feda.lma, f'or example, describes 
her reaction at her first glimpse of' her then unknown f'ather in the 
following words. 
It f'ound me there-
Seemed to have travelled f'ar to f'ind me there 
And grasp me-- claim this f'estal life of mine 
As heritage of sorrow, ohill ~ blood 
With the cold iron of' some unknown bonds. 57 
Evolutionary psychology, with its emphasis on a racial memory is not 
enough on its own to account for the behaviour of' these two displaced 
persons. It is the acceptance of an im~lied obligation in the terms of 
their ancestry which is so binding and offers such a concussive check 
to their freedom. Fedalma. in the language of contracts, talks of re-
deeming a Itpledge u and paying "debts." 
o mother lif'e, 
That seemed to nourish me so tenderly, 
Even in the womb you vowed me to the fire, 
Hung on ~ soul the burden of men's hopes, 
And pledged me to redeem! -I tIl pay the debt. 58 
As her "Notes on !!:!. Spanish Gypsy and Trage~ in general" reveal, 
George Eliot has melded a notion of' inevitability, what she calls an 
"hereditary, entailed Nemesis, II 59 on to the evolutionary psychological 
notion of ancestral memory. We are now encumbered with a racial past 
which is as binding as our -"personal past.-Nemesis here is surely not 
representative of "retributive justice" (OED, "Nemesis," 2) as there 
is no judgement involved f'or either Deronda or Fedalma. It is closer 
to bur idea of Fate or the Greek MOira, something inescapable that 
drastically determines the course of' our lives. Fedalma actually ex-
plains to her fiance, 
Silva, it is fate. 60 
Great Fate has made me heiress of this woe. 
In this way George Eliot creates an iron restraint on ~edal~ and 
Deronda by identifying duty with ancestral heritage. Duty is one of 
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George Eliot's constitutive categories, one of the encoded messages of 
her novels by means of which she cues her readers in their assessment of 
a character's worth. To refuse the mantle of ancestry now that it is oom-
pounded with duty would be to falloff badly on George Eliot t s moral 
scale. 
Let us now examine in some detail Deronda' s situation prior to the 
revelation of his birth to see whether the two concepts are in faot so 
tightly woven that he is left with virtually no choice at all.Harvey's 
suggested formula for deciding about the amount of freedom granted to 
a.n.v character is useful again here: what sort of chooser he is and what 
range of choices is offered. 61 Of Gwendolen and her decision to marry 
Grandcourt we are told that ltshe seemed .to herself to. be,. at'te.r, all, . .only 
drifted towards the tremendous decision:-but drifting depends on some-.'· 
thing besides the currents, when the sails have been set beforehand." 62 
We now need to see whether Deronda' s sails are similarly pre-set in the 
direction of ancestral duties. 
Deronda first enters our awareness as the ironio spectator of 
Gwendolen's suocess and then loss at the gambling table. Regrettabl~ we 
do not witness his quixotic deoision to redeem her necklace. It provides 
the action-which binds these two characters together and illustrates the 
same interfering assumption of moral superiority that Felix Holt shows 
towards Esther Lyon. But the impulse to rescue is very strong in 
Deronda's nature, and constitutes, in fact, what George Eliot would re-
fer to as a ''bias'' of his personality. We see this in his almost in-
stinctive rescue of Mirah and the constant help and advioe he gives to 
his friend, Hans lfeyerick. Sir Hugo more than once oomments on J)eronda • s 
tendenoy to attract lame dogs and warns him to keep himself unscathed in 
such encounters. These acts, whioh are motivated by his ooncern for other~ 
are examples of the, e~quisite .mora.Lsensibili:t;y:'ee~se:El:iot ifkA.'t;;;:pa.i.aa 
to display in this character. He would appear an insufferable prig if 
it were not for the fact that he does show a moral weakness, and a re-
latively serious one in George Eliot's oanon: he is aimless and drift-
ing. He himself is very much aware of this and assooiates his indecisive-
ness, his inability to oommit himself to any profession or way of life, 
with his ignoranoe as to his parentage. In his own mind he :feels that 
onoe this is oleared up he will feel free and thus be able to make some 
necessary commitment. Eventually this 'sense of a possible :future partisan-
ship becomes so identified in his mind with some duty connected with his 
parentage that he convinces himself that the two are identical really, 
not just ideally. 
The evening on which he rescues Mirah his disaffected condition is 
made very clear. "It was already a year or more sinoe he had oome back 
to England, II we discover, 'twith the understanding that his eduoation 
was finished, and that he was somehow to take his place in English soc-
iety; but though, in deference to Sir HUgo's wish, and to fenoe off 
idleness, he had begun to read law, this apparent deoision had been 
without other result than to deepen the roots of indeoision." 63 He is 
aware that his will is somewhat IIparalysed, It 64. that he has fallen into 
a "meditative numbness. tt 65 He longs forusome external event, or some 
inward light, thatfir1lIi urge him into a definite line of aotion." 66 
Instead, he feels as if he isllroaming ••• like a yearning disembodied 
spirit, stirred with a vague socia~passion, "butw1thout'lt'uedJ..QQal 
habitation to render fellowship relt-l." 67 He dreads, and at the same 
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eagerly awaits the disclosure of his birth, believing that it will carry 
with it some revelation that will end the t'disembodied lf 68 state which 
troubles him. He hopes that it may help him "to make his life a sequence 
which (!il~ take the form of duty, /I that it will save him from "having 
to make an arbitrary selection where he [!ee~ no preponderance of de-
sire. It 69 His state of mind here is very similar to those feelings 
Maggie Tulliver dreads will assail her if she breaks the bonds of connect-
ion to her past and disturbs, as it were, the sequence. She feels it 
will destroy her sense of identity; Deronda, for all his moral sensitiv-
ity to the sufferings of others, is having trouble establishing any 
sense of identity at all in the faoe of his uncertainty about his parent-
age. Maggie fears to destroy her roots, Deronda is an::dously seeking his. 
But his indecision and reticence paralyse him; in that he can no more 
tackle Sir Hugo squarely as to the question of his parentage than he can 
commit himself to some oourse of work. 
This is his state of mind when he comes into contact with Mordecai, 
who functions as Deronda t s spiritual mentor just as Deronda is Qwendolen's. 
The first real communication between the two men has been subtly pre-
pared for. Deronda's mortification at the earlier abrupt cessation of 
Mordecai's interest in him once he states that he is not a Jew, and 
knows no Hebrew, is akin to Gwendolen's tremulous sense of inadequacy 
under his s:earching gaze at Leubronn. Accordingly, Deronda is partially 
reaqy to respond to Mordecai, and in addition, Mordecai is offering him 
the possibility of just the sort of commitment for which his soul is 
thirsting. The follOwing remark about J;leronda is indicative of his prior 
acceptance of Mordecai' s visi onary claim on him. "But the moment had· in- " ) 
fluences which were not only new but solemn to Deronda: any evasion here 
might turn out to be a hateful refusal of some task that belonged to him, 
some act of ~ fellowship. /I 70 (lI\Y italics) It is interesting to re-
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member the derivation of the word ttdue. II It comes originally from the 
French devoir and is thus linked etymologically with the word. t'duty. It 
Although the following chapter shows us Derond.a examining Mordecai' s 
claim with some scepticism, he is an easy subject for enthusiasm which 
affords a marked contrast to his previous disaffected state. The mails 
have been pre-set beforehand. The previous quotation is just another 
example of the anticipatory comments that lead us and Derond.a to a 
passive acceptance not just of his parentage--after all he can no more 
alter that than he can change the time of his birth--but of the nation-
alistic implications of his birth. Even as he goes to Genoa to meet his 
mother he is emotionally prepared for accepting some responsibility or 
other and secretly hoping that it will take the form of the "very best 
of human possibilities ••• the blending of a complete personal love in 
one current with a larger duty. It 71 He hopes to learn that he is a Jew. 
We are told that after his meeting with his mother. ''he came back with 
something like a discovered charter warranting the inherited.right that 
his ambition had begun to yearn for: he came back with what WaS better 
than freedom--with a duteous bond which his experience had been prepar-
72 t ing him to accept gladly. ttDuty, and in Derond.a s case, the embracing 
of a cause, provide a moral safeguard and protection against the "slavery 
of unregulated passion or impulse." 73 Derond.a's commitment to the cause 
of Jewish nationalism, a commitment which arises from the Itduty" con-
ferred on him by the facts of his ancestry, is better than a goalless 
. freedom which is equated vdth slavery. 
He returns toMirahandMordecai, excited and voluble, and pours out 
his recognition that his being a Jew has been operating below the level 
of his consciousness all the time. He now feels at home in the world. 
He talks of 
an inherited yearning--the effect of brooding, passionate thoughts 
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in many ancestors--thoughts that seem to have been intensely -
present in my grandfather. Suppose the stolen offspring of some 
mountain tribe brought up in a city of the plain, or one with an 
inherited genius for painting, and bornblind--the anoestral life 
would lie within them as a dim longing for unknown objects and 
sensations, and the spell-bound habit of their inherited frames 
would be like a ounningly-wrought musioal instrument, never played 
on, but quivering throughout in uneASY mysterious moanings of its 
intricate structure that, under the right touch, gives musio. 
Something like that, I think, has been my experience. 74 
Deronda t s enthusiastio oommi tment· t otheJ ewishoause is thematioally 
contrasted with Grandcourt' s moral laxity. The epigraph to ohapter 25 
shows the result of excessive aimlessness. 
How trace the why and wherefore in a mind reduced to the barren-
ness of fastidious egOism, in which all direot desires are dulled, 
and have dwindled from motives into a vaoillating expectation of 
motives: a mind made up of moods, where a fitful impulse springs 
here and there conspicuously rank amid the general weediness? 'Tis 
a condition apt to befall a life too much at large, unmoulded by 
the pressure of obligation. 75 
It is not surprising that we feel as we are expected to feel that Deronda 
is the more worthy for emerging from his state of drifting dilettanteism 
and for making a whole-hearted commitment to some impersonal cause when 
we are shown, very graphioally, in the character of Grandcourt, some of 
the moral flaws attendant on the lack of a dutiful commitment. 
The preceding section has s et out the identifica.tion in IW-eorge Eliot t s 
mind between the principles of evolutionary psyohology and duty. It has 
shown tha.t Deronda., after several years of indecisiveness suddenly 
"chooses," supposedly freely, to acoept Jewish partisanship and to work 
lito bind @is I race together in spite of heresy. II 76 We need now to 
examine whether in faot George Eliot has allowed him a free choice or 
whether the opposition between freedom and duty does not indicate an 
inflexible control of her character and a possible flaw in the novel. 
I have already adumbrated my conclusion that, in actuality, the 
facts of evolutionary psychology, even Deronda's Jewish ancestry, do 
not in the~selves constitute too drastically limiting a factor. Oert-
ainly they become yet another of the unmodifiable laws of existence 
against which it is not j !lst futile but even impious to struggle. But 
it is the conjunction in George Eliot of hereditary conditions and 
duty, the creation of a "hereditary/entailed Nemesis," 77 an awe-ful 
\ 
figure of Fate, that constitutes such a ckedk on a character's freedom 
_,_~"."~o/ 
of choice. Duty, as we have seen, is a moral absolute. Characters such 
as don Silva who insist on their own rights to choose are foredoomed. 
He exclaims, "I have a right to choose Il\Y good or ill. tl 78 This pro-
vides a thematic contrast to Zarca's impassioned outburst to his 
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daughter, that 'lbeing of the blood you are--Il\Y blood--/Iou have no right 
to choose. tI 79 Fedalma has a pledge to redeem; as she says, ItI'll pay 
the debt." 80 Don Silva ends as a guUt-ridden pilgrim; Fedalma, although 
she believes her cause is hopeless now that her father is dead, retains 
a faithfulness and loyalty to the facts of her gypsy birth. She suffers 
as a result of her commitment; consequently her loss of fre~dom is 
more apparent. Deronda embraces his commitment eagerly; we ar~ expected 
to rejoice with him. Don Silva takes the facts of his heritage for grant-
ed and imagines he can lightly dismiss them but he is wracked with re-
morse and horror when he realises that the gypsies have killed many of 
his compatriots. He realises too late that he is bound as stringently 
by the fact that he is born a Spanish Catholic as Fed.alma is in her ac-
knowledgement of her Zinc ali blood. The other two have both experienced 
unexplained yearnings: Fedalma longs for space and freedom (the symbolic 
uncaging of the little birds provides an analogy here) 81 and Deronda 
reaches out for his "social captainship, it 82 for an opportunity of se1£-
dedication. They learn of their ancestry and both feel that some vital 
missing clue to their personalities and motivation is now supplied. 
We need now to decide whether Deronda actually chooses or whether it 
would be truer to say that he has been chosen, that events have been 
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arranged in such a way that no choice is open to him. The inarticulate 
yearning was there as a tendency, a disposition of his personality, a-
waiting the right conditions (to paraphrase Lewes). The right conditions 
have now arrived and he seizes his opportunity with all the eagerness 
, 
that comes from recognising clearly something that has been there all 
the time. It is no new situation; rather his realisation of his Jewish-
ness is almost akin to a sense of d:j~ ~ and is attended with a feeling 
of release from pressure. He himself fully realises that there is no 
more choice in his taking up Mordecai's plans than there would be in a 
displaced mountain dweller recognising and identifying his love for 
mountain scen~. It constitutes part of him that has been dormant, 
awaiting the right signal. There is a strong fatalistic sense of inevit-
ability. George Eliot adds duty in the form of hereditary conditions to 
the other factors: the bias of the personality, and the social and. en-
vironmental pressures of a person's life. She thus shows v~ clearly 
that the room for individual manoeuvre she allows her characters is 
pitifully slight. She wrote to Charles Ritter in 1878 that ''the great 
~~~-
division of our lot is that between what is immodifiable and. is the 
object of resignation and that which is modifiable by hopeful activity--
by new conceptions and new deeds." 83 
Hereditary conditions in ~he sense, then, of ancestral memory are 
"immodifiable lt and, therefore, Deronda is adopting the wisest course in 
embracing necessity gladly. Fedalma, because her necessity involves 
sacrificing her love for don Silva, requires patience and resignation 
and this is how we leave her at the. end ofd~Spanish Gypsy. But Deronda 
is able to be glad that his life is shaped the way it is. This does not, 
however, make him any the less constrained and limited. His grand choice 
is no choice but an acceptance of the inevitable. We must not allow the 
fact that it is presented as a noble choice to cloud our assessment. Up 
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to the time when he finds his identity in the facts of his birth, he bas 
been indecisive and not much of a chooser. Now that he knows who he is 
and can embrace his duty we can see that his opportunity for choice is 
slight indeed. 
We have seen that George Eliot saw an opposition existing between 
freedom and duty. We can recognise that, for her, a voluntary submission 
to duty, toa worthwhile cause, i~ preferable to ~es~nJi[!~'., 'Wbi1~ .we 
may agree with that, it is undeniable that she does not allow Deronda a 
wider range of possibilities. He faces an either/or situation: aimlessness 
or duty; moral insufficiency or moral worth. These constitute the two 
extremes of a moral axis and all intermediate and moderate positions are 
ignored. Given such a choice, it is inevitable that Deronda does not 
hesitate. Duty, as we have alreaqy seen, in George Eliot's scheme has 
been elevated into an absolute. 
In terms of the novel, however, in the ordering of characterisation 
and plot, this moral absolute inevitably creates an inflexible set of 
co-ordinates. The loss of freedom, in consequence, is considerable. George 
Eliot has converted the principles of, evolutionary psychology into a 
moral straitjacket. She conceals this fact from her readers by the 
narrowness of choice that is offered to Deronda, by her preparation of 
the reader and Deronda himself for the ultimate commitment to a nation-
alistic goal, and by her presentation of Deronda as choosing willingly. 
It still remains that Deronda surrenders himself and his own will, how-
ever voluntarily. In this novel George Eliot has constrained Deronda to 
act in accordance with a rigid moral goal, and has oonverted the prin-
oip1es of evolutionary psychology for the purpose of her identification 
of Deronda's ancestral heritage with his duty. 
Maggie Tulliver's choosing to reject Stephen appears to be in acc-
84 
ordance with a principle of IIperfect goodness," but her firmly en-
trenched habit of renunciation makes her "choice" inevitable. Derona.a's 
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commitment to the cause of Jewish nationalism appears to be unconstrained, 
but George Eliot's identification of hereditary claims with her moral 
absolute, duty, leaves him no choice. Thus, her incorporation of the 
principles of association and evolutiOnary psychology into her novels 
makes for a 108s of freedom for her characters. And the constraining 
force of her moral absolute is even more perva~ve. We are entitled, 
therefore, to ask the question: does it create inflexible co-ordinates 
which limit the development of character and plot? We have seen that its 
operation restricts the range of options George Eliot offers to her 
characters and sets out a rigidly defined path of moral development. In 
addition, it accounts for the many instances where George Eliot un-
equivocally directs the reader to adopt a specific attitude towards her 
characters. Someimes these instances are blatant appeals to the reader's 
sensibility, but more usually they take the more subtle form of encoded 
messages, moral pointers directing the reader's response. George Eliot 
certainly controls her characters firmly, but she keeps a restraining 
hand on her reader as well. 
Let us now examine the co-ordinates of her moral scheme so that we 
can determine what limitations they impose on the development of plot 
and character. 
Throughout the novels we are given the chance to witness certain 
characters achieve a superior state of moral awareness. But instead of 
their being accorded greater autono~ and greater possibilities for 
creative action, their very moral goodness requires that they perform 
services which are even, at times, sacrificial of their own develop-
mente George Eliot may write of "hopeful activity •• • new conceptions 
and new deeds" 85 but as I have pointed out earlier, the new activity 
does not allow room for any "marginality. II 86 The potential of her 
charaoters is not freely realised in their establishing of their own 
identity, their achieving of autonOll\Vi instead, by means of either/or 
situations, the characters are brought to the point of denying their 
individuality in patient resignation to the service of others. Within 
the frame of reference of the novels, the loss of freedom or of origin-
ality is not manifest. Because we tend to accept George Eliot's premises, 
we find ourselves approving and oondoning the various decisions, with 
only a vestigial uneasiness. If, however, we place the intellectual 
and moral constructs of George Eliot's world across the world of the 
novels, we see that she has to prune and distort in order to contain her 
charaoters and their development within her moral scheme. Accordingly, 
Janet Dempster has to rest contented in her autumnal afternoon; lrIaggie· 
Tulliver has no alternative after her moral struggle but a gl,orious 
death; Romola does not even deliberate the pros and cons of looking after 
Tessa and the children, not just financially but in shared and torpid 
domesticity; Dorothea Brooke chooses between widowed stagnation at 
Lowick and marriage to Will Ladislaw; and Deronda eagerly embraces the 
cause of Jewish nationalism. 
Dorothea seeks the "perfect Right, II 87 Mr Lyon t s "higher rule"; 88 
Deronda hopes for the "very best of human possibilities. It 89 They have 
all set up for themselves a goal of service that transcends their own 
pettyegoi-sm and dissolves the distorting "speck of self. II 90 We need 
to decide, however, whether such a selfless goal does not itself be-
come as distorting a speck, as constraining a limitation as the speck 
of egoism. Basil Willey, paraphrasing Locke, states that "if a man 
comes under the habitual sway of duty, or religion, so that he is con-
strained always to choose what really is the greatest good, this is not 
to be understood as loss of liberty. tt 91 Such a viewpoint is entirely 
appropriate to a survey of moral philosophers. But in terms of a novel, 
it suggests that the characters will be brought to make this choice willy-
nilly, and betokens a rigid control over their development. It also re-
quires that the reader accept the writer's presentation of what COnll':.';, . 
stitutes the "greatest good." If we reject the idea of self-renouncing 
service, if we prefer to think in terms of identity rather than relation-
ship, if, in ahort, we cannot accept the basic premises on which George 
Eliot bases her novelistic structures, we find ourselves mourning a 
loss of freedom and autono~ in her characters. 
William Gass, setting out the opposition between the writer of fict-
ion and a moral philosopher, olaims that "the moral philosopher is expect-
ed to take a stand. He is expected to pronounoe upon questions. of· value." 
The writer of fiction, on the other hand, is "subject only to those cal-
culated disorders which are the result of his refusal, in tha faoe of the 
actual complexities of any well-chosen 'oase' to take a stand. tI 92 George 
Eliot, like other nineteenth century writers, for example Dickens or 
Thacker~, undoubtedly does take a stand and does not allow herself or 
her characters free rein. The "calcYlated disorders" are only minimally 
i present. They are generally kept outside the world of the novels at 
least as far as the main characters are concerned. And it becomes sur-
prisingly difficult for the reader to dissociate himself from George 
Eliot's moral stand and gain his own perspective on the character's 
development. George Eliot's assessment and her expectation that we 
will share that assessment are all-pervasive. George Eliot has residual 
i In ~ Novels .2£.. George Eliot, Barbara Hardy has pointed out, for 
example, the scene where Ladislaw contemplates a possible adulterous re-
lationship with Rosamond Viney. But he is redeemed and spared such a 
future by Dorothea's love. 
traces of Puritanism, and, as Ian Watt points out, in common with other 
writers with a similar bent, she treats life as if it were a "moral 
continuum." 93 There is no decision in her novels that is not dealt with 
in moral terms. This has certain consequences for the structure at the 
novels which I will now consider. Moral actions and deoisions are 
placed along a finely oalibrated axis. This creates a hierarchical 
arrangement of oharacters acoording to their degree of moral awareness. 
In addition, there are certain recurring types at behaviour or response 
which constitute moral categories in the novels and become, in the end, 
a system of encoded messages to help the reader determine and place 
each oharacter accurately on this moral axis. 
In an~arlier chapter I set out George Eliot's belief in the poss-
ibility of moral development. I related this to the beliefs of her con-
temporaries, all of whom shared the same anxiety that moral growth 
should take place aocording to general laws of human development. I also 
discussed the conoept of the moral sense and showed that it ~artook of 
the feelings and of the intellect. Sympathy is the affective component 
of the moral sense. A rational appreoiation of oneself and one's posit-
ion in the world, a recognition of what laws need to be submitted to and 
what laws are modifiable, however gradually, are the cognitive compon-
ents. Characters can be placed along an axis according as they manifest 
more or fewer of these moral qualities. Thus, Dorothea, who score,a 
highly and is very morally sensitive, still fails at first in her ability 
to accept another person' 5 selfhood .. It is not until she makes the most 
difficult moral step, the t'suspension of disbelief in the selfhood of 
someone else," ~ that she is able to respond compassionately to her 
husband. Similarly, Deronda, whose exquisite moral sensibility is shown 
in his treatment of other people, might appear initially to have very 
little progress to'make, yet he lacks a committed duty. Once we have 
identified the crucial aspects of George Eliottsconcept of morality 
and acknowledged her belief in the possibility of moral development, 
we can assess the state and progress of any given character. She does 
not need to claim explicitly that a certain character, Mr Casaubon, for 
example, is deficient in the moral sense; she can indicate this by a 
reference to his small measure of sympathy, and we know instantly how 
to regard him. In this way, we register that his "was that proud narrow 
sensitiveness which has not mass enough to spare for transformation 
into sympa.thy. II 95 
The various signalling devices indicate to the reader the character's 
moral status and warn us whether he is capable of moral growth or is in 
moral decline. They provide us with an effective taxono~ of character. 
Duty, relationship to the past and a healthy, integrative memory, sym-
pathy, attitudes towards immutable laws, all provide constitutive cat-
egories. Martin Price has pointed out that "manners ' ••• for Jane ..Auaten 
are the field in which the moral self is revealed and defined." 96 
George Eliot has several such fields. Thus the contrasting attitudes 
Gwendolen holds towards the family home at Offendene reveal that she has 
grown morally and integrated herself to the past. I have already quoted 
the authorial regret, at the beginning of the novel, that she is not so 
established, but after she has been scathed by her marriage to Grand-
court, she thinks wistfully of Offendene as a weloome haven and no long-
er as a place of imprisoning dullness. 
••• 
She saw the grey shoulders of the downs, the cattle-specked fields, 
the shadow,y plantations with rutted lanes where the barked 
timber lay for a wayside seat, the neatly ... clipped hedges on the 
road from the parsonage to Offendene, the avenue where she was 
gradually discerned from the windows, the hall-door opening, and 
her mother or one of the troublesome sisters coming to meet her. 
All that brief experience of a quiet home 'which had once seemed 
a dullness to be fled from, now came back to her as a restful 
escape, a station where she found the breath of morning and the 
unreproaching voice of birds •••• 97 
Gwendolen's rejection of the stability of her family life and her con-
sequent rejection of the claims of duty contrast strongly with Deronda's 
love of his family home and his search for relationship, identity, and 
duty. (When the book is laid out schematically like this, we can Bee 
wQy George Eliot was angered at suggestions that it might profitably be 
divided.) Similarly, Maggie Tulliver' s sensitive response to other 
people is presented as a foil to Tom's rigidity, although they both have 
a love of the past, a recognition of its value, and a strong sense of 
duty. It is just that Tom's morality partakes of the inflexibility and 
narrowness of his nature. He lacks the compassionate tolerance of his 
sister. 
The morally degenerate characters likewise have their taxonOn:l3". They 
lack the qualities that make up the constitutive categories. Alcharisi 
suffers from remorse but still claims confirmation that she was in the 
right to make a life for herself without considering her father's wishes 
for her. Tito Melema's "first distinct colloquy" 98 points constantly 
to his moral insufficiency when he decides, on purely hedonistic and 
egoistic principles, to continue his comfortable existence in Florence 
and not seek out his adoptive father. Some oharactersare inevitably 
more highlighted than others. Alcharisi's role is purely functional: 
to conceal from and eventually to reveal to Deronda, the faots of his 
birth. \Vbat she is and how she becomes what she is, are of no import-
ance to the development of the plot so that she can be charaoterised 
and taxonOmically placed quite briefly by her insistence on her own 
rights. Tito Melema, on the other hand, is important in himself, not 
just functionally. Accordingly, we have the laying out of the stages 
of his moral decline by means of a technique George Eliot adapted from 
the assumptions of the theory of psychological determinism. 
The categories are not necessarily discrete. This is especially 
apparent when we look at the characters at the far end of the moral axis, 
the egoists. They tend to fall short on all the moral counts, disclaiming 
all duty, lacking in sympathy, believing in chance and the efficacies 
of gambling, and totally misconstruing each other's motives. The "speck 
of self" 99 George Eliot mentions in Middlemarch effectively blots out 
the rest of the world and they respond only in accordance with their own 
claims. Rosamond Viney's neutrally expressed question to Lydgate after 
he has attempted to win her co-operation in their money troubles, is 
symptomatic of such egoists. "'What can !. do, !'erlius?'" 100 she asks. 
Her self-protecting mask is shattered only once by the angry disdain of 
Will Ladislaw, and this makes it easier for her to respond to Dorothea t s 
goodness. But otherwise she remains the same: exquisite, shallow and 
egoistic. Other egoists are redeemed in George Eliot's eyes b,y remorse. 
Arthur Donnithorne does his penance outside the covers of the book, 
~ Bede, but Gwendolen Harleth who has much in common with Rosamond 
suffers before our eyes and, like Esther Lyon, is only redee~ed by the 
impact of a larger character on her narrow selfishness. 
The signalling devices nudge the reader in the right direction, re-
fine his moral awareness, and prevent him from giving his sympathy or 
attention to the wrong character. In an earlier novel, The !ill. ~ ~ 
Floss, George Eliot emphasises Tom Tulliver's rigidity at the expense of 
his morally laudable qualities: his acceptance oft duty and his strong 
relationship with his past. Accordingly, few readers grant him the sym-
pathy they give t 0- Maggie. Both Tom and Maggie , however, were meant to 
illustrate the problem one generation has with another. The messages 
with regard to Tom were not clearly enough expressed. George Eliot re-
gretted the withdrawal of the reader's sympathy from Tom; she would 
have been outraged that any reader could feel sympathy with Grandcourt, 
whose behaviour towards Gwendolen has been seen as entirely appropriate 
for upper middle class society where there is a skittish wife to be 
brought under control. George Eliot's insistence that Grandcourt is 
evil has been deplored. This shows us that we need to be on our guard 
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in case George Eliot's directions to the reader by way of these en-
coded messages prevent us from exercising our own judgement in the case. 
With such morally reprehensible characters as Tito Melema and Henleigh 
Grandcourt, we need to be alert for George Eliot's cues and reserve our 
own judgement. I have already indicated with regard to Romola how we 
are led to accept that the heroine is in the right in her assessment of 
her husband's character because we have been previously informed of his 
baseness to his father, which she is ignorant of. She justifiably feels 
betrayed at Tito's sale of her father's library and in her anger, she 
turns on him and accuses him of betraying someone else. She does this 
on the flimsiest of evidence. She has felt that he is concealing from 
her his true motives in wearing the defensive armour and she has seen 
Piero di Cosimo' s painting of a Tito blanched with fear and clutched by 
an escaping prisoner, whose connection with her husband she has no way 
of knowing. We accept that she should thus accuse him on such scant 
evidence because we alreadJr know of his relationship to Baldasarre. We 
forget to allow for the fact that we are seeing him through Romola t s un-
flinching gaze. The rigidity of her moral integr~ty is partly what de-
stroys him. He is understandably repelled by the harshness of her judge-
ment and their relationship is permanently damaged. If George Eliot had 
intended him to be redeemed by Romola's larger nature, he would have 
been brought to confess openly his misdemeanours. 
In the same way we see Grandcourt often through Gwendolen's eyes and 
accept, as a result, that he is as cruel as she makes him out to be. Be-
cause she is scared of him, we accuse him of sadism. We do, however, know 
that he likes to exert power (as we see very graphically in the scene 
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with his dogs 101),. and we are told that he would make an excellent gov-
102 
ernor of a colony, .... and that he expects .toassert his own will in his 
marriage. He has also had a passionate affair with another man's wife, 
which has produced several children, and although his feeling t~lards her 
has died down he still maintains contact with her and supports her fin-
ancially. He is bored and obnoxious, but because Gwendolen hates him 
this does not make him evil. Gwendolen has not fulfilled her side of the 
marriage contract. She has married him without love, which he knows full 
well, and has no understanding of the duties she has undertaken as a 
wife. What makes us accept Gwendolents conception of him is the general 
disapproval meted out to him by means of the encoded messages. He is not 
left to stand on his own merits or demerits and we are not allowed a 
free assessment of him. It is not that George Eliot appeals to our better 
judgement in order that we may judge him more kindly than we feel dis-
posed to do. And Gwendolen's growth does not require her to see her hus-
band compassionately as Dorothea's does. This is one of the reasons why 
Mr Casaubon is treated so generously and the pathos of his situation 
is brought to our attention. George Eliot pontificates against Grand-
court and leaves us with a picture of unmitigated evil. Gwendolen fears 
Grandcourt i but even more, she fears her own violent instincts which are 
strongly aroused now that, after a lifetime of p~tty tyranny over her 
mother and sisters, she is trapped by a stronger will than her own. This 
does not automatically make Grandcourt vicious. Intransigence often 
calls forth murderous rage. Lydgate could easily have taken Rosamond's 
white throat and throttled her and Gwendolen has to throwaway the key 
of the box which contains the stiletto knife. But the murderous rage 
belongs to the person who feels it. The one who has inspired it may be 
innocuous. In the case of Tito and Grandcourt, I feel that we are asked 
to accept rather too much on hearsay. The master illusionist is dis-
tracting us while the real events are enacted elsewhere. 
What this means in terms of the novels is that, as Quentin Anderson 
says, no George Eliot character is "enfranchised ll in the way that don 
Quixote or Julian Sorel is. "The very fineness and clarity of George 
Eliot' s vision, extending to the edge of her canvas, II he claims, "quite 
preclude her granting to her characters the favour of existence. II 103 
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Fineness and olarity still exercise oontrol, no matter how admirable they 
may be in their own right. This is a different problem in a novel to 
that of point of view and the post-Jamesian rejection of the involved 
author. George Eliot is an omniscient author modifying and guiding the 
response of her readers, sometimes directly by means of explicit appeals 
to them and sometimes less directly by a sort of emotional blackmail. 
~or example, when she has shown us Tom Tulliverts intransigence towards 
Maggie, she steps in to prevent our adopting too "severe" a j~dgement 
of his character. 'Tom, like every one of us," she informs us, "was 
imprisoned within the limits of his own nature •••• If you are ~clined 
to be severe on his severity, remember that the responsibility of toler-
ance lies with those who have the wider vision." 1 ali- This leaves us 
little alternative; to persist in severity is to declare ourselves of 
lesser vision and so George Eliot directs our judgements by exhortation 
and subtle suasion. 
Such control has been described as the tlauthoritarian monism ~;.~ 
of the fully omniscient mode of narration" andhasbee!l"oontrested;J. 
with the"multifarious relativism" 1 05 of twentieth century modes. It 
106 is inevitably hard for the novel, "the distinct art form of liberalism," 
with its "acknowledgement of the plenitude, diversity and individuality 
of human beings" 107 to absorb such "authoritarian monism. tI We may be 
prepared to accept the authorial directives towards our increased moral 
awareness when they issue from a mind of the quality of George Eliot's. 
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But we may also feel that the subtly enooded messages impose too rigid 
a struoture and prevent the oharaoters from manifesting their "plenitude, 
diversity and individuality." W. J. Harvey olaimsthat the noveliat, lias 
he surveys the crowded human soene" ~must II be able to withhold final 
judgement, to suspend his attaohment to a partioular point of view, to 
reconcile disparities, to encompass the multitudinous and oonflioting 
interests, values and assumptions of the world if he is to allow this 
108 full weight within the world of his novel." 
I am maintaining that George Eliot does not always aohieve this sus-
pension of final judgement. This is not to de~ the breadth and oom-
passion of her insight, the eoologioal oomplexity of her presentation of 
the inter-relationship between an individual and his society, nor the 
trenohant iro~ with whioh she treats her morally deluded oharacters. But 
at either end of her moral soale there is a rigidity of presentation. 
And espeoia1ly with the more morally evolved charaoters, the moral absol-
utes take over and we feel that they are being held in too oonstraining 
a grasp_ 
But, as I have indioated, it is not every George Eliot oharacter 
who is locked in this rigid set of co-ordinates. There are ~ char-
act ers in the middle range of her moral scale who are struggling against 
their own impUlses, foroed to endure the consequences of giving in or 
failing to exert the neoessary strength of will. And for them, George 
Eliot herself aoknowledges, a different psyohologioal approaoh is needed. 
She answeredB1aokwood's demurabout~Maggie-Tul1iverby_deo1aring that 
"if the ethios of art do not admit the truthful .presentation of a ohar-
acter essentially noble but liable to great error--error that is anguish 
to its 'own nobleness--then, it seems to me, the ethics of art are too 
109 
narrow, and must be widened to correspond with'a widening psychology./I 
The presentation of such oharacters as Maggie and Lydgate whose errors 
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are tlanguish to ~hei~ own nobleness" belongs to such a widening psych-
110 
ology. They are surrounded with a "penumbra of unrealised possibilities. tI 
And this is not just that they are presented ecologically with their 
relationships to, and their independence on their respective commun-
ities drawn so convincingly. It is more that we sense that it is touch 
and go whether they will betray their own ideals; a little more exertion 
here and a little less pressure there, and things might have been diff-
erent. Maggie might have found the courage to stand up to her redoubtable 
brother; Lydgate might have succeeded in presenting their financial sit-
uation to Rosamond in terms that she could or would have understood. 
These characters are allowed to be more convincingly and roundly human. 
Gwendolen H~leth is another such, except that with her we are in doubt 
as to the permanence of her moral redemption once Deronda' s constraining 
presence is withdrawn. There is an unpredictability about these char-
acters. The encoded messages still place them but the presentation of 
thei±' moral struggles is more flexible and we sense that they confront 
a wider range of possibilities. The morally very good and very bad of 
George Eliot t s characters are tlresultants, il in Lewes t terminology; these 
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middle range characters are "emergents" and, as a result, they them-
selves take on a greater humanity and a greater vividness. There is 
greater roOm in their portrayal for George Eliot.' s binocular vision. In 
an earlier chapter I have already indicated the withdrawal of irony 
from the morally evolved characters. But with characters like Maggie 
or Gwendolen/or Lydgate, George Eliot can regard their foibles and 
their moral struggles with irony at the same time as she is surround-
ing them with her compassion. 
The satisfaction we feel at her presentation of her erring char-
acters and the dissatisfaction aroused by her very good or very bad 
characters fit an Aristotelian definition of character and its re-
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lationship to tragedy. We are examining those characters who can be said 
to suffer from hamartia. They show a fatal flaw and we can concede that 
their stories are tragic. There is a sense of waste surrounding 
Lydgate t s realisation that he will not be able, after all, to contribute 
, 
significantly to medical progress. There is great pathos in lmggie s 
desperate struggle with the more passionate side of her nature and in 
her final oomprehension of the true meaning of renunoiation. George 
Eliot tells us that "it is [!h~ very perception that the thing we re-
nounce is precious, is something never to be compensated to us, which 
constitutes the beauty and heroism of renunciation. II 112 There is great 
tenderness in the final portrait of Gwendolen's suffering, in her 
attempts to disoard her egoistic clinging to Deronda and rejOice at his 
happiness. It is these situations that survive a reading of the novels, 
not whether Tito and Grandcourt get the deaths they deserve. 
George Eliot' s own expressed goal in writing her novels was to win 
our sympathy for t'struggling, erring human creatures. It 113 In~vitably 
our sympathies are more engaged with oharaoters who are It wrestling, It 114 
like Maggie Tulliver, with themselves and unyielding environments,-;thl1n 
when we are oOnfronted with the downfall of the unjust or the elevation 
of the just. And so we appreciate George Eliot's powers more fully when 
she oeases to direot us so foroibly. 
I have concentrated on the implioations of George Eliot's moral and 
psychological position in order to show that it constitutes a rigid set 
of co-ordinates and provides a more or les8 distorting model for her 
more extreme oharaoters. The edges of this moral frame are the problem. 
Against its lower boundaries, lesser oharacters, Tito Melema and 
Grandcourt, for example, are bruised. They are made to endure a form of 
poetic justice sadly out of keeping for a realistic novel. 115 Against 
its upper frame there is a limitation of possibilities. Characters like 
Romola, Dorothea Brooke and Deronda, while they appear to have greater 
freedom to act than their fellows, are actually tightly constrained by 
their creator. In her rule-governed universe there is no room for the 
random nor the truly original. But in the welter of existence that 
faces the morally struggling and suffering characters, there is more 
space. Her presentation of the decline or rise of such a oharaoter is 
more three-dimensional. There are. inevitably morepossibilites for 
progress and regression, and greater opportunities for t he exercise of 
irony .. 
2.52. 
If' we accept t he terms of referenoe offered us in the novels, and 
adopt their set-of criteria for evaluating the behaviour of the diff-
erent oharacters, we may not find the loss of freedom too damaging. If, 
on the other hand, we step outside George Eliot' s moral frame, reoognise 
the persuausive force of her encoded messages, and attempt to judge her 
characters apart from her own clearly expressed intentions, we find our-
selves regretting that she held both her characters and the reader in 
such a constraining hand. 
Conclusion .. 
George Eliot's novels hover precariously on the of a mechSn-
iatic universe where every ca.use is scrl...-pulously laic. out and irreversible. 
At the same time, her belief in the possibility of moral development, 
whether of the individual or of therace,requires her to allow some 
measure of freedom, some room to manoeuvre within this harsh, uncom-
promising universe. To soften the impact of an inexorably impersonal 
world, she stresses the importance of fellowship ana. sympathy. Char-
acters are defined in terms of relationship, not of ::,<lentity. Submission 
and resignation are enjoined; individUalism in suspe~t. and becomes implic-
itly identified with egoism and selfishness. The mOX'~.~L absolutism of 
George Eliot t s thought does not permit her t 0 er.f!'!i,n.;,1:~ise either her 
characters or her readers. 
We have completed our "xamination or George Eli'::"" 8 system of be-
liefs and outlined the mora:., and. psychological pre;:;>:.,Jpations she :>hared 
with her oontemporaries. We have seen how she reache(: ;,. compromis.;; be-
tween "necessitarianism II and the ability tlto \'lill ";t.~'}ngly .. " 1 We hay,) 
traced her acceptance of the various psychologioal i:".:.,' :,lJIllptions that 
prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century .. And most ficantly, we 
have defined her value system and her belief in m.o.r;~ progress .. These 
are fundamental ideas that recur not only in her and articles 
but also in the authoria.l comruentary of her novels a. heir scientif'ic 
and litera.ry allusions. And, as we have ~een, they 9.:.50 greatly deter-
mine the ways in which she presents her characters tc us and their 
various responses to the rn:':;,!'al dilemmas cQr.f'rontir:!lem. 
In this analysis of hex'.:ork T Lave ~,'~~':'p~~ed. a tw,)-fold stance .. I have 
identified and isolated :.le" .~deas ar.?:::l :n;5, r elating them con-
stantly to the nov~ls and to the shared mid-oentury moral and psych-
ological discourse~ But I have also endeavoured to provide a means of 
evaluating these ideas in terms of the aotual demands of writing a 
novel: the presentation of oharaoter growth and ohange, the development 
of plot, the interweaving of themes, and the use of aesthetic distanoe 
in the varying perspeotives offered by a oompassionate and an ironio 
narrator. In this way, I have brought out both the strengths and weak-
nesses of George Eliot's system of beliefs when it is applied to the 
I 
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novels. In so far as it requires her to shift her perspective baokwards 
and forwards betwe~n the inexorable laws, (the "hard unaooommodating 
Actual," 2) and the individual, struggling human being, it greatly en-
riohes her novels. But in other ways it militates against their free 
development. Her belief in "universal causality," 3 in the effeot'of 
habit as a strong determinant of oharaoter, and in the transmission of 
inherited tendenoies leads her to impose restraints on the development 
of her oharacters. Her moral stand also provides too rigid a set of 
co-ordinates within whioh the charaoters establish themselves. Flawed 
oharaoters like Gwendolen Harleth and Lydgate have spaoe within this 
system, but the degenerate oharaoters die too oonveniently, and the 
morally elevated charaoters appear to be granted more freedom than is 
indeed the case.·· Their development is oarefully marked out within 
George Eliot's moral absolutism and her hierarohical value system. 
Charaoters and readers are too rigidly controlled within a world which, 
no matter how internally coherent, still offers a ver.y limited range of 
choices. George Eliot's system of beliefs limits the development of her 
oharacters and provides too inflexible a set of parameters. 
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